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ABSTRACT
THE SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL SUBJECT IN SARTRE
AND FOUCAULT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR HEALTHCARE ETHICS

Kimberly S. Engels, BA, MA
Marquette University, 2017
This dissertation explores Jean Paul Sartre’s and Michel Foucault’s view that
subjectivity is socially and historically constituted. Additionally, it explores their
corresponding ethical thought and how these viewpoints can be applied to ethical issues
in the delivery of healthcare. Sartre and Foucault both hold the view that human beings as
subjects are not just participants or spectators in social practices, rather, they become
subjects with ontological possibilities through their interaction with these practices. In
Chapter One, I trace Sartre’s views on subjectivity in his two major works Being and
Nothingness and The Critique of Dialectical Reason, Volume 1, showing how he argues
that we are constituted as subjects through a dialectical interaction of consciously
intended praxis with the reified results of human affairs, or practico-inert. In Chapter
Two, I trace Foucault’s views on the subject through all three periods of his career, and
show how he argues that we are constituted as subjects through systems of thought,
strategies of power, and practices of the self. I specifically differentiate the views of each
philosopher from those of the more traditional moral philosophers Immanuel Kant and
John Stuart Mill, who view the subject as self-determining and ahistorical. In Chapter
Three, I examine each thinker’s later lectures on ethics, and show that each philosopher
presents an outline for an ethical mode of being, which I call “ethical subjectivity.” For
both philosophers, ethical subjectivity requires critical historical reflection, ethics as an
ongoing task, and innovation. In Chapters Four and Five, I use Sartre’s and Foucault’s
views on subjectivity and ethics to analyze two contemporary issues in healthcare ethics:
conscience-based refusals and mandatory HPV vaccination. Through discussion of these
two issues, I show how focusing on the social, historical, material dimensions of how we
become who we are introduces a different starting point for analysis and leads to a unique
discussion in contrast to the ethical approaches rooted in the thought of Kant or Mill.
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Introduction:
Despite being two of the most important thinkers in 20th century France, Sartre
and Foucault are often characterized as having little common ground. However, a close
examination of the two philosophers’ later work reveals that they have many related
insights regarding subjectivity as socially and historically constituted. By subjectivity, I
mean the state of being a conscious subject capable of having beliefs, setting goals,
experiencing emotions, acting intentionally, and possessing a conception of self. The
later Sartre (after 1961) and the later Foucault (after 1969) are both concerned with the
extent to which social, material, and historical conditions introduce a field of
possibilities for thinking, speaking, and acting that individuals then use their freedom to
navigate. Both Sartre and Foucault share the view that we are not merely spectators or
participants in societal practices, institutions, and norms, but that we become subjects
with ontological possibilities through our interactions with social and historical
practices. The subject is not a starting point; rather our subjectivity emerges through
various modes of social and historical interaction. The purpose of this work is a
comparison and application of Sartre’s and Foucault’s views on subjectivity and their
relevance for contemporary ethics, rather than a historical study of the influences of
Sartre on Foucault.
While Sartre is better known for his earlier phenomenological works, it is in the
Critique of Dialectical Reason (CDR)1 that Sartre presents his most convincing account
of human experience and how it is necessarily intertwined with its social and historical

1

Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, Volume 1: Theory of Practical Ensembles,
translated by Alan Sheridan-Smith (New York: Verso, 2004).
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conditions and material environment. Whereas Sartre’s earlier philosophy, particularly
Being and Nothingness (BN)2 describes human subjectivity as constituted by
spontaneous, free consciousness, in CDR human beings are presented as material
organisms that interact in a dialectical relation with their environment and the sociohistorical practices of their time. Sartre stated in an interview shortly before his death
that CDR is the work he would like to be remembered for, suggesting that he retained
this conception of subjectivity for the rest of his life.3 This position is not in
contradiction with Sartre’s earlier view that the subject’s essence is developed through
one’s ability to choose some possibilities over others. The dialectical experience of the
human subject involves negating some options while affirming others. In both Sartre’s
early and late philosophy, human beings are characterized by unconditional freedom, or,
their unique ability to imagine possibilities beyond the current states of affairs. On this
point, there is consistency in all of Sartre’s work.
However, in CDR Sartre recognizes the extent to which these very possibilities
are limited, confined, and structured by human historicity. He argues that we are
constituted as subjects through a dialectical relationship of human “praxis” with the
“practico-inert.” Praxis is defined as purposeful, conscious activity which organizes or
totalizes all the various objects of its environment into a continuous unity when pursuing
certain ends or goals.4 The practico-inert is that with which praxis interacts and is
described as the “traces” of past praxis that have become alienated from the individuals

2

Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, translated by Hazel Barnes (New York: Philosophical
Library, 1956).
3
Michel Contat, “Sartre at 70,” translated by Paul Auster and Lydia Davis,
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1975/aug/07/sartre-at-seventy-an-interview/.
4
Sartre, CDR, 80.
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who initiated them and have solidified into material and social structures. Examples
used by Sartre throughout CDR include social institutions, such as school systems,
prison systems, and labor unions. These solidified structures can also include deeply
ingrained attitudes and ideas that do not rise to the level of intentional, goal-oriented
praxis.5 Subjectivity emerges through a dialectical interaction of individual praxis with
the practico-inert. The subject is still characterized by unconditional freedom, however.
The historical, material, and social realm offer a field of possibilities for thinking,
speaking, and doing, but human subjects are always free to take up an attitude or place
among this field of possibilities. While CDR reveals Sartre’s most convincing account
of subjectivity, there has been little literature developing the full contemporary
significance of his insights in this text.
Foucault’s social thought explores similar issues, studying what he refers to as
three different “axes” of experiences through which subjects become who they are. In
his earlier works such as The Order of Things (OT)6 and The Archaeology of Knowledge
(AK),7 he studies how language and discourses introduce conceptual frameworks
through which subjects differentiate potential objects of knowledge and categories for
determining truth. In his genealogical works such as The History of Sexuality (HS),8 and
Discipline and Punish (DP),9 he articulates how social institutions and practices (related

5

Sartre, CDR, 191-196.
Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York:
Vintage Books, 1994).
7
Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1972).
8
Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, translated by Robert Hurley (New York:
Pantheon 1978).
9
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, translated by Alan Sheridan (New York: Random
House, 1977).
6
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to madness, sexuality, and prisons) introduced strategies for controlling behavior and a
field of possibilities for becoming a subject. Foucault clarifies in later interviews that the
themes he studied in his genealogical works were, ultimately, a study of how human
subjects become who they are through the discourses, behavioral regulations, and
standards for normality established by the social practices of their epoch.10
Foucault’s descriptive analyses argue that our possibilities for subjectivity are
currently governed by an epoch of “biopower.” “Biopower” refers to strategies or
mechanisms of control which developed alongside the discovery of human beings as a
specific species occupying a specific environment. Certain characteristics of human
beings have come to be seen as susceptible to being controlled and manipulated.11
Biopower functions by bringing humans as a species in line with certain medical or
behavioral norms. The norms are established through policies and practices directed at
controlling certain behavior. Normalization acts through imposing homogeneity on
subjects, while at the same time individualizing them. This takes place through
observing human behavior or examining results from medical tests or developments and
mathematizing the findings. The differences between subjects are then measured, and
levels of normality determined. When a “normal” behavior or disease rate is
established, the norms are then enforced through societal mechanisms such as the
appointment of specific personnel, or the development of social institutions that can

10

“What I wanted to try to show was how the subject constituted itself, in one specific form or
another, as a mad or healthy subject, as a delinquent or non-delinquent subject, through
certain practices that were also games of truth, practices of power, and so on,” Foucault,
Essential Works 1: Ethics: Subjectivity, and Truth, edited by Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose
(New York: The New Press, 1997) 290.
11
Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 142.
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observe and regulate behavior.12 Biopower is a mechanism that is rich for philosophical
analysis and contemporary application for three reasons: First, it captures a shift that
occurred in human development when a series of mechanisms were discovered for
controlling human life, which is especially relevant to how medicine is currently
practiced and delivered. Second, biopower is a mechanism that Foucault argues is
currently operative in society and is structuring our possibilities. Third, biopower as a
modern mechanism of power affects the ways that we relate to each other and form
beliefs about ourselves and the world.
Sartre and Foucault also both give an account of ethics that is significantly
different from traditional deontological and utilitarian approaches, both historically and
in the present. Both philosophers provide the conceptual foundations for a model of
ethical subjectivity. By ethical subjectivity, I mean a mode of being-in-the-world
characterized by an ethical orientation and ethical commitments. By ethical orientation, I
mean the framing of ethical reflection and deliberation in terms of certain questions,
attitudes, and background assumptions. Ethical commitment refers to the result of
ethical inquiry that takes the form of concrete principles, maxims, rules, or concepts. 13
An ethics primarily focused on commitments will be eager to make moral judgments
and formulate universal moral maxims. An ethics primarily structured on an orientation,
such as we find in Sartre and Foucault, instead aims to situate our possibilities for ethical
living in the present.

12

Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 181-187.
This metaethical distinction is made by Colin Koopman in his discussion of ethical subjectivity
in Foucault, to be discussed further in Chapter Three. See “The Formation and SelfTransformation of the Subject in Foucault’s Ethics,” in A Companion to Foucault, edited by
Christopher Falzon, Timothy O’Leary, and Jana Sawicki (Chichester: Wiley and Blackwell, 2013),
530.
13
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Both Sartre and Foucault argue that a necessary criterion for humans to be
ethical involves a critical reflection on the forms of conditioning that have structured our
experience of the world, including a recognition of how social practices have
contributed to how we—and others—interpret our possibilities. In the case of Sartre, an
examination of three post-CDR lectures on ethics, Morality and History,14 The Rome
Lecture,15 and A Plea to Intellectuals,16 reveals a prescriptive framework for creating
ourselves as ethical subjects: subjects who are critically reflective, actively empathetic,
and have the courage to produce or invent ourselves in spite of, or even in opposition to,
our past. However, there is a paucity of scholarship on Morality and History and The
Rome Lecture, as they are currently unpublished. Foucault, too, suggests that ethics is a
process of self-transformation requiring refusal, curiosity, and innovation.17 This theme
is present in his late interviews as well as his last lecture series at the Collège de France.
In his lecture series The Hermeneutics of the Subject,18 The Government of Self and
Others (GSO),19 and The Courage of Truth (CT),20 he examines several forms of what

14

Jean-Paul Sartre, Morality and History, excerpts found in Robert Stone and Elizabeth
Bowman, “Sartre’s Morality and History: A First Look at the Notes for the Unpublished 1965
Cornell Lecture Notes,” in Sartre Alive, edited by Ron Aronson and Adrian Van den Hoven
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1991), 53-82.
15
Jean-Paul Sartre, The Rome Lecture Notes, Lecture given at Insituto Gramsci in Rome on May
23, 1964, translated by Elizabeth Bowman and Robert Stone, accessed September 7-20, 2015,
at Bibliothèque nationale de Paris, France.
16
Jean Paul Sartre, A Plea for Intellectuals, in Between Marxism and Existentialism, translated
by John Matthews (London: Verso, 1974), 228-285.
17
Michel Foucault, “Power, Moral Values, and the Intellectual,” interview by Michael Bess,
History of the Present 4 (1988), 13.
18
Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Lectures at the Collège de France, 19811982, translated by Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
19
Michel Foucault, The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France, 19821983, translated by Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
20
Michel Foucault, The Courage of Truth: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1983-1984,
translated by Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
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he calls the practices of the subject. Through his discussion of historical practices of
care of the self in the Hellenistic period as well as parrhesia or truth-telling in Ancient
Greek and Roman life, Foucault opens a window into how ethics functioned historically
in relation to the truth and as a practice of caring for self and others. However, in the
literature there has been little development of what truth-telling as a philosophical way
of life and care of self would mean for us today, in our current epoch of biopower.
While Sartre’s and Foucault’s views on subjectivity and ethics can add depth and
perspective to debates about different ethical practices of our time, their views are
especially useful for healthcare ethics. Healthcare as a profession is directly concerned
with individuals’ physical health, flourishing, and well-being. It also deals with
foundational human issues related to the beginning and end of life. Thus, individuals’
frameworks for thinking, speaking, and acting, their beliefs about themselves and the
world, and their relationships with others play an integral role in the delivery and
practice of medicine. For example, moral and religious beliefs about when life begins or
under what circumstances it should end affect how healthcare providers approach their
jobs and affect the treatments that patients’ choose. Similarly, experiences such as
pregnancy and childbirth, and undergoing treatment for a serious disease have profound
influences on individuals and their possibilities. Consequently, healthcare practices are
distinctly subject-forming experiences. Thus, Sartre’s and Foucault’s views on
subjectivity and ethics can add insight and depth to conversations in healthcare ethics by
introducing perspectives that are not currently present in mainstream healthcare ethics
literature.

8

Current approaches to applied healthcare ethics are primarily deontological or
utilitarian approaches rooted in the thought of Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill, and
these approaches are often extrapolated into a rights-based framework. Utilitarian and
deontological approaches often assume a liberal conception of subjectivity. Moral and
political liberalism is the view that individuals should have the basic right to live as they
choose and to determine their own ends, so long as they respect that right in others.21
The subject of moral and political liberalism is characterized as primarily selfdetermining and ahistorical. This conception is founded on the belief that human beings
are autonomous, rational, and capable of self-governance, and that their possibilities are
a combination of a universal human nature and their own autonomous control. For
example, Kant posits the idea of an ahistorical “noumenal self” that exists outside of the
empirical world, which is capable of making objective rational judgments and possesses
a robust sense of autonomy.22 Mill presents a view of human nature in which human
essence is defined by its rationality and a capacity to lead self-directed, autonomous
lives that are free from interference from the state, culture, and custom. Mill argues that
human capacities are fully actualized when they make our own decisions free from
interference from others.23 For Mill, like Kant, the subject exists prior to being
potentially interfered with or left alone.

21

See John Christman, The Politics of Persons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 2;
Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) 12.
22
Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, edited and translated by Paul Guyer and Allen
Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 530-537.
23
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, edited by Elizabeth Rapaport (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, 1972), 56-66.
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In accordance with his view of human nature, Kant introduces a moral
framework based on acting in a manner that is universalizable and that acknowledges
the inherent worth of each rational human being.24 Mill’s moral system is based on the
consequences that produce the most happiness for the most people. Because Mill
ascribes to a view of subjectivity in which human nature flourishes best when free from
constraints, he advocates for introducing societal rules which protect an individual from
interference from others. These rules will, in Mill’s view, lead to the greatest good for
the greatest number.25 Kant’s and Mill’s moral frameworks are often extrapolated into a
system of moral rights in which certain protections are introduced in order to protect the
rights holder. While in a Kantian framework, rights are introduced to protect the
inherent dignity of each person, in a Millian utilitarian framework, rights are introduced
as instrumental for producing human happiness or wellbeing.
Because healthcare ethics approaches often presuppose the liberal conception of
subjectivity, the discussions primarily focus on balancing the moral rights of patients
and providers as well as balancing concern for each individual against the welfare of the
population as a whole. While these philosophical discussions focus on an important
dimension of the ethics of the delivery of medicine, they do not emphasize the subjectforming dimension of healthcare practices. There is no development of how these issues
are existential—how they are shaping the field of possibilities for us, as subjects. I
choose two ethical issues that are currently being debated in healthcare ethics:
conscience-based refusals and mandatory HPV vaccination. Conscience-based refusals

24

Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by James Ellington
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), 30.
25
John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, edited by George Sher (Hackett: Indianapolis, 2001), 53.
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refers to a healthcare provider refusing to perform a task or provide a service because
doing so would conflict with personal moral or religious beliefs.26 This is currently an
area of debate in the delivery of medicine and in the philosophical healthcare ethics
literature. Regarding mandatory vaccination, the HPV vaccine is an interesting case. It
became available in 2006 and the debate about whether or not it should be mandatory is
still ongoing.27 The vaccine introduces a different set of concerns compared to routine
vaccines because the disease is spread sexually not casually, and the vaccine is given in
adolescence, not infancy. The contribution of Applied Ethics literature to consciencebased refusals and mandatory vaccination have typically consisted of general analyses
that attempt to balance competing rights of liberal subjects. Such approaches miss what I
want to emphasize: how these practices contribute to the shaping of socio-historical
conditions through which humans as subjects emerge and modify the possibilities we
have as subjects for what we think, speak, and do. Thus, evaluating these practices
through the lens of Sartre’s and Foucault’s views on subjectivity and ethics can add an
important and currently absent voice to the debate.
The objectives of the following dissertation, then, are as follows: First, I intend
to articulate the cogency of Sartre’s and Foucault’s views on social and historical
subjectivity, differentiating them from the views of Kant and Mill, and emphasizing
their contemporary relevance. Second, I aim to articulate prescriptive frameworks for
self-transformative ethical subjectivity that Sartre and Foucault offer in their late

26

James Childress, “Civil Disobedience, Conscientious Objection, and Evasive Non-compliance:
A Framework for the Assessment of Illegal Actions in Healthcare,” Journal of Medicine and
Philosophy 10 (1985): 68.
27
Center for Disease Control and Prevention, “HPV Vaccine: Questions and Answers,” accessed
January 5, 2017, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vpd-vac/hpv/vac-faqs.htm.
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lectures and strengthen them through my own insights, emphasizing how these
approaches are unique compared to traditional deontological and utilitarian approaches
to ethics. Third, through a critical analysis of conscience-based refusals and HPV
vaccination, I seek to demonstrate both the relevance and cogency of their views for
contemporary discussion in healthcare ethics. This analysis will explore how these
practices are conditioning our existential possibilities and our emergence as subjects in
our social and historical context. Lastly, I construct ethical responses to these issues
from a Sartrean or Foucauldian framework. It is important to note that my project is an
exploration of subjectivity and ethics in each thinker, and what this can contribute to our
current understanding of ourselves and our healthcare practices. My project is not a
historical study of the influence of Sartre on Foucault.
In Chapter One, I will present an examination of Sartre’s views on subjectivity
and freedom in both BN and CDR. By providing a clear conception of Sartre’s view of
social and historical subjectivity in CDR, I demonstrate the progression and
improvement of Sartre’s thought from BN. In particular, I show that, in CDR, Sartre
fully develops the extent to which the possibilities one can imagine are conditioned by
social practices, discourses, and conceptual frameworks of one’s time. CDR recognizes
that our unconditional freedom is necessarily limited by our historicity and social
practices.28 I will show that Sartre still maintains his earlier assertion from BN that the
individuals experience the world by affirming certain possibilities and negating others,
but he recognizes that the possibilities which we envision for ourselves are necessarily a
product of our culture, society, and practico-inert structures. Thus, Sartre has not
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abandoned his prior claim that existence precedes essence, but now emphasizes that the
practico-inert precedes our existence.29 Through my close reading of CDR, I examine
the different “layers” of the social and historical conditioning that Sartre argues shape
our field of possibilities: physical objects imprinted with human meaning, language,
deeply engrained ideas, social institutions, class, and societally specific moral norms. I
show how these layers both limit and enable our freedom, as our freedom operates in
response to them. I then contrast Sartre’s view of subjectivity and freedom with that of
Kant, in order to show the uniqueness of Sartre’s views and set up the discussion of
ethics in Chapter Three.
In Chapter Two, I examine Foucault’s vision of subjectivity, showing that
Foucault, like Sartre, examines specific discourses and social practices and shows that
they have a historically dated origin and change over time. These social and historical
practices make modes of thinking, speaking, and acting possible. I elucidate three
different axes in Foucault’s work: the axis of things, the axis of behaviors, and the axis
of practices of the self.30 In his works on the axis of things, for example in The Order
of Things, his interest was the lived experiences of subjects in different historical periods
that were influenced by the creation of bodies of knowledge. This period focused on
uncovering different standards for truth, that is to say, the rules governing speaking and
acting that determine what is accepted as true. In the second axis focused on behavior,
for example in Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality, Foucault focuses on
how conduct was controlled, observed, and classified in order to establish different
categories of normality and abnormality. Foucault refers to these systems of controls as
29
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“strategies of power.”31 Foucault’s third axis studies modes of being a subject or
practices of the self. This refers to ways that subjects perform practices on themselves
in order to become a certain type of subject. I then focus on biopower in particular, as
Foucault argues that biopower has dominated Western thinking and life processes for the
past several centuries. The introduction of biopower was an important moment in our
recent historical past. I show that according to Foucault, there is room for freedom in his
thought, and this freedom takes the form of resistance and critical reflection. I then
compare Foucault’s views on subjectivity to the views of John Stuart Mill, in order to
show the uniqueness of Foucault’s view over the liberal conception, as well as to set up
the contrast in Chapter Three with respect to ethics. Because Foucault elucidates his
philosophical views by examining particular historical practices in their specificity, the
best way to compare and contrast Foucault’s views with another thinker’s is through
application to a specific example. Thus, I use the example of the modern War on Drugs
in the United States to illustrate the differences between Foucault and Mill.
In Chapter Three, I articulate the important differences between Sartre’s and
Foucault’s views on subjectivity. I then examine each thinker’s lectures on ethics,
showing how their ethical views flow from their visions of the subject. I develop a
model for a historically-situated, intersubjective, transformative mode of being, which I
call “ethical subjectivity,” in each thinker. For Sartre, this consists of a critically
reflective, actively empathetic moral subjectivity which includes the moral courage to
creatively direct one’s freedom. This is accompanied by ethical commitments to
mutually recognizing each other’s freedom and to meeting human needs. For Foucault,
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ethical subjectivity involves a refusal of inevitabilities, a critical inquiry into ourselves
in our historical moment, and a general orientation towards self-transformation. I
develop what ethical commitments to care of self and the philosophical way of life could
mean for us today in our epoch of biopower, acknowledging that Foucault himself does
not explicitly advocate for these commitments. My analysis shows that both Sartre and
Foucault provide us with the foundational concepts for a model of ethical self-creation
as engaged historical agents in our own epoch. This discussion will set up a
demonstration of how Sartre’s and Foucault’s approaches to ethics provide a
significantly different model in comparison to ethics as presented in the thought of Kant
and Mill.
In Chapter Four, I examine conscience-based refusals in healthcare through a
Sartrean lens. I use the Sartrean views on subjectivity that I develop in Chapter One to
show that conscience-based refusals are subject-forming and shape the praxis of patients
and providers. I then use the ethical subjectivity model that I develop in Chapter Three
in order to formulate an ethical response from a Sartrean viewpoint. I make a case for
what Sartrean ethical subjectivity demands of individual healthcare providers and I show
how a Sartrean analysis should be applied at the level of policy. Drawing on Sartre’s
vision of social, historical, and materially situated subjectivity, along with the model of
ethical being-in-the-world I develop in Chapter Three, I show how conscience-based
refusals shape the possibilities of both providers and patients, and how this should affect
our moral approach. I explain why none of the current approaches in the Applied Ethics
literature, which discuss conscience-based refusals primarily in the context of competing
moral claims to liberty, are properly accounting for the subject-forming dimension of
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conscience-based refusals. I emphasize the differences in my approach to those rooted in
the deontological or utilitarian thought of Kant or Mill, respectively.
In Chapter Five, I analyze mandatory HPV vaccination through the Foucauldian
framework I construct in Chapters Two and Three. I show why none of the current
philosophical approaches in the Applied Ethics literature are properly accounting for the
subject-forming dimension of HPV vaccination and how this should influence our
response. I argue that the HPV vaccine and its administration are particularly subjectforming because of the link to adolescent sexuality. I examine the HPV vaccine as a
mechanism of biopower. I show that this practice shapes the possibilities for youth who
are targeted to receive the vaccine and for their parents who must make the decision
whether or not to vaccinate. I argue that the issue of mandatory HPV vaccination is not
only a debate between parental autonomy weighed against the benefits to the population
as a whole. Possibilities for subjectivity, new strategies of power, and new categories for
normality and abnormality emerge alongside this medical procedure and mechanisms for
implementing it. To elucidate this point, I discuss Foucault’s analysis of the
administration of the smallpox vaccine in 18th-19th century Europe and the new concepts
and categories for normality that emerged alongside it. I then use the Foucauldian ethical
subjectivity model from Chapter Three to suggest how this analysis should influence our
moral approach. I again emphasize how the analysis I offer is unique from traditional
approaches that are rooted in the thought of Kant or Mill.
I conclude by highlighting the key points of my analyses, as well as making
suggestions for how Sartre’s and Foucault’s views on subjectivity and ethics can
continue to be applied in discussions of contemporary moral problems, especially in
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healthcare. Overall, the significance of my project is fourfold. First, given that Sartre’s
Morality and History and The Rome Lecture are unpublished, there is a paucity of
scholarship on them. There is very little development of Sartre’s later ethics in the
applied ethics literature. Second, Foucault’s late lectures at the Collège de France The
Government of Self and Others and The Courage of Truth have only been recently
published in French in 2008 and translated into English in 2010 and 2011, respectively.
My project is one of the few offering a reading of them on ethics, and there has been
very little development of these lectures in approaches to applied ethics. Third, there is
currently no scholarship studying the connections between Sartre’s lectures on ethics
and Foucault’s last lecture series. Fourth, the ethical issues that I have chosen to evaluate
through Sartrean and Foucauldian frameworks have primarily been discussed in terms of
balancing the rights of the liberal subject, while my approach will emphasize how we
are becoming subjects through these practices. As a result, my dissertation will make a
contribution in four ways: the historical scholarship on Sartre and Foucault, a
comparison between them, a demonstration of the cogency of their views through
contemporary application, and, through all of these, an innovative philosophical
contribution to healthcare ethics.
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Chapter One: Sartre and our Historical, Material, Social Possibilities: The Subject
as Spiral and the Practico-Inert

Introduction:
Jean-Paul Sartre’s philosophical work focuses on giving a rich account of the
experience of individuals in the world. Throughout both of his major works Being and
Nothingness (BN)32 and The Critique of Dialectical Reason Volume 1 (CDR),33 he
presents a conception of subjectivity as socially and historically constituted. By
subjectivity, I mean the state of being a conscious subject capable of having beliefs,
setting goals, experiencing emotions, acting intentionally, and possessing a conception
of self. Sartre’s view that history and sociality condition the possibilities for subjectivity
are rooted in his conceptions of the For-itself and In-itself in BN, and progress to his
notions of praxis and the practico-inert in CDR. CDR fully develops the influence of
historicity, materiality, and sociality on human subject formation. Additionally, it shows
how this influence is incorporated into our existential choice of self, which Sartre calls
“project.”
By historicity, I mean that human subjectivity necessarily has a historical origin
so that people interpret experience within a historically given framework of material
objects, concepts, social practices, norms and shared values. In BN Sartre gives an
abstract account of the relationship between consciousness (For-itself) and matter (Initself), in which consciousness relates to matter through a process of differentiation and
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negation. In CDR he gives a more concrete description of the individual within history
and the material world.34 In this text the relationship between human consciousness
(praxis) and worked matter (practico-inert) is characterized by mediation. Human
subjectivity is presented as a dialectical spiral that is deeply influenced by the historical
past, the current material environment, social institutions, and relationships with
others.35
While Sartre explores a multitude of philosophical themes in his account of
human experience, he is most known for his views on human freedom. His theory of
freedom argues that freedom is an originary ontological characteristic of human
consciousness. In BN, he is known for his claim that human consciousness is
spontaneously, radically free, due to its ability to question and doubt, therefore
“negating” the given.36 In CDR, Sartre qualifies his viewpoint of freedom through a
new focus on the historical and the material, that is to say, the practico-inert. While
human consciousness is free, the practico-inert thoroughly conditions and limits our
possibilities for thinking, speaking, and acting. Thus, the vision of freedom that Sartre
offers in CDR is much more limited and conditioned. In this text, freedom takes the
form of practical choice, resistance, and imagination.
This change in Sartre’s views of freedom has to do with his transition from the
In-itself to the practico-inert as the realm encapsulating the material environment with
which we interact. The practico-inert introduces a relationship of mediation rather than
negation, in which worked matter is absorbed into the project, not negated. It introduces
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a realm of passivity into our subjectivity, while in BN the For-itself is characterized by
its intentional activity. The practico-inert also has interests or demands of its own that
counteract our praxis and make it difficult to achieve our intended goals. Additionally,
the practico-inert has modes of social interaction and thinking embedded within it,
which Sartre refers to as “seriality.”37 These modes of thinking and interacting are
characterized by a lack of conscious reflection and by feelings of alienation. These
layers of the practico-inert pout significant restrictions on our freedom.38
Sartre’s vision of a free subject with historically, socially, and materially
constituted possibilities is a direct challenge to accounts which consider the subject
primarily as self-determining and ahistorical. This includes the conception of
subjectivity in traditional liberal approaches to ethical and political theory. Moral and
political liberalism is the view that individuals should have the basic right to live as they
choose and determine their own ends, so long as they respect that right in others. This
conception is founded on the belief that human beings are autonomous, rational, and
capable of self-governance, and that their possibilities are a combination of a universal
human nature and their own autonomous control.39 One philosopher who held this view
of human nature was Immanuel Kant. In order to set the stage for discussing the
normative implications of Sartre’s thought and how it differs from deontological ethical
approaches in Chapter Three, I will contrast important characteristics of Sartre’s view
with Kant’s. Kant introduces the concept of an ahistorical “noumenal self” that exists
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outside of the empirical world, which is capable of making objective rational judgments
and possesses a robust sense of autonomy. He also views our possibilities for
subjectivity as constructed by external, pregiven, universal laws and meanings.
Freedom for Kant is characterized by human’s ability to obey or disobey the objective
moral law. This is a significant contrast to Sartre, who views freedom as a complex
interplay of our conscious behavior and thoughts with the conditioning forces of our
historical epoch.
Thus, this Chapter has four objectives: 1) to explicate Sartre’s conception of
subjectivity, beginning with his concepts of the For-itself and In-itself, and showing how
these concepts evolve to praxis and the practico-inert. This will demonstrate how the
shift to from In-itself to the practico-inert is of significant philosophical importance for
Sartre’s view of subjectivity, 2) to show how history, materiality, and sociality within
our given situation shape our possibilities for subjectivity, as elucidated in BN and CDR,
3) to explain the important role of freedom in Sartre’s thought and the place it occupies
in both BN and CDR, including the modifications it undergoes, and 4) to contrast the
important characteristics of Sartre’s view of subjectivity with Kant’s in order to show
the uniqueness of Sartre’s position and set up the discussion of the ethical implications
of his thought in Chapter Three. Because I cannot provide a detailed overview of the
entirety of Sartre’s corpus, I will focus my discussion in each section on the specified
themes.

21

1

Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason: Current Literature

Important current work on Sartre’s CDR comes from Joseph Catalano,40
Anthony Manser,41 Kenneth Anderson,42 Thomas Flynn,43 and Thomas Busch.44
Catalano’s detailed commentary was the first major work on CDR. Catalano provides
important clarifying exposition regarding Sartre’s method and philosophical views in
CDR, offering exceptional explanatory work on points on which Sartre himself was less
than clear. Catalano argues that Sartre attempts one of the most philosophically needed
tasks of our time—an analysis of the historical significance of the mundane, showing
how individuals sustain a historical context even in our most ordinary daily actions.45
Catalano argues that through an examination of specific historical events, Sartre’s thesis
in the text is that we can never separate the historical and material situation of the human
questioner from philosophical investigations. Catalano provides thorough explanation
and examples of all the important concepts in CDR, including the practico-inert. He
additionally emphasizes how, for Sartre, our personality and identity are formed in
response to the praxis of others and to practico-inert structures.46 My project is different
from Catalano’s to the extent that I will, first, focus on the connections between CDR
and Sartre’s earlier BN, second, discuss in detail the different categories or layers of the
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practico-inert that are evident throughout CDR, and, third, will emphasize the role of the
concept of practico-inert in Sartre’s ethical views.
Anthony Manser traces the development of Sartre’s thought throughout all of his
major works. Manser argues that Sartre’s early focus was on the choices of individuals,
portrayed as detached from their social surroundings, while his later focus reflected a
growing awareness of the influence of social, political, historical circumstances on
humans’ ability to choose. Manser emphasizes that CDR focuses on the dialectical
relationship between individual experience and history, and how this affects our
philosophical approach.47 Manser traces Sartre’s thought through all of his major works,
including his novels and plays, to show the shift from the strong focus on individual
consciousness to Sartre’s later focus on how social, historical, and material factors lead
people to think, speak, and act the way they do. Thus, while Manser presents a
monumental work, the attention paid to Sartre’s lengthy CDR is rather brief, as is his
discussion of the practico-inert, which is wedged in between discussion of all of Sartre’s
other works in his massive corpus.
Kenneth Anderson presents a strong analysis of Sartre’s view on subjectivity in
CDR. Anderson argues that there are three conceptions of subjectivity present
throughout the text, although Sartre does not refer to them this way: the organic subject,
the serial subject, and the common subject. Anderson argues that the organic subject, the
most basic level of subjectivity, forms in response to need or lack. The pure physical
needs of human subjects present an initial tension with our material environment, and
we direct our individual praxis to resolves this tension by modifying the environment to
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meet our needs. This interaction constitutes organic subjectivity. Next, Anderson
introduces serial subjectivity, which forms through the mediation of the practico-inert.
Through interaction with others in the practico-inert field, subjects form as atomistic
individuals, isolated from and in antagonistic opposition to others. The last type of
subjectivity is common subjectivity, which occurs when individuals unite around
common goals, allowing unifying group praxis in which subjects are no longer alienated
from one another.48 Anderson’s work is unique because he succinctly identifies different
modes of subjectivity in Sartre’s text, especially in relation to social interaction. My
project is not in tension with Anderson’s findings, but will focus more on clarifying
Sartre’s concept of practico-inert, drawing connections between the practico-inert and
Sartre’s earlier conception of In-itself, explaining Sartre’s changing views on freedom,
and making connections to ethics.
Thomas Flynn and Thomas Busch both provide works on CDR that discuss the
link between the In-itself and the practico-inert. In Flynn’s Sartre and Marxist
Existentialism, he argues that there is continuity between Sartre’s early existentialist
social thought and his later post-Marxist views. Flynn argues that Sartre’s later works
retain a place for the traditional existentialist values of individual freedom and
responsibility within a historical understanding of structural exploitation and class
struggle. He argues that a robust notion of responsibility unites these two philosophical
periods. In Flynn’s view, Sartre’s earlier focus on a strong sense of individual
responsibility evolves in CDR, through a focus on social collectives, into a strong sense
of collective responsibility for making social change.49 Flynn’s book was also the first,
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(and currently one of the only) works to provide a comprehensive analysis of the
concept of the practico-inert.50 Flynn shows that the focus on freedom and
responsibility in Sartre’s earlier writings is supplemented and improved by his
introduction of the practico-inert. I will draw on Flynn’s exposition of the practico-inert
as appropriate.
Busch, for his part, traces the changes in Sartre’s thought from his earlier to later
works, and also identifies a unifying thread—the relationship of individual
consciousness to a given field of historical possibilities. He takes up the relationship
between Sartre’s career-long thesis of the power of free consciousness and Sartre’s later
discovery of the force of circumstances. In other words, Sartre’s later work is influenced
by the realization of how much our social, historical, material circumstances constrain
and limit our conscious experience. Busch convincingly identifies the shift in Sartre’s
thinking from a robust, spontaneous free consciousness to a view of subjectivity that is
socially and historically mediated. Busch argues that Sartre’s growing awareness of
social alienation and solidarity later in his life developed a tension between his earlier
and later thought.51 Busch also provides an in-depth analysis of Sartre’s concept of the
practico-inert and how the overall shift from In-itself to practico-inert accounts for some
of the changes in Sartre’s thought. I will discuss Busch’s work on the practico-inert
alongside Flynn’s throughout my analysis below.
My work will differ from current Sartre literature on CDR in that I, first, make
connections between BN and CDR by detailing the transition in Sartre’s thought from
In-itself to practico-inert and the changes in his view of subjectivity that accompany this
50
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transition. Second, I identify common themes in BN and CDR in terms of the different
layers of social, material, and historical conditioning that shape our field of possibilities.
I show that Sartre gives many similar examples throughout both texts, although with
some modifications. Third, I specifically differentiate Sartre’s vision of the subject from
the liberal conception of the subject rooted in the thought of Kant. Fourth, I specifically
develop the implications of Sartre’s view of subjectivity for ethics. As the purpose of
this Chapter is to provide a close reading of Sartre’s texts in order to clarify his concept
of the practico-inert and the role it plays in his view of subjectivity, my use of secondary
literature throughout the main discussion will be limited. I will draw on the work
completed by others, notably Flynn’s and Busch’s in-depth discussion of the practicoinert, when it will help clarify important points in Sartre’s thought.

2

From For-itself/In-itself to Praxis/Practico-inert

2.1 From Nihilation to Dialectic, Negation to Spiral

To begin, we must set up the basic concepts that Sartre introduces in BN and
trace their evolution in CDR. In BN, Sartre uses the expressions “being In-itself” and
“being For-itself” to refer to objects and consciousness respectively.52 Being In-itself
characterizes objects and matter in the physical world. Examples Sartre uses throughout
the text are an inkwell, a pen, and a glass.53 This category further includes natural
entities such as trees or mountains. These things simply are what they are; they are
objects that cannot willfully change their characteristics. As Sartre says, they are fully
52

Sometimes Sartre refers to these categories as “the In-itself” and “the For-itself” and I will
subsequently refer to them this way.
53
Sartre, BN, 102-103.

26

“positive” being, that is, not free to be anything other than what they are.54 Being Initself “is what it is. It is full positivity. It knows no otherness; it never posits itself as
other-than-another-being. It can support no connection with the other.”55 Being In-itself
is isolated and ontologically inert until it interacts with being For-itself.
Being For-itself characterizes human consciousness. It is “negative” being in the
sense that it can differentiate itself from its environment by understanding what it is not,
and then negatively construct a concept of what it is. Being For-itself can consciously
make choices, have goals and beliefs, experience emotion, and imagine. This category
of being includes only human consciousness.56 Sartre argues that the For-itself, because
it compares itself to what it is not, experiences itself as a lack in the fully positive Initself. Being For-itself is radically different from the In-itself, but it is at the same time
dependent on the In-itself to found its being. “The For-itself corresponds…to an
expanding and de-structuring of the in-itself, and the in-itself is nihilated and absorbed
in its attempt to found itself.”57 In other words, because consciousness is necessarily
consciousness of something, the For-itself needs the In-itself to have the characteristic
“conscious of” and to differentiate itself.
In BN, Sartre argues that people develop as subjects by projecting themselves
toward a future that they want to be. Our subjectivity is based on a choice we make of
ourselves in the world through nihilation of the In-itself, which Sartre refers to as a
human’s “fundamental project.” By fundamental project, Sartre means “the projection
of myself toward an original possibility, which causes the existence of values, appeals,
54
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expectations, and in general a world.”58 Our project refers to a future goal or image we
have of ourselves that we strive to be. We then use this image to structure our beliefs,
memories, actions, and choices into an intelligible totality. Without the human project,
the In-itself has no meaning or value, as nothing is bestowed from the outside.
The choice of fundamental project is made against the backdrop of our situation.
Our situation, or the given, presents us with various possibilities for our actions, goals,
and choices. We then build ourselves by negating, or as Sartre says, “nihilating” some of
those possibilities while affirming others. “Human reality is its own surpassing toward
what it lacks; it surpasses itself toward the particular being which it would be if it were
what it is.”59 Those possibilities that we choose to affirm are influenced by our original
choice of ourselves in the world. It is our original choice of ourselves in the world—our
project—which arranges the world and gives it meaning.60 Our subjectivity emerges
from an ongoing process of interaction with and nihilation of the given. This notion is
behind Sartre’s famous claim that “existence precedes essence.” Our essence or nature
is determined by our choice of project.
While the primary emphasis in the text is human beings’ power of choice, BN
does acknowledge the important social dimension of subject-formation, for example, the
importance of communal meaning. The given is not a blank slate for the For-itself to
write on; it is already imprinted with human meaning. Sartre writes:
[W]e do not first appear to ourselves, to be thrown subsequently into enterprises.
Our being is immediately “in situation”; that is, it arises in enterprises and knows
itself first in so far as it is reflected in those enterprises. We discover ourselves
then in a world peopled with demands, in the heart of projects.61
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Sartre uses the term “facticity,”62 which can be defined as the limits that are imposed on
human beings by their concrete situations. These limits come from the In-itself and our
encounters with other For-itselfs. Our consciousness understands objects by nihilating
them, but they have first been given. In interpreting and nihilating the In-itself, the Foritself is constantly aware of concrete limitations.
Sartre’s early view of freedom is often referred to as “radical freedom” because
he argues that our presence in the world is always characterized by freedom. Freedom is
an unconditional fact of our existence. Even though we are thrown into an already given
situation, we can always use the power of our free consciousness to nihilate some
possibilities and affirm others. “Man does not exist first in order to be free subsequently;
there is no difference between the being of man and his being free.”63 While our
facticity limits us, the ways we choose to interpret and respond to our facticity are free
choices, according to Sartre. Human beings are thus unconditionally free and
unconditionally responsible for their choices.
An important concept in Sartre’s early vision of subjectivity is what he calls “bad
faith” or a state of lying to oneself. Bad faith occurs when the For-itself either denies its
freedom, or denies elements of facticity. Sartre’s famous example of bad faith is that of
a waiter at a café. In one sense he is a waiter, because it is a part of his facticity.
However, he does not exist as waiter in an unchanging, permanent state:
[T]he waiter in the cafe cannot be immediately a café waiter in the sense that this
inkwell is an inkwell or the glass is a glass…it is not that I do not wish to be this
person or that I want this person to be different. But rather there is no common
measure between his being and mine…But if I represent myself as him, I am
not he; I am separated from him as the object from the subject…Yet there is no
62
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doubt that I am in a sense a café waiter—otherwise could I not just as well call
myself a diplomat or a reporter? But if I am one, this cannot be in the mode of
being in-itself. I am a waiter in the mode of being what I am not.64
The waiter exists in bad faith if he considers himself simply a waiter—because his free
consciousness can transcend his situation as a waiter. But he is also in bad faith if he
denies that he is in some way a waiter. It is part of his situation and social role. Bad
faith is possible, according to Sartre, because we always possess some level of
awareness regarding our freedom, even if we deny it. This is a point that will change for
Sartre by the time he writes CDR.
In CDR Sartre introduces different terms to capture roughly the same concepts,
but with some important alterations. The For-itself/In-itself pair is replaced with the
praxis/practico-inert. Praxis generally replaces Sartre’s previous notion of For-itself and
refers to purposive, conscious activity which totalizes (makes intelligible as a whole) all
the various objects and perceptions of its environment into a continuous unity when
pursuing our chosen ends. Praxis is thus not just a process of thinking, imagining, and
differentiating like the For-itself, but involves material interaction with the
environment.65 In BN, Sartre describes the relation of For-itself-In-itself at the level of
ontological nihilation; in CDR he emphasizes the importance of the physical body and
its concrete interaction with the material realm. He claims that our relationship with the
given is a relationship of mediation, not nihilation. What this means is that
consciousness no longer “negates” what is given, rather the given is incorporated and
retained in praxis. Sartre keeps the concept of fundamental project from his earlier work,
but now claims that our project is constructed through a dialectical interaction of praxis
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with reified and institutionalized results of previous human affairs. This includes
manipulated physical matter, language, sociality, culture, and class.
The project is now portrayed as an ongoing totalization, and takes the shape of a
spiral. While the nihilating project was portrayed as a break from positive being, the
spiraling project interiorizes the given. Our projects are ongoing totalizations, in which
our praxis dialectically interacts with history and materiality. A totality is traditionally
understood as an entity that is distinct from its individual parts. A totalization by
contrast, is a totality that is continuously being formed by human activity. The parts and
the whole are being developed simultaneously and can be potentially altered by the
totalizing activity itself:66
I find myself dialectically conditioned by the totalized and totalizing part of the
process of human development: as a ‘cultured’ man I totalize myself on the
basis of centuries of history and, in accordance with my culture, I totalize this
experience. This means that my life itself is centuries old, since the schemata
which permit me to understand, to modify and to totalize my practical
undertakings…have entered the present.67
The “dialectical” aspect of our subjectivity is a product of our conscious decisions and
actions being directly altered by their encounter with the environment and with the
historical past, the traces of which are all around us. These traces are then integrated into
our project. While in BN these environmental conditions are described as layers of the
In-itself and modes of being with and for others, in CDR Sartre refers to them as the
“practico-inert.”
The practico-inert replaces Sartre’s references to In-itself but is a philosophically
distinct category. The practico-inert is more than just physical matter, but an ontological

66
67

Sartre, CDR, 45.
Ibid. 54.

31

realm where past actions influence current praxis. Sartre introduces the term to represent
“alienated praxis and worked inertia.”68As Flynn comments, “the complex term
‘practico-inert’ introduces aspects of being-in-itself into the realm of action.”69 Sartre
refers to the practico-inert as “simply the activity of others insofar as it is sustained and
diverted by inorganic inertia.”70 There is also a constraining factor, as Manser points
out: the practico-inert is “the area in which previous free actions restrict present
behavior.”71 In short, in the words of Flynn, the practico-inert names the “‘worked
matter’ that mediates our social and historical relations even as it preserves the sediment
of past praxes.”72 Unlike the In-itself, the practico-inert contains inertia that allows it to
respond, or act upon current praxis. It is not just a background against which we build
our project, but is incorporated into and preserved in our project. As Sartre says, praxis:
[A]lways arises within an existing society, it is in fact never wholly natural and
as we have seen, is always expressed in techniques and social institutions—
which transform it to the extent that it occurs within them.73
These practices, social conventions, collectively valued objects, and even deeply
ingrained attitudes establish the boundaries of our current praxis and become the
practico-inert.
Sartre emphasizes that the practico-inert is what most forcefully shapes our
possibilities for our projects. He comments:
Subjectivity then appears, in all its abstraction, as the verdict which compels us
to carry out, freely and through ourselves, the sentence that…society has
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pronounced upon us and which defines us a priori in our being. This is the level
at which we shall encounter the practico-inert.74
From this passage it is clear that our original project is given to us as inevitable, as a
verdict that we must obey. This has implications for Sartre’s view of freedom. Because
we emerge into the practico-inert, the radical freedom Sartre proposes in BN is revised
and limited in CDR. Existence precedes essence, but the practico-inert precedes
existence. The thoughts we can think, the words we can speak, and the ideas we can
imagine are all conditioned by the historical, material, social realm.
There are several characteristics of the practico-inert that were not part of
Sartre’s concept of In-itself in BN. The first is the possibility for the practico-inert to
negate the negation, or, deflect our praxis. Sartre calls this potential “inertia,” and
describes it as “a magical field of quasi-dialectical counterfinality…everything acts on
everything else from a distance.”75 Because human praxis is projected onto the practicoinert, which harbors the potential to repel praxis, the results of human action can become
alienated from their original intentions. This potentiality was not accounted for with the
In-itself. The free praxis of human beings alters the environment, becomes solidified
into the practico-inert, and then comes full circle to restrict their possibilities. In the
complexity of a subject’s historical situation in the practico-inert realm, an individual
encounters what Sartre calls an “authorless antipraxis.” He describes antipraxis as:
[A] retroactive power eroding my freedom, from the final objectivity to the
original decision; but nevertheless emerging from it; it is the negation of freedom
in the domain of complete freedom, sustained by freedom itself, and proportional
to the very completeness of this freedom.76
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Antipraxis is the practico-inert’s “reply” to praxis. It is our free praxis that leads to the
antipraxis. Thus, in a sense, our freedom restricts itself. The In-itself was considered
inert and subject to interpretation and manipulation by the For-itself. The practico-inert,
in contrast, has physical demands of its own that often conflict with an individual’s
interests. For example, physical machines such as cars or factory lines impose demands
upon us that can be at odds with our own interests. Cars need fuel and repair, and factory
lines need power and people to operate them. Sartre refers to one extreme form of
antipraxis as a “counterfinality.” According to Sartre, a counterfinality is “the
contradiction…which develops within an ensemble, in so far as it opposes the process
which produces it.”77 Counterfinalities are a modification of the environment through
praxis in which the field of inertia deflects this praxis, resulting in the direct opposite of
the agent’s conscious intentions. Sartre gives the example of the discovery of gold in
Spain at the end of the sixteenth century. Attempts to increase wealth by King Philip II
through the outsourcing of gold led to an increase in the price of living throughout the
Mediterranean, the effects of which eventually led to the decline of Spain.78
In another departure from the In-itself, the practico-inert is the mediating factor
in all of our social interactions. The practico-inert is the primary source of individual
alienation because its workings often keep individuals in a state of “seriality.” Sartre
refers to the most basic social collective of individuals as a “series.” In a series,
individuals are loosely grouped around some practico-inert object but remain isolated
from each other. This leads to what Sartre calls “serial rationality,” which is the default
mode of thinking in the series. With serial rationality, ideas are spread passively and
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without conscious intention.79 Sartre gives the example of colonialist’s attitudes about
the native people they were colonizing being dirty, dishonest, or lazy. Sartre argues that
the colonizers were a series, not a socially bonded group:
[W]hen two colonialists, in conversation, appear to be exchanging these ideas,
they actually merely reactualize them one after the other in so far as they
represent a particular aspect of serial reason….the sentence that is uttered, as a
reference to the common interest, is not presented as the determination of
language by the individual himself, but as his other opinion, that is to say, he
claims to get it from and give it to others.”80
With serial reason, individuals accept ideas from others and the practico-inert at face
value with no process of reflection. Sartre argues that serial reason is the default mode of
thinking contained in the practico-inert realm. This is different from the In-itself which
was limited to describing physical matter.
Sartre argues that the practico-inert is characterized by scarcity (la rareté).
Periodically throughout the text he refers to the practico-inert field merely as the “field
of scarcity.”81 Sartre says that scarcity persists even in developed societies with more
readily available resources. While developing countries experience scarcity of food,
water, or shelter; in more developed societies, scarcity still exists in lack of jobs,
educational disparities, or wealth inequality. “The origin of struggle always lies, in fact,
in some concrete antagonism whose material condition is scarcity (la rareté).”82
Additionally, he says scarcity “is the contingent but fundamental relation of man to
Nature, which remains the context of the whole investigation.”83 Here Sartre references
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nature; shortly after he gives the example of scarcity at a bus stop when there are not
enough seats for everyone, exemplifying the scope with which he employs the term.
Sartre’s concept of project transitions from the nihilating For-itself/In-itself in
BN to the spiraling praxis/practico-inert in CDR. The philosophical implications of this
shift are an important development in Sartre’s thought, but its discussion occupies a
disproportionately small place in the philosophical literature on Sartre compared to the
exhaustive studies on his early works on radical freedom. The most extensive
discussion comes from Busch and Flynn, who explore the transition in depth. A
discussion of their views will help highlight the important philosophical changes and
their implications.

2.2 The In-itself and Practico-Inert: Current Literature
In Busch’s detailed discussion of the progression of Sartre’s thought, he
identifies five relevant philosophical modifications when Sartre transitions from the Initself to the practico-inert. First, Busch says, there is a material bond between praxis, as
consciousness acting on matter, and the practico-inert, as matter worked on by praxis.
This material bond was not identified and emphasized in the In-itself/For-itself dualism.
Busch notes that in CDR, the situation or givenness, as he calls it, is no longer simply
“there” as a factual scenery upon which we project our existential possibilities. Instead,
the practico-inert exists as a thoroughly conditioned material region itself dependent on
history and the social forces that have created it.84 In BN, Busch says, Sartre’s language
of transcending or surpassing what is given is “depicted…as a sharp severance.”85 In
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BN, the material world, even when used by us to achieve our ends, is secondary to our
free project. Our projects are a negation of any external meaning and objects are objects
for us and our ends. However in CDR, Busch argues, using the material world to
navigate our possibilities does not negate the meanings bestowed upon it by historicity
and sociality. Human beings, when acting on the material world in order to pursue their
ends, are themselves subject to the material effects of the world which modify and
influence their ends. According to Busch, we see that “using a technique, such as a tool
or a machine, in CDR involves an internalization that is profoundly influenced by these
techniques.”86 This is illustrated in Sartre’s examples of factory lines and cars. In
addition to these objects having their own physical demands, we must adjust our
physical bodies to the objects in order to use them.
This material link between consciousness and matter flows logically into Busch’s
second point. While in BN, consciousness interacted with matter by “nihilating” it
through the power of choice and differentiation, in CDR, the practico-inert mediates
praxis rather than being nihilated by it:
The thrust of the language [in CDR] is not consonant with Being and
Nothingness, where negation was equivalent to rupture, fission, break. Here the
language allows for conservation. The project in both Being and Nothingness and
Search for a Method is an instance of ‘surpassing the given,’ yet the
intelligibility is different in the early and later text.87
To support this point Busch references two passages from Sartre describing the project
in Search for a Method, which was an introduction to CDR.
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“‘To surpass…is also to preserve”88 and “the project retains and unveils the
surpassed reality.”89
Busch concludes that the relationship between consciousness and matter is no longer one
of negation or rejection.90 Busch notes that the fact that the practico-inert is preserved
and cannot be transcended or nihilated like the In-itself has existential and social
ramifications. As material conditions constrain our actions and are incorporated into our
project, circumstances such as socio-economic class become so integral to our project
that attempts to transcend them merely result in fulfilling them.91
The third important difference Busch identifies is the active versus the passive
self. Busch argues that the existential self emerging from Sartre’s discussion in BN is
characterized by activity—the intentional, free action of the For-itself. The existential
self presented in CDR, in contrast, is characterized by both activity and passivity
because of the inertia contained and preserved in the practico-inert. This includes serial
rationality. Busch says that serial rationality is characterized by an interiorization of the
practico-inert without individual conscious reflection. It is not a matter of sharing
consciously intended ideas, but passively accepting ideas from others and the
environment.92 Thus, with the introduction of the practico-inert, passively received
ideas become a much more prominent factor in our project.
The last important philosophical difference that Busch believes Sartre introduces
with the practico-inert is the transition in the degree of awareness subjects have of our
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freedom. In BN, Busch says, the For-itself intuitively “knows” its freedom. If people
deny their freedom, this is a matter of bad faith. With the shift to the practico-inert,
Sartre’s position evolves into the stance that we do not immediately comprehend
ourselves as free. Rather, praxis initially interprets itself in matter, in our “inert” form.
We know ourselves through the ways we are inscribed in matter.93 Busch draws on the
following passage from Sartre, “his objective perception of himself presents him as an
inanimate object, the result of an operation.”94 Consequently our freedom must be
discovered through experience with the practico-inert. Busch comments:
Whereas in his earlier, existentialist thought it was assumed that everybody
‘knew’ about freedom, now, in order to account for alienation, it appears that
everyone must ‘discover’ freedom out of an initial alienation of knowledge.95
This is an aspect of serial rationality, in which individuals passively interiorize a
conception of themselves as unfree, as this is how they immediately experience
themselves in the practico-inert.
Flynn also discusses the link between practico-inert and In-itself in depth, noting
that the differences between them are important for understanding Sartre’s later view of
a human being. Flynn echoes Busch’s sentiment that the practico-inert is the
“givenness” of every situation, but this givenness assumes a different form in CDR than
it did in BN. First, Flynn says, unlike the In-itself, the practico-inert is an “intrinsically
subject referring term;” it functions as practico-inert “only while interiorized-totalized in
our activities.”96 While the In-itself was presented as a realm of matter subject to be
interpreted by For-itselfs, the practico-inert is only practico-inert through interaction
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with subjects. Additionally, the practico-inert does not relate to praxis through nihilation
or destruction, but by “deviation and inversion.”97 Flynn argues that if the For-itself was
the negation of matter, practico-inert is matter’s “negation” of the For-itself. It deflects
our actions and makes them other than we intend.
Second, Flynn, like Busch, notes that the practico-inert introduces a realm of
passivity into our subjectivity that was not present in the In-itself/For-itself dichotomy:98
We have seen how praxis inherits the intentionality and self-transparency of the
for-itself. Praxis, like consciousness, is ontologically free, for it is the unifying
and reorganizing transcendence of existing circumstances toward the practical
field. But Sartre has come to realize that this transcendence is dialectical; that is,
that it is simultaneously negation, conservation, and spiraling advance. In other
words, it is totalizing.99
The inclusion of practico-inert and image of the project as a spiral introduces the realm
of passive activity. Flynn argues that the forces at work in the practico-inert, such as
antipraxis and counterfinality, contribute to the passivity of our projects and serial
rationality. When projected in the practico-inert realm, people’s actions are absorbed and
in Sartre’s words, “replaced by monstrous forces.”100 Flynn says that those monstrous
forces are the necessities and counterfinalities present in the practico-inert field of the
various systems that people participate in. This is the realm of passive activity.101 Flynn
draws on Sartre’s example of panic, exemplified in the following passage from CDR:
The basic difference between serial activity, which—though counterfinalized and
passive…is not the freedom of individual praxis, since contagious panic, as
much as a deliberate attack, realizes itself through everyone’s praxis; is that in
the first case, freedom posits itself only to reveal its alienation in the passive
activity of impotence.102
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This passage on panic is relevant because the experience of panic is not consciously
intended praxis, although its effects are realized through praxis. Flynn argues that this
passage shows that passive activity does not originate in individuals themselves, which
would be intentional praxis. Instead, the passive is an “ontological deformation of
praxis”103 that results from practico-inert mediation.
Third, Flynn, like Busch, argues that the introduction of the practico-inert entails
that human beings do not intuitively know their freedom, although he words it
differently. Flynn says that the practico-inert “allows inauthenticity to be linked to the
‘sorcery’ of matter.”104 According to Flynn, the introduction of the practico-inert means
that failing to recognize our freedom is no longer just a personal failure, but is
ontologically located in the practico-inert field. Our self-determination is also not
immediately evident to us because the practico-inert responds to praxis and makes our
actions appear out of our own hands. “This awareness, simultaneously of necessity and
powerlessness, is the experiential basis for the concept of the practico-inert.”105
Fourth, Flynn also identifies the point that the practico-inert contains a type of
rationality, serial rationality, embedded within it that was not present in Sartre’s
conception of In-itself:
[T]he practico-inert serves to connect a class of automatic and impersonal
processes with underlying praxes, while retaining a certain rationality of its
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own…It is the logic of otherness, of exteriority, of passivity, of alienation, of
social impotence, and ‘flight.’106
We see again the emphasis that while the In-itself was a type of brute facticality, the
practico-inert contains forms of reasoning and acting within it.
Last, Flynn, too stresses the importance of the inability of human beings to
transcend the practico-inert, as part of it is absorbed into our dialectical projects.
Because the practico-inert is characterized by scarcity, this leads to the formation of
class. Flynn argues that Sartre’s entire aim of discussing the practico-inert is to afford us
a more adequate grasp of socioeconomic class.107 He notes that in CDR working people
discover themselves and their possibilities as they are “signified” by their class status.108
Sartre does not think it is inevitable or inherent that the practico-inert should be
alienating, rather, as Flynn shows, it is the historical reality of scarcity that leads to class
divisions and seriality.109
Busch and Flynn correctly point out that with the transition from In-itself to
practico-inert in Sartre’s thought, there is no longer nihilation of our materiality and
historicity, but mediation between our praxis and the environment. The new image of
the existential project as a spiral illustrates how the practico-inert is both surpassed and
absorbed in the totalization of our projects. As the practico-inert precedes our existence,
there is no longer a pre-reflective consciousness. Additionally, our existential project is
both active and passive. It is active in the sense that we have intentional, freely chosen
projects. It is passive in three senses: first, we interiorize the practico-inert in order to
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decide what projects to pursue. Second, the self is passive in terms of serial rationality in
which we receive and transfer ideas passively, without conscious reflection. Third, the
existential self is passive to the extent that we are acted upon by the antipraxis and
counterfinalities. Busch and Flynn are also correct that Sartre repeatedly emphasizes
socio-economic class as the most powerful conditioning factor in shaping our
possibilities.110
As both Busch and Flynn accurately show, the addition of the practico-inert
means that human beings are not immediately conscious of our freedom. We do not
recognize our freedom because we passively form a vision of our nature from the
practico-inert. Our freedom is not immediately obvious to us and we must become
gradually aware of it. Sartre also admits much stronger limits on our practical freedom,
acknowledging that our presence in a historical, material, social environment constricts
our possibilities. This is perhaps the starkest contrast between Sartre’s earlier and later
thought. The following passage explains the transition from In-itself to practico-inert:
“[I]t would be quite wrong to interpret me as saying that man is free in all situations…I
mean the exact opposite: all men are slaves insofar as their life unfolds in the practicoinert field.”111 The constraints of the practico-inert realm are not abstract limits or
barriers we place on ourselves through bad faith, but concrete barriers given by history,
materiality, and sociality.
The transition from In-itself to practico-inert is important for my purposes
because it adds a level of historical depth and material constraint to Sartre’s existential
project. The praxis/practico-inert spiral represents human beings as dialectical who
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111

For example, see CDR, 65-67, 193-194, 679-680, and 787-788.
Sartre, CDR, 331-332.

43

incorporate the givenness of the situation into our projects. The backdrop against which
we build our project is not just inert matter, but given modes of thinking, doing, and
group membership. In both the In-itself and practico-inert, our freedom exists as a
negotiation amidst already given conditions. The inclusion of the practico-inert shows
that lack of awareness of freedom is not a moral failing of an individual, but a product of
material limitation and modes of thinking embedded within practico-inert mediations. In
order to develop how we can apply Sartre’s views to ethics, which will be explored in
Chapter Three, we must examine how we can act intentionally, develop awareness of
our freedom, form our conception of self, and relate to others. All of these things are
mediated by the practico-inert.
In the following section I will discuss Sartre’s vision of our social-historical
possibilities for our projects, elucidated through both BN with the In-itself and CDR
with the practico-inert. We see that constructing our essence is a matter of negotiating
with our physical environment, with language and collective ideas, social practices, and
class, all in our unique historical moment. We will also see that in CDR Sartre
recognizes more and more the limitations to freedom and the full force of historical,
material circumstances. Throughout the discussion in both texts, we will see the
recurrence of the identified themes: mediation rather than nihilation, the active and
passive self, serial rationality, a lack of immediate awareness of our freedom, and the
effects of scarcity, including class and alienation.
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3

Our Given Possibilities

3.1 The Material: Physical Objects, Human Artifacts, and Altered Nature

In BN, Sartre says that being In-itself, even though it is interpreted by individual
For-itselfs, is already imprinted with collective meaning. We become conscious of
physical objects which have been collectively designated for particular purposes.
Examples include items that have been given a special status in society, such as precious
metals, fine china, or artifacts.112 It also includes socially designated physical structures,
such as buildings designed specifically for schools, prisons, or offices. These objects
reveal to us a world that is already collectively organized and intersubjectively shared.
In BN, Sartre says, “It is the world which makes known to us our belonging to a subjectcommunity, especially the existence in the world of manufactured objects.”113 When
we see a human-created instrument, we recognize the use it serves for others and hence
the purpose it should serve for us. We understand ourselves as emerging into a
community with collective ends. He continues:
As soon as I use a manufactured object…it indicates to me the movement to be
made…Thus it is true that the manufactured object makes me known to myself
as ‘they’; that is, it refers to me the image of my transcendence as that of any
transcendence whatsoever.114
Using a collectively designated object makes one aware of oneself as a person
interchangeable with others. There is nothing unique about using things for their
intended purposes, so one becomes part of a collective “they.”
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Designated objects present options for our possibilities. Sartre gives the
examples of signs prohibiting certain behavior, such as “No Exit” signs, or exclusions
forbidding minorities from utilizing public services. The “they-meaning” conferred
through these signs automatically immerses us in a network of relationships in which we
obey or disobey the collective command.115 As soon as I understand the collective
designations, the objects themselves reveal the actions and expectations of others to me.
I understand what I should do, what kind of person I can be, and how I fit into society:
It is indeed to me that the printed sentence is directed; it represents in fact an
immediate communication from the Other to me: I am aimed at. As soon as I
avail myself of the opening market ‘Exit’ and go out through it, I am not using it
in the absolute freedom of my personal projects. I am not constituting a tool by
means of invention; I do not surpass the pure materiality of the thing toward my
possibles…The object is already humanized; it signifies ‘human control.’…I do
not submit to the object itself when I use it as an ‘Exit’; I adapt myself to the
human order. But by my very act I recognize the Other’s existence; I set up a
dialogue with the other.116
Objects convey to us that we are in a social situation with expectations and
responsibilities from others. At the same time, the fact that these objects direct us toward
certain behavior open up possibilities for our project:
[A]ccording to the free possibilities which I choose, I can disobey the
prohibition, pay no attention to it, or, on the contrary, confer upon it a coercive
value which it can hold only because of the weight which I attach to it.117
Objects have normative force for us as they offer potential for our actions. At another
level we create our own meaning by choosing how to react to the sign. Sartre gives
another example of public transit. The working of the transit system, what it is used for,
where it takes us, how we use it, and the rules for using it are a socially collective
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project, not simply a projection of one individual For-itself. “In this subway corridor
there is only one and the same project, inscribed a long time ago in matter, where a
living and undifferentiated transcendence comes to be absorbed.”118 The subway has
absorbed the meaning of other past freedoms to become one collective project. But a
subway can also take on a very personal meaning for someone who meets a special
person there. All collectively inscribed objects can simultaneously hold individual
meaning.
In CDR, Sartre reaffirms that manufactured objects, altered nature, and artifacts
are integral to interpreting our possibilities and relating to others. However he goes
further from his discussion of objects as In-itself in BN and now argues that human
made objects, as practico-inert, can have their own physical demands. As emphasized by
Busch, physical objects have a bond of materiality with consciousness and impose a
material exigency on our experience. Sartre now argues in CDR that these human made
apparatuses alter our being at its core. Not only do we modify our behavior, but we
adjust the rhythm of our bodies to the working of the machines when we are operating
them.119 While objects in BN have normative force, in CDR, materiality and
consciousness are ontologically intertwined. We need not view Sartre as completely
abandoning his previous views in BN, but as further recognizing that human-made
objects have a conditioning effect that goes beyond conveying collective meaning.
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3.2 Our Given Possibilities: Language, Attitudes, and Ideas

Our existential possibilities are also shaped through the use of language. In BN,
Sartre identifies the use of language as automatically placing us into a web of social
relations at the level of our community, nationality, and all of humanity:
[T]o know how to speak is not to know how to pronounce and understand words
in general; it is to know how to speak a certain language and by it to manifest
one’s belonging to humanity on the level of a national collectivity.120
The words we use precede us, so that our freedom is bound to the collective terms and
concepts we use to communicate. Yet, defined in their communal sense, Sartre says it is
the act of speaking that makes words exist. Language exists before us but it functions
when we use it to communicate with other free individuals.121 The laws of language and
speaking are produced by individual freedoms because each act of speaking is an act of
freedom by the For-itself. Language possesses many qualities of the In-itself like an
inanimate object. Because it is linked to the actions of the For-itself, it comes to be
through For-Itselfs and exists at the level of communal meaning.
In CDR, Sartre refines this distinction. While language most certainly conditions
our possibilities, the intermediary category of the practico-inert allows him to make
clear distinctions between language and speaking. Speaking is a form of praxis, but
language itself is practico-inert. In one reference, he says, “words are matter.” At the
same time, “they carry the projects of the Other into me and they carry my own projects
into the Other.”122 Thus, Sartre suggests that “language might well be studied in the
same way as money: as circulating, inert materiality” but, as he adds, language “unifies
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dispersal.”123 Words cannot fit into Sartre’s previous ontological dichotomy: they are
neither inert physical objects (the In-itself) nor pure consciousness (For-itself). These
distinctions regarding words and language remain implicit in Sartre’s further discussion
of how speaking and listening lead to practico-inert beliefs, which he calls “Ideas.”
“Ideas” are a byproduct of serial rationality.
We briefly explored the transmission of serial Ideas through the example of
colonialist’ characterization of natives. Sartre uses another example of the Great Fear of
1789. The Great Fear was a widespread panic among the rural population that occurred
at the beginning of the French Revolution. A shortage of crops, in addition to circulating
rumors of a conspiracy to starve the peasant population, led fearful citizens to organize
and arm themselves in self-defense. During this time period rumors circulated that there
were “bandits” or “foreigners” burning buildings. Sartre uses this example to show how
easy it is for ideas to spread without any conscious reflection on the part of those who
“think” them:
The opinions of public opinion arise like the Great Fear, in that everyone makes
of himself other by his opinion, that is to say, by taking it from the Other because
the Other believes it as Other, and makes himself the informer of Others. At this
level, the Idea is a process; it derives its invincible strength from the fact that
nobody thinks it. That is to say, it does not define itself as the conscious moment
of praxis—that is to say, as the unifying unveiling of objects in the dialectical
temporalization of action. Instead it defines itself as a practico-inert object whose
self-evidence, for me, is the same as my double inability to verify it and
transform it to Others.124
When the Idea of “bandits” or “foreigners” posing a threat was circulated between
various individuals who accepted the Idea without thinking, the force of the Idea grew
even stronger. No one reflected on the idea as consciously intended praxis, and yet a
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great sense of panic spread among peasants in France. This exemplifies serial rationality
and an idea “embedded in matter.” Discourses can become solidified, unquestioned,
static, and “carved” into the very structure of our thought.
Through this example, we see not only how language automatically places us in
networks of relationships within a community, but also how language can make ideas
almost “ours,” even when we do not consciously intend them, allowing the meanings
embedded in matter to shape the possibilities we imagine for ourselves. This is
accounted for with the practico-inert, but was not with the In-itself. We also see
evidence of why Flynn and Busch characterize serial rationality as fundamentally
alienating, leaving subjects feeling powerless.

3.3 Our Given Possibilities: The Social and the Other

We have already discussed some of the ways in which sociality affects our
possibilities: others communicate to us through objects, language, and Ideas. Another
aspect intricately detailed by Sartre includes the effects an original encounter with
another person has on our own self-formation. Our encounters with other For-itselfs
instill in us an awareness that we too represent an objectivity for others. In other words,
in the individual For-itself’s experience, one understands oneself as the subject for
which the environment is there. When we encounter other For-itselfs we realize in turn
that we are there for them. Our actions, gestures, and words are subject to be interpreted
by other free individuals.125 Thus my physical surroundings, which I may have viewed
as there “for me” before encountering the Other are, in a sense, stolen from me, as I
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now realize I cannot perceive the world as the Other perceives it.126 This also means
that my whole perception of my possibilities can be changed if the Other looks at me:
[M]y fundamental connection with the Other-as-subject must be able to be
referred back to my permanent possibility of being seen by the Other. It is in and
through the revelation of my being-as-object for the Other that I must be able to
apprehend the presence of his being-as-subject.127
The recognition of the Other as a subject and oneself as an object makes us realize that
we are not purely self-determined. While we can try to behave in a way that gives others
the perception we want to convey, we ultimately cannot control how others view us and
the type of “object” they perceive us to be.
Sartre argues that the realization that we are potentially observable by others
conditions all of our thoughts. “Being-for-others is a constant fact of my human reality,
and I grasp it with its factual necessity in every thought, however slight, which I form
concerning myself.”128 Because our consciousness understands what it is by
differentiation, we compare ourselves to others in order to form our conception of
ourselves.129 This includes understanding ourselves through social categorizations,
which are projected upon us by others:
There exists, in fact, something in ‘my’ world other than plurality of possible
meanings; there exist objective meanings which are given to me as not having
been brought to light by me. I, by whom meanings have come to things, I find
myself engaged in an already meaningful world which reflects to me meaning I
have not put into it.130
In a recent work on social subjectivity in BN, Matthew Eschleman argues that
Sartre’s claim that existence precedes essence is complemented in the second half of the
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text by the claim that sociality precedes existence. Social forces and social
categorizations contribute to one’s identity and shape the possibilities that we imagine
for ourselves. We “carve out” our possibilities in the In-itself, but the way we do the
carving is affected by social conditions which precede us.131 Social categorizations are
not concepts created by us but concepts presented to us by others through which we then
organize our projects. As Eschleman comments, “Basic social designations like being
black, white, rich, poor, etc., define one’s identity before being ‘actively’ interiorized,
and…they provide the grounds upon which one understands the world and projects
oneself into it.”132 However, none of the social categorizations given to us strictly
determine the choices we make. In Eschleman’s words:
[T]he molding powers that form one's social identity are, in some sense,
necessary for free actions to take place. Only upon the imposition of social
categorization does a field manifest, and only within the field do individuals
carve out practical possibilities.133
This is how powerfully our sociality affects our perceived possibilities in BN. Sartre is
willing to go even further in CDR due to the addition of the practico-inert as a historical,
material realm which mediates our praxis. Sartre takes his view regarding how our
possibilities are altered by the encounter with the Other, and places it in a historical and
material context. This results in his discussion of socioeconomic class.
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3.4 Our Given Possibilities: Class Being

Beyond sociality, Sartre argues that the effects of socio-economic class have the
most formative influence on our possibilities, a point repeatedly emphasized in the
secondary literature. This assertion is made in BN, but more forcefully emphasized in
CDR. In BN Sartre says:
It appears that it is no longer I who decide in terms of my ends whether the world
appears to me with the simple, well-marked oppositions of the “proletarian”
universe or with the innumerable interwoven nuances of the “bourgeois” world. I
am not thrown face to face with the brute existent. I am thrown into a worker’s
world, a French world…which offers me its meanings without my having done
anything to disclose them.134
Our possibilities are affected by the fact that others have more or less than us. Social
categorizations regarding class and material possessions are imposed upon us, not freely
chosen. Although Sartre discusses sociality at length in BN, the issue of class is a
secondary one, portrayed as one social designation among others. In BN, class does not
place an untranscendable limit on one’s freedom.135 In CDR Sartre’s position changes
because of his introduction of the practico-inert. The fact that the practico-inert is
characterized by scarcity entails that our encounters with others are saturated with
shortages within the material environment. This leads to a state of practico-inert being
that accompanies the fact that we belong to a certain class, which he calls “class being”
(l’être de classe).136 Scarcity includes not only scarcity of resources necessary for
subsistence, but also scarcity of space, land, jobs, possessions, and opportunities. Even
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in advanced societies, our general interaction with others is permeated with the
differences that are linked to the socio-economic classes to which we belong.
For example, class differences lead to identifying one’s project in relation to the
types of work considered a realistic option for oneself. This is especially true in
developing societies where the wealth of one’s family strictly determines the educational
opportunities available. While in BN Sartre focuses on the structure of encountering
another freedom, in CDR he includes in the discussion the way these meetings between
free subjects are shaped by existing class structures. The following passage describes a
“bourgeois” on vacation who encounters laborers from the lower working class. The
bourgeois cannot view these workers without comparing them to himself:
It is in fact as a “holiday-maker” confronting a gardener and road-mender, that I
come to conceive myself; and in making myself what I am I discover them as
they make themselves, that is, as their work produces them…I realise myself as a
member of a particular society which determines everyone’s opportunities and
aims; and beyond their present activity, I rediscover their life itself, the relation
between needs and wages, and, further still, social divisions and class
struggles.137
Class being is not consciousness nor pure matter, but it is certainly real. When one sees
the gardener and the road-mender, one interprets them as members of a particular
societal class with an economically and socially specified array of possibilities. In turn
one shapes one’s own possibilities in relation to the class one occupies. Individuals
bond with other members of their class because they collectively understand common
interests and values as necessary for their life as members of the same class. In addition,
the occupations of those of the lower working class usually involve factory labor that is
completely bound to a physical practico-inert structure, “individuals realize their class
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statute through one another…everyone’s class-being comes to him not only from the
class which exploits him, but also from all his comrades.”138 Class being is such a
dominating force within the practico-inert that attempts to eliminate class differences are
countered by social and historical forces: the discourses we use to communicate, the
attitudes about those of a different class, the physical structures which designate
individuals to certain space, such as segregated neighborhoods, the social institutions,
such as proper schooling or health insurance to which the lower classes have never had
complete access. Even if someone successfully moves to a different class out of good
fortune, one cannot escape how much class being has saturated the way one views and
understands the world.
From this discussion we see that according to Sartre, historicity and sociality are
not secondary to our subjectivity. Rather, our historicity assigns meanings to the
worked matter of the objects of our experience, and these historically constituted
meanings govern our possibilities. While the In-itself serves as a useful philosophical
concept for showing how environment shapes our thinking, doing, and comprehension
of ourselves, the practico-inert as a ontological realm of historical materiality and
rationality shows how intertwined are possibilities are with the given. The nature and
role of freedom is extremely important in Sartre’s thought and also undergoes important
modifications with the shift from nihilation to spiral. The complexity of Sartre’s
position on freedom warrants a separate section dedicated to his views.
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4

Sartre, Subjectivity, and Freedom

4.1 Freedom in Being and Nothingness
We have seen that what is referred to as Sartre’s “radical” human freedom is in
fact restricted. Even in BN, not only do social and historical forces limit our practical
actions, they also condition our ability to project meaning onto the In-itself, because our
projects are always simultaneously affected by communal meanings. Yet our historical
situation does not eliminate our freedom, but rather enables it:
This historization, which is the effect of the for-itself’s free choice, in no way
restricts its freedom; quite the contrary, it is in the world and no other that its
freedom comes into play; it is in connection with its existence in this world that
it puts itself into question. For to be free is not to choose the historical world in
which one arises—which would have no meaning—but to choose oneself in the
world whatever this may be.139
Freedom results from a relationship between different conditioning forces that arise
from our situation. It is only by interacting with these conditioning forces that we can
resist or accept them, and this is how freedom reveals itself in a meaningful way. Thus,
freedom and facticity are interwoven and interdependent. Sartre writes:
Freedom is indispensable to the discovery of my facticity. I learn of this facticity
from all the points of the future which I project; it is from the standpoint of this
chosen future which I project…My place appears in terms of the changes I
project. But to change implies something to be changed, which is precisely my
place. Thus, freedom is the apprehension of my facticity.140
Our project necessitates an understanding of our present characteristics. An
apprehension of our situation in the world provides us with the parameters for the future
we can imagine. We learn how our facticity can be transcended and how it will
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inevitably limit us. However, how we choose to respond to these limits is an exercise of
freedom:
Our freedom itself creates the obstacles from which we suffer. It is freedom itself
which, by positing its end and by choosing this end as inaccessible or accessible
with difficulty, causes our placing to appear to our projects as an insurmountable
resistance or a resistance to be surmounted with difficulty…To be sure, in being
born I take a place, but I am responsible for the place which I take.141
Even if all we can do is take up a certain attitude in relation to our possibilities, Sartre
considers this attitude the product of freedom. Sartre argues repeatedly throughout BN
that failing to acknowledge that we are free and possess no determined nature is a matter
of an individual’s bad faith.142 An example of this is the waiter who may be tempted to
deny that he is free to transcend his role as a waiter. But this notion undergoes
significant changes in CDR when Sartre shows that our available tools for interpreting
our possibilities are constricted. The introduction of practico-inert mediation, the role of
the passive, and serial reasoning result in freedom playing a more limited role in our
subjectivity.

4.2 Freedom in The Critique of Dialectical Reason Volume 1

In CDR, there are more significant restrictions on freedom than were implied in
the abstract picture presented in BN. Freedom is still operative, however, and takes the
form of practical choices, resistance, and imagination. These different operations can
lead to a significant change in a person’s project. However, the practico-inert places
limits on all types of freedom. As identified by secondary authors, Sartre shows that our
immediate perception of ourselves in inert terms means that our freedom is not
141
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immediately evident to us. Due to antipraxis and counterfinality, the free praxis of
human beings alters the environment, becomes solidified into the practico-inert, and
then comes full circle to restrict their possibilities. We are frequently exposed to
historical forces that seem to arise from nowhere and thwart our best laid plans. This
places concrete limits on our options and also leads to feelings of determinism.143
Seriality also places limits on our freedom. Sartre uses the example of
individuals waiting for a bus. The practico-inert object (the bus stop) unites these
individuals to the extent that they all need the bus to take them where they need to go.
However, they have no other bond beyond the fact that they are waiting for the same
bus. In seriality, the practico-inert object unites individuals and isolates them at the same
time. The practico-inert “unites them from the outside”144 because the only connection
between them is their gathering around the object. Though they have the common
interest of riding the bus to reach their destination, this is not a collective interest or
internal bond. The possibilities presented by waiting in line for a ticket to ride the same
bus are basically interchangeable. The lack of meaningful practical options and the
feeling that one’s place is interchangeable with others does not support a comprehension
of ourselves as free.
“Seriality derives from practico-inert matter, that is to say, from the future as an
ensemble of inert, equivalent possibilities.”145 This is reminiscent of Sartre’s discussion
of the subway in BN which shows the continuity between the two works. The bus stop
brings together individuals of various ages, sexes, classes, and social milieus who would
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otherwise not be in contact with each other. However, they remain semi-unaware of each
other, mostly indifferent to those around them, and only notice others if something out
of the ordinary occurs. When individuals are interacting with each other only to the
extent that they are united by a practico-inert object and see no intentionally chosen
unifying bond between them, a feeling of alienation from others arises as well as a lack
of control over one’s own fate. The following passage describes someone who has come
to awareness of the destiny presented to him by the practico-inert. He is alienated from
his freedom, as he comprehends himself in inert terms:
[T]he man who looks at his work, who recognizes himself in it completely, and
who also does not recognize himself in it at all; the man who can say both: ‘This
is not what I wanted’ and ‘I understand that this is what I have done and I could
not do anything else,’ and whose free praxis refers him to his prefabricated being
and who recognizes himself equally in both—this man grasps, in an immediate
dialectical movement, necessity as the destiny in exteriority of freedom.146
Sartre introduces the example of a woman who works long shifts in a Dop
shampoo factory whose existential project is devoted only to struggling to meet her daily
needs. For many people, especially in developing societies, their possibilities are
reduced to striving to fulfill their basic needs amidst practico-inert limitations:
What is “assigned” to them is a type of work, and a material condition and a
standard of living tied to this activity; it is a fundamental attitude, as well as a
determinate provision of material and intellectual tools; it is a strictly limited
field of possibilities.147
When Sartre speaks of “material and intellectual tools” he means not only that some
people lack material resources, but that the available mental apparatuses for interpreting
experience are constricted. The nature of their attitudes toward the world and the
orientation of their projects are predetermined by their class being. The practico-inert
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produced a verdict for the Dop shampoo worker’s project the moment she emerged into
the proletariat class:
Her life and destiny can be determined before she gets her job, and this prefabricated reality must be conceived in the mode of being, in the pure materiality
of the in-itself. The role and attitude imposed on her by her work and
consumption have never even been the object of an intention.148
There was no deliberate choice for this woman of where she would work, how she
would live, or what she could value. The practico-inert structures established very
narrow boundaries for her thoughts, motives, beliefs, and choices.
In spite of the bleak and deterministic picture painted by this example, Sartre still
argues that this woman is in some sense free. While our possibilities are structured by
the practico-inert, this does not mean that we are completely determined. By forcing
themselves upon us, these different conditioning forces themselves enable our freedom
to exist. This claim by Sartre is in direct continuation with his discussion of the
interplay between freedom and facticity in BN. The fact that we can become aware of
our own limitations and take up an attitude in relation to them is itself an exercise of
freedom. Freedom is exercised when we choose how to navigate these limitations,
resist these limitations, or imagine a state of affairs beyond them.
I suggest that the freedom that Sartre envisages in CDR operates on several
different levels. First, there is freedom to make simple everyday choices within the
practical options available. The Dop shampoo factory worker can choose to spend her
wages on food for her family or on a new pair of shoes. Although these options are not
always strictly determined, they also cannot be considered meaningful choices. The
second way that freedom can operate is when a subject intentionally resists the forces of
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the practico-inert. In a later interview, Sartre describes freedom as “the small movement
which makes of a totally conditioned social being someone who does not render back
completely what his conditioning has given him.”149 This characterizes freedom as
resistance or refusal to become only what the practico-inert has conditioned you to be.
In this case the Dop shampoo worker attempts to earn more by increasing her production
or searching for a new job. In this case freedom acts as a rejection of complacency with
her situation. The last way that freedom can operate is the use of human imagination or
creativity to imagine new possibilities. This view of freedom is only hinted at
throughout CDR, but will become more prominent in Sartre’s lectures, to be discussed
in Chapter Three. In this passage, Sartre argues that if his work in CDR is ultimately
successful:
[W]e shall finally be able to prove the strict equivalence between praxis with its
particular articulations and the dialectic as the logic of creative action, that is to
say, in the final analysis, the logic of freedom.150
Creativity and imagination do not involve completely transcending the practico-inert
because what is surpassed is also incorporated into the dialectical spiral. The power of
imagination, when coupled with ideal resources and practical options, can lead to
significant transformations in a person’s project. One of Sartre’s main points in CDR is
that current practico-inert structures, especially those related to class being, make such a
transformation impossible for the majority of people. In order for an opportunity for
change to be achievable by all, there must be alterations in the practico-inert field.
Because the practico-inert is subject dependent and created by freedom, it can change.
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Change is possible, although not easy, due to the primacy of individual praxis
over the practico-inert. He writes, “praxis alone…is, in its dialectical freedom, the real
and permanent foundation (in human history up to the present) of all the inhuman
sentences which men have passed on men through worked matter.”151 While the
practico-inert restricts our freedom, it is created by and rooted in our freedom: “[T]he
original foundation of unity, of action, and of finality is individual praxis as the unifying
and reorganizing transcendence of existing circumstances toward the practical field.”152
The practico-inert field, while constricting, is ultimately created and sustained by praxis.
The view of subjectivity and freedom that Sartre presents has significant
normative implications, especially his view of the limits placed on freedom by the
practico-inert domain. In order to lay the groundwork of my overarching goal of
showing the importance of Sartre’s views for ethics in Chapter Three, I now highlight
how Sartre’s view of the dialectical subject with socially and historically conditioned
possibilities is different from the liberal subject that is presupposed in mainstream
deontological approaches to healthcare ethics. When we see the key differences
between the two views of subjectivity, we will easily see the divergence in normative
views in Chapter Three.

5

The Sartrean Subject and the Kantian Liberal Subject

By liberal subject I mean the individual as generally conceived by moral and
political liberalism: the view that individuals should have the basic right to live as they
choose and determine their own life path, so long as they respect that right in others. In
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philosophical literature this view is usually founded on the belief that human beings are
autonomous, rational, and capable of self-governance, and that their possibilities are a
combination of a universal human nature and their own autonomous control.153 I here
outline the conception of subjectivity which is rooted in the thought of Kant, who
provides the groundwork for deontological approaches to ethics. Deontological
approaches to ethics are focused on universal moral duties owed to all human beings,
who by their nature deserve respect, and are grounded on the premise that human nature
is generally rational, ahistorical, autonomous and capable of making independent,
objective judgments. My intent here is not to offer a detailed historical comparison
between Sartre on the one hand and Kant on the other, but rather to trace the roots of the
contemporary liberal subject in Kantian thought in order to show how Sartre challenges
key points of this view. I choose to contrast Sartre’s view of the subject with Kant’s
subject because as we will see, Sartre directly mentions Kant several times and
specifically differentiates his position from Kant’s. Additionally, the phenomenological
tradition of which Sartre’s philosophy is a part was strongly influenced by Kant’s
thought. Kant presented the view that there was a distinctly human experience of the
world, focusing on how our categories of rationality structure the objects of our
experience.
Through this discussion we will see that Sartre’s views challenge Kant’s in four
key ways. First, Kant posits an ahistorical “noumenal self” that exists externally to the
historical and material realm. For Sartre, as we have seen, our historicity and materiality
are integral to our subjectivity. Second, the two thinkers diverge regarding the meaning
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bestowed externally onto human actions, which Kant argues is given by the moral law.
Third, Kant argues for a robust sense of autonomy of the will, which is a contrast to
Sartre’s strong focus on the passive dimension of the self and limits on freedom. Fourth,
the two thinkers diverge regarding the nature and role of freedom in human experience.
All of these differences result in the two thinkers having significantly different visions
of that which comprises our possibilities for being subjects.

5.1 Kant and the Noumenal Self
Kant’s view of subjectivity is characterized primarily by three premises: 1)
each person has an ahistorical “noumenal self” which is independent of the empirical
world, 2) human beings possess a strong sense of autonomy, and 3) humans are free to
the extent that they can choose whether or not to follow the moral law. This is in
addition to the view that the moral law is universal and that the moral value of an action
is not affected by historicity.
Kant’s view of the subject must be understood in terms of his philosophical
divide between the things as they appear to us, or the phenomenal realm, and things as
they exist without being conditioned by our rationality, or the noumenal realm, which he
also refers to as the “thing-in-itself.” Kant argues that we are incapable of experiencing
the world as a thing-in-itself because we are separated from the world by the workings
of our intellect.154 Our experience of the world is necessarily conditioned by our
universal faculties of sense perception and rationality, and we only interpret the world
after it has been processed through the categories of our understanding. This
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conditioning is the same for every human being, and is at the heart of Kant’s view of
human nature.
Kant applies his distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal realm to
human beings and uses it to argue that there is no inherent contradiction between
causality and human freedom. Now, Kant’s principles of understanding require that we
understand the objects of experience through causation.155 The idea of transcendental
freedom, which is an event not purely caused, is what provides the foundation for the
concept of practical freedom, the ability to choose without necessitation or, in other
words, to perform actions free from determining causes.156 Normative moral judgments,
Kant says, require that an individual’s choice could “produce something determined in
the temporal order in accord with empirical laws, and hence begin a series of
occurrences entirely from itself.”157 In Kant’s view, the possibility of practical moral
philosophy necessitates that we are free to act outside of a causal series.
To solve this problem, in his “Third Antinomy” Kant makes a distinction
between the intelligible and empirical character of a human being. Kant defines the
empirical character as the causally determined self that exists in the world of
appearances:
[F]or a subject in the world of sense we would have first an empirical character,
through which its actions, as appearances, would stand through and through in
connection with other appearances in accordance with constant natural laws.158
The empirical character is subject to the same natural laws of causality, just as all other
objects in the phenomenal world. However, Kant argues that there must also be an
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intelligible character that exists in the realm of the thing-in-itself and is not subject to
these same causal laws:
[O]ne would also have to allow this subject an intelligible character, through
which it is indeed the cause of those actions as appearances, but which does not
stand under any conditions of sensibility and is not itself appearance.159
Kant’s argument is that freedom can only be attributed to the intelligible character--the
“noumenal self”—not the empirical one, because the empirical character is bound by the
causal laws of nature and is not free of necessity.160 Kant returns to this split between
the empirical and noumenal self in his ethical work, the Groundwork for the
Metaphysics of Morals. He says:
[A] rational being must regard himself as intelligence (and not from the side of
his lower powers), as belonging to the world of understanding and not to that of
the senses. Thus he has two standpoints from which he can consider himself and
recognize the laws of the employment of his powers and consequently of all his
actions: first, as belonging to the world of sense under laws of nature
(heteronomy), and, second, as belonging to the intelligible world under laws
which, independent of nature, are not empirical but founded on reason.161
It is through this dualistic conception of the self that Kant makes room for freedom of
the will. The possibility of the freedom of the will allows Kant to posit his robust sense
of human autonomy which is at the heart of his ethical thought.
This bridges into the second key characteristic of Kant’s subject: that human
beings possess a robust sense of autonomy. This autonomy allows objective, rational
judgments that aid in self-determination. For Kant, human beings are moral agents—
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they have the ability and the responsibility to follow the moral law. Essential to this
view of moral agency is the autonomy of the individual agent’s will. In his third
formulation of the Categorical Imperative, he writes that people should “always act as
both subjects and sovereigns in the kingdom of ends.”162 This means that human
rationality creates the moral law and at the same time is subjected to it or should obey it.
Kant is clear that genuine moral requirements originate in our ability for rational
deliberation and are not based on values, principles, or ends that are imposed on the will
from the empirical world. Wise judgments and moral decisions come from within,
originating in reason a priori:
[W]e cannot possibly conceive of a reason as being consciously directed from
outside in regard to its judgements; for in that case the subject would attribute the
determination of his power of judgement, not to his reason, but to an impulsion.
Reason must look upon itself as the author of its own principles independently of
alien influences.163
It is from this premise that Kant argues morality is universal and independent of social
and historical circumstances. What matters for the issue being discussed here is that
Kant views individuals as rational, autonomous agents who can separate themselves
from the specificity of their circumstances to make objective reasoned judgments.
Third, Kant introduced the idea of the noumenal subject with the motivation of
preserving the possibility of freedom. For Kant, freedom is grounded in our rationality
and ability to understand the moral law, and thus freedom and morality are intrinsically
linked:
A free will must find its ground of determination in the law, but independently of
the material of the law…Thus freedom and unconditional practical law
reciprocally imply each other. The moral law and how we act in relation to it
162
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together constitute freedom. It is therefore the moral law, of which we become
immediately conscious as soon as we construct maxims for the will, which first
presents itself to us; and, since reason exhibits it as a ground of determination
which is completely independent of and not to be outweighed by any sensuous
condition, it is the moral law which leads directly to the concept of freedom.164
Kant argues that the moral law is discoverable through the use of reason alone without
the need for empirical observation. The first two formulations of the Categorical
Imperative (that one should act only in a way that is rationally universalizable and that
no one should be treated only as a means) are dependent upon this universal conception
of human rationality.
Thus, the key characteristics of Kant’s view of subjectivity are as follows: Kant
argues that all human beings have a “noumenal self” which makes free choices
externally to the empirical realm, where it is not restricted by the laws of causality. The
noumenal self is independent of the historical and material influences. Human beings
possess a strong autonomy of the will and are free to obey or disobey the moral law,
which is discoverable through the use of reason alone. This moral law is objectively
given and does not vary in historical or social contexts. Historicity is seen as secondary
to subjectivity, not as constituting it.
5.2 The Dialectical Spiral versus The Noumenal Self
We are now in a position to contrast Sartre’s views with Kant’s. The first
difference regards the existence of the noumenal self which makes choices independent
of the empirical realm, removed from history and materiality. Kant’s noumenal self
persists independently of historical norms, material scarcity, educational opportunities,

164

Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Practical Reason, translated and edited by Mary Gregor
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 29

68

social institutions, or relationships with others. As we have seen, this is a significant
departure from Sartre, who views human nature as a dialectical spiral resulting from an
ongoing interaction between one’s choices and the material in BN, and the historically
conditioned worked matter of the practico-inert in CDR. The key difference is Kant’s
removal of the most defining characteristics of the subject from the empirical realm, thus
divorcing it from historical, cultural, and social influences. It is in the image of the
human project in CDR, as one that retains history as it surpasses it, that is in greatest
contrast to Kant’ noumenal self. Our encounter with human made objects, institutions,
deeply engrained ideas, and class establish limits for what we can do and think.
Second, the two thinkers diverge regarding the meaning bestowed externally
onto human actions, which Kant argues is given by both our universal nature and the
moral law. For, Sartre, as we have seen, the meanings that we encounter in the In-itself
or the practico-inert are imprinted by the freedom of human beings. There is no
external, objective meaning or value that precedes our actions. Meaning is created
through an interplay between individual freedom and collective significance inscribed in
the “worked matter” of our experience. This point is elucidated in the following passage
in which Sartre explicitly criticizes the Kantian view that the meaning of one’s actions
(potentially moral or immoral) precedes both the action itself and the person’s own
existence in the world. This, for Sartre, has instilled in many people the false view that
meaning exists externally from experience. He writes:
[I]nstead of seeing that the transcendences there posited are maintained in their
being by my own transcendence, people will assume that I encounter them upon
my surging up in the world; they come from God, from nature, from ‘my’ nature,
from society. These ends readymade and prehumen will therefore define the
meaning of my act even before I conceive it.165
165
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This passage is from BN, but this is also true in CDR. While the meanings embedded in
the practico-inert precedes our individual existence, as I discussed, the practico-inert is
subject referring and dependent on human praxis. Thus the world we occupy is
dependent on our ancestors and on us. However, the nature of things is not given to us
from anything outside of human affairs. The objective meaning posited by Kant with the
universal moral law are not malleable, but the practico-inert, as a human construction, is.
Third, Kant argues for a robust sense of autonomy of the will, derived from our
powers of reason. The contrast to this assertion is most apparent in CDR, in which
Sartre emphasizes the importance of the passive dimension of self. Passive dimensions
of self include the ways the practico-inert deflects our intended praxis through antipraxis and counterfinality. Kant’s strong sense of autonomy and its relation to morality
suggests that we can use reason to determine the correct course of action. But this does
not take into consideration the ways that our chosen actions (praxis) will be deflected by
embedded inertia, making the choice of what to do never easily predictable. Passive
dimensions of self also include serial rationality, Ideas, and the interiorization of class
being. Given these strong constricting factors on our ability to both determine and
complete our own ends or goals, Sartre’s spiraling subjects cannot be considered
autonomous in the same sense as Kant’s. While Sartre does believe in the primacy of
praxis over the practico-inert, his emphasis on the constraining forces of the practicoinert reveals that we are not primarily self-determining.
Fourth, the two thinkers diverge on the nature of human freedom and its role in
our subjectivity. In BN Sartre explicitly rejects Kant’s choice of intelligible character or
noumenal self:
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This is why we reject Kant’s ‘choice of intelligible character.’ The structure of
the choice necessarily implies that it be a choice in the world. A choice which
would be a choice in terms of nothing, a choice against nothing, would be a
choice of nothing and would be annihilated as choice.166
In this passage, Sartre argues that a free choice is inconceivable if it is not made in
relation to the In-itself. This particular criticism is made by many commentators of
Kant.167 Freedom for Kant exists only in relation to objective values (the moral law).
“[A] free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same.”168 In contrast,
Sartrean freedom in BN is the ability to choose values themselves in relation to
collective, contingent, historical values that are offered to us. Sartre’s freedom is one
that is engaged in the world—it comes into being only through its existence in its
historical situation which determines its possibilities.
In further contrast to Kant’s view of freedom, Sartre argues that it is not the will
that is the operation of freedom in the individual. The reflective decision to choose
certain possibilities over others takes place in light of the original act of freedom that is
our emergence into the world:
[T]he will, far from being the unique or at least the privileged manifestation of
freedom, actually—like every event of the for-itself—must presuppose the
foundation of an original freedom in order to be able to constitute itself as will.
The will in fact is positive as a reflective decision in relation to certain ends. But
it does not create these ends. It is rather a mode of being in relation to them.169
While Sartre’s view of freedom in BN is clearly different from Kant’s, his revised view
of freedom in CDR takes him even further away from the Kantian view, as
consciousness and action become more deeply dependent on our physical environment
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and the meanings engraved in matter. I identified three different operations of Sartrean
freedom: practical choice, resistance, and imagination. Together they can lead to a
transformation in one’s project. All three of these manifestations of freedom are
interdependent with the practico-inert. The first manifestation of freedom, practical
choice, necessitates interaction with the empirical world to present those options. The
second manifestation, resistance, require practico-inert circumstances against which to
resist. The third manifestation, imagination, takes place with the practico-inert as the
original foundation against which we imagine another state of affairs. Freedom for
Sartre is deeply dependent on historical and material conditions and is inconceivable
independent of the empirical realm.
These four differences between Sartre’s and Kant’s views result in very different
framework for interpreting what conditions our possibilities as subjects. For Kant, our
possibilities for being subjects are conditioned by our universal categories for
rationality, objective, pre-existing moral values, and our freedom to obey or disobey the
moral law. For Sartre, our possibilities are conditioned by material objects with
collective meaning, language and ideas, encounters with others, and class—all which
bear the traces of history within them. With the introduction of the practico-inert in
CDR, the praxis/practico-inert spiral presents an even starker contrast to Kant. As I have
noted, the practico-inert adds historical depth to every aspect of subjectivity, drawing a
larger margin of difference between the noumenal self and the dialectical spiral. The
practico-inert shows the full force of circumstances on our experiences, our
comprehension of ourselves, and all of our decision making. This becomes especially
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important when we explore ethics in Chapter Three—while for Kant, the moral law is
timeless and objective, for Sartre, ethics is historically situated and dependent.
Conclusion

In this Chapter, we have seen that Sartre introduces a view of subjectivity as an
ongoing project. In BN, this project is built by a relationship of nihilation between
consciousness and matter. In CDR, the project is an ongoing spiral of consciousness
mediated by matter, history, and sociality. CDR adds historical depth to the existential
vision Sartre builds in BN and shows the full force of historical circumstances on the
formation of our subjectivity. The introduction of the practico-inert introduces a realm
of worked matter comprised of physical objects, culture, and class. It introduces serial
thinking, passive activity, and the effects of antipraxis and counterfinality on our project.
Sartre constructs a socially, materially engaged historical agent whose possibilities are
structured by material objects, language and ideas, culture, class, and sociality. This has
consequences for Sartre’s view of freedom, in which individuals’ freedom must take
place as a negotiation with that which is already given. The examples of people from
the lower working classes, such as the Dop shampoo worker, show the limits on
practical navigation, resistance, and imagination. CDR introduces passivity, seriality,
antipraxis and counterfinality, and shows how these both limit and enable us.
Sartre’s views are clearly at odds with the self-determining and objectively
rational liberal subject. Kant’s metaphysical move of positing the noumenal self outside
of the empirical realm and his association of freedom with the universal moral law result
in a subject whose possibilities are narrowly defined through limits which are
independent of historical, social, and cultural situations. At the same time, Kant’s
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subjects are granted a robust sense of autonomy that they possess independently of
individual material circumstances. Similarly, contemporary deontological and
contractarian approaches rooted in Kantian principles see social and historical conditions
as secondary to our subjectivity, not as constituting it.
As will be emphasized in detail in Chapter Four, Sartre’s views on subjectivity
have significant implications for the field and profession of healthcare. For example, the
delivery of medicine in the United States is affected by the practico-inert in terms of the
employer-sponsored private insurance system, which contributes to scarcity in the
delivery of medicine in by limiting providers and constraining the treatment options
providers can offer patients. Additionally, experiences with each other in the context of
healthcare bring together individuals of many different economic and social
backgrounds whose worldviews and conceptions of self and other have been shaped by
their specific experiences unique to their social, historical context. Consequently the
delivery of medicine is an intersubjective experience that unites individuals around a
common object (for example, medical facility) but may result in serial relations between
patients and providers. Additionally, the passive dimensions of self that Sartre
identifies, including internalized ideas and discourses, are reflected in patients’ and
providers’ beliefs and this affects the delivery and practice of medicine. Because
healthcare requires cooperation between numerous agents to deliver care, seriality and
serial reasoning are especially undesirable in this context. The freedom of both patients
and providers is a matter of navigating amidst a set of sometimes very constraining
limiting conditions. For example, providers’ praxis is operates within limited time to
interact with patients, shortage of staff, pressure from colleagues, facility rules, medical
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codes of ethics, and the choices and desires of patients. In a Sartrean framework,
individuals are becoming subjects with possibilities through healthcare practices,
inscribed in a social, historical, material context, and affected by the practico-inert,
scarcity, seriality, and other intersubjective encounters. Thus, a Sartrean approach to
healthcare ethics provides a more encompassing analysis of the subject-forming
dimension of healthcare than deontological approaches rooted in the thought of Kant.
In the next Chapter I will show how Foucault shares several of Sartre’s
assertions on social-historical subjectivity and the relationship of freedom and necessity
in subject-formation. However Foucault’s theory also challenges Sartre’s assertions in
several respects: Foucault rejects Sartre’s notion that the relationship between the
individual and one’s environment is dialectical, arguing instead that subjects form
through historical breaks, not constantly developing totalisations. Foucault focuses on
unintentional mechanisms of power as structuring individual’s ontological possibilities,
a position that holds similarities and differences with Sartre’s conception of practicoinert. Foucault’s thought also challenges Sartre’s view regarding the primacy of praxis
by showing how unintentional mechanisms of power, such as biopower, can transform
our material conditions. Contrasting Foucault’s subject with a version of the liberal
subject will also bring the differences between the two thinkers into greater clarity.
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Chapter Two: Foucault and our Historical, Material, Social Possibilities: Systems
of Thought, Strategies of Power, and Practices of the Self
Introduction: Foucault’s Turn to the Subject
Michel Foucault’s philosophy, like Sartre’s, is focused on giving an account of
the historically specific experiences of individuals. His corpus, including his early works
on language and knowledge, his genealogical period focused on regulation of behavior,
and his later lecture series on practices of the self, share at least one common goal with
Sartre’s work: to uncover how social, historical, and political forces shape the
ontological and practical field of possibilities for individuals to become subjects.
Foucault, like Sartre, examines specific social practices and discourses and shows that
they have a historically dated origin and change over time. These social and historical
practices make modes of thinking, speaking, and acting possible. Sartre began his
philosophical exploration in Being and Nothingness by focusing on the conscious
subject’s experiences, and then later explored the external social forces which structure
the possibilities for subjectivity in The Critique of Dialectical Reason, Volume 1.
Foucault, in contrast, began his philosophical career by first exploring the social and
historical sources of conditioning, and turned to the experiences of individual conscious
subjects in his last lectures. Like Sartre, he also thought that his earlier works should be
understood in light of his later conclusions.
In his lecture series The Government of Self and Others (GSO), Foucault
retrospectively comments on his motives throughout his career. He states that
throughout his works he has explored a “history of thought,” which he describes as:
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[A]n analysis of what could be called focal points of experience in which forms
of a possible knowledge (savoir), normative frameworks of behavior for
individuals, and potential modes of existence for possible subjects are linked
together.170
He identifies three different axes in his work: the axis of things, the axis of behaviors,
and an axis of modes of subjectivity.171 In his works on the axis of things, for example
in The Order of Things (OT),172 his interest was the lived experiences of subjects in
different historical periods that were influenced by the creation of bodies of knowledge.
This period focused on uncovering different standards for truth, that is to say, the rules
governing speaking and acting that determine what is accepted as true. In the second
axis where the focus is on behavior, for example in Discipline and Punish (DP),173 and
The History of Sexuality (HS),174 Foucault analyzed how conduct was controlled,
observed, and classified in order to establish different categories of normality and
abnormality. Foucault refers to these systems of controls as “strategies of power,”
understood in a non-pejorative way.175 Foucault’s third axis, for example, The
Hermeneutics of the Subject,176 refers to modes of being a subject or practices of the
self. This refers to ways that subjects perform practices on themselves in order to
become a certain type of subject. The conditions for knowledge and truth, control over
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behavior, and practices of the self offer possibilities for experiences in each historical
epoch. It is by navigating these possibilities that subjects emerge. Every stage of his
thought, Foucault says:
[T]ried to define to some degree what could be called “experiences.” The
experience of madness, the experience of disease, the experience of criminality,
and the experience of sexuality are, I think, important focal points of experiences
in our culture.177
Foucault’s famous explorations of human thought and behavior are ultimately about
experiences people have that influence what they think, speak about, and do. In “The
Subject and Power,” Foucault echoes these statements, asserting that his interest
throughout his philosophical works was ultimately “to create a history of different
modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects.”178
During his second axis of study, in The History of Sexuality, Foucault identifies
a strategy of power he calls “biopower.” Biopower refers to a diverse set of controls
which developed after the Western discovery that human beings are a species. Foucault
describes biopower as the “numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the
subjugation of bodies and the control of populations,”179 and defines it as “the set of
mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became
the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power.”180 With the emergence
of biopower, mechanisms of conditioning were put into place to foster new
understandings of human life processes and to control or modify them. Foucault argues
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that biopower has dominated Western thinking and life processes for the past several
centuries, and the introduction of biopower was an important moment in our recent
historical past. Understanding how our subjectivity is constituted today must include an
exploration of biopower and the disciplinary mechanisms or “mechanisms of security”
that accompany it. Although Foucault believes that strategies of power comprehensively
shape our field of possibilities, he nevertheless argues that there is still room for freedom
in his thought, which takes the form of resistance and critical reflection. We will see
that freedom for Foucault is not an unconditional characteristic of human consciousness,
as it is for Sartre, but a practice that individuals can participate in.
Foucault’s view of the subject, like Sartre’s, calls into question many
characteristics of the liberal subject that are presupposed in mainstream healthcare
ethics. In Chapter One I examined the liberal roots of the deontological subject using
Kant’s work. In this Chapter I present the liberal view of the subject found in the
thought of John Stuart Mill, which is at the basis of contemporary rule-utilitarian
approaches. Mill presents the view that human nature is defined by our rationality and
ability to lead self-directed, autonomous lives that are free from interference from the
state, culture, and custom. I show that Foucault’s analyses challenge Mill’s thought by
rejecting an inherent human nature. In a Foucauldian interpretation, in Utilitarianism
and On Liberty, Mill offers a set of historically specific practices for becoming a subject,
and Mill’s thought has historical limitations, not universal application. Additionally, for
Mill, the subject exists prior to being potentially interfered with or left alone. This is in
contrast to Foucault’s argument that the subject develops alongside our policies and
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practices. Because Foucault presents his philosophical views through analysis of
historical examples, I will illustrate this point with a contemporary example.
Hence, the objective of this Chapter is fourfold: 1) to explicate how Foucault
argues that possibilities for subjects are constituted through frameworks of thought,
behavioral control, and practices of the self, 2) to focus on discipline and biopower in
particular, illustrating their functioning and connection with contemporary subjectivity,
3) to show the role of freedom in Foucault’s vision of subject-formation, and 4) to
contrast Foucault’s conception of the subject with the view of the liberal subject found
in the work of John Stuart Mill.

1

Foucault and Subjectivity: Recent Literature

There are many recent historical studies tracing Foucault’s views on subjectivity
and how it relates to his different focal points throughout his career. Jon Simons,181 for
example, focuses on Foucault’s conceptualizations of power and resistance in his
genealogical period, or axis of behavior, focusing on the relationship between truth,
power, and ethics. Simons focuses on discipline, normalization, and biopower as they
infiltrate possibilities for subjectivity. He shows how resistance against these
mechanisms is necessary for actively fashioning our own subjectivity, and allows us to
carve our own identities. He pays great attention to resistance of power mechanisms as
a practice of freedom.182 My project will be different from Simons’ because, first, I
include all three of Foucault’s periods in my analyses, second, I focus on biopower as a
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life-affirming mechanism, third, I emphasize critical historical reflection as a practice of
freedom, and, fourth, I contrast Foucault’s views on subjectivity and the liberal version
found in Mill.
Amy Allen’s project discusses three different moments in Foucault’s corpus,
focusing on his examination of madness, the subject and normalization in prison, and
practices of the self.183 She argues that all three of these moments in Foucault’s thought
can be interpreted through the lens of the subject formed through power. Allen focuses
on Madness and Civilization,184 Psychiatric Power,185 and the Hermeneutics of the
Subject. She argues that there is continuity in all three periods of Foucault’s career, and
works that are traditionally separated as incompatible periods of Foucault’s thought
actually show coherence and consistency. All three eras, in Allen’s view, can be
considered studies of power. Even though Foucault had not yet fully developed his own
concept of power during his first axis, Allen argues that power is present in the text. All
three axes can also be considered investigations into the discursive and non-discursive
possibilities for subjectivity. Last, Allen argues that all three periods show consistency
in terms of the relationship between truth and subjectivity.186 She argues that Foucault
uses different concepts and analytical frameworks as tools in each period to examine
historical experiences, but always focused on the problematics of power, subjectivity,
truth, discourse, and knowledge.187 I am in agreement with Allen that Foucault is using
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different tools to study the same themes throughout all three axes. I will emphasize in
more detail how each period is an analysis of historically specific practices that
introduce a field of possibilities for subjects to emerge.
Johanna Oksala provides recent work tracing Foucault’s concept of biopower to
his concept of governmentality, which refers to the actual historical practices and
technical means through which Western liberal democracies are governed.188 Oksala
traces the shift in Foucault’s thought from studying disciplinary power and biopower in
his earlier genealogical periods to his focus on the administrative state in his lecture
series Security, Territory, and Population. In this lecture series, she argues, Foucault
transfers his discussion of the new interest in “populations” that arose with biopower
into the context of the power of the political state.189 She argues that Foucault
convincingly shows that disciplinary power was never more important or valuable than
the moment when it became useful to control people at the level of populations. She
argues that Foucault’s shift of interest from the specifics of disciplinary institutions to
that of governments was not a change in focus, just an extension of his interest in power
and how discipline and biopower became integrated into security apparatuses of the
state. The new concept of “population” that arose in the 18th century led to government
officials having interest in things like birth and death rates, labor capacity, and economic
potential. To govern a population meant to have some degree of control over these
characteristics. Oksala writes, “[W]e live in society in which a complex managerial and
administrative apparatus governs a population by means of policies, tactics, and
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strategies in the name of wellbeing and care.”190 She emphasizes that this shift to the
state having an interest in controlling these aspects of the “population” as a whole
produced a new type of subjectivity that was carefully regulated by various apparatuses
of the state.191 Oksala provides a convincing and useful account of Foucault’s interests
in his lectures on governmentality, their connections with earlier works, and how
biopower and mechanisms of security are related to subjectivity. My work will go
beyond Oksala’s in that I focus on Foucault’s views of subjectivity in all three periods of
his career, and emphasize the contemporary relevance of biopower and mechanisms of
security for understanding contemporary subjectivity, especially as it relates to
healthcare practices.
In a comprehensive work, Robert Strozier192 outlines Foucault’s views on
subjectivity as they relate to different representations of subjectivity in various periods
and thinkers in the history of Western Philosophy, including the Sophists, Renaissance
thinkers, Descartes, Kant, and Freud. Strozier examines these traditions against the
background of Foucault's work, especially Foucault's later writings on care of self as a
practice of self-relation and Foucault’s idea of historical subjectivity in general. Strozier
argues that almost every treatment of subjectivity in the history of Western thought is
related to the idea of the “originating subject” in which the subject is a starting point that
produces culture and history. In contrast, he characterizes Foucault’s view as one in
which the subject is produced by culture and history. For example, Strozier comments
on Kant:
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The Kantian ahistorical subject defines an essential part of the discourse of
modernity; it is this transparent subject and object of knowledge from which
scientific knowledge is produced. On the other hand, it is this same subject that,
by a later turn of the discursive element, becomes obscure, demanding
autonomy, ahistoricality, and escape from determination by scientific
discourses.193
Strozier includes commentary on how Foucauldian genealogy can be used to reveal how
categories related to race, gender, or sexual orientation have been produced by culture or
history. This provides us with insight into how these categories might be disrupted. In
other words, showing a lack of necessity in the categories through which we identify
ourselves can help us rethink the boundaries of those very categories.194 These are
possibilities enabled by Foucault’s view of the subject, which would not be possible if
we view the subject as the origin or starting point. Strozier provides an important,
comprehensive study that engages with many different thinkers throughout history to
show the uniqueness of Foucault’s views. My analysis will be different from Strozier’s
to the extent that, first, I focus more on contemporary subjectivity as it relates to
biopower and mechanisms of security in particular, second, I draw connections between
biopower and ethics in Chapter Three, third, I compare Foucault’s subject to the view of
the subject found in Mill, and, fourth, show the relevance of Foucault’s thought for
contemporary healthcare policy analysis.
In a recent work, Arun Iyer195 explores the epistemological implications of
Foucault’s discursive practices and Heidegger’s history of being, and argues that the two
thinkers significantly expand the notions of knowledge and thought. Iyer traces how
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both philosophers argue that thought is not just an act by which the object is represented
in an idea, and knowledge is not just a state of the mind of the individual subject
corresponding to the object. Both Heidegger and Foucault argue that thought is a
dynamic process in which the subject and the object gain their respective identities
alongside each other. Iyer shows how for both, knowledge is the opening up of a space
in which the subject and object can encounter each other and in which true and false
statements about an object then become possible. Iyer focuses on Foucault’s argument
in his first axis focused on knowledge and thought. My project is different from Iyer’s
to the extent that I examine Foucault’s views on subjectivity in all three of his periods
(or “axes”), and emphasize how power is shaping our possibilities today. I will draw on
Iyer’s work as appropriate when exploring Foucault’s first axis.
In short, my work differs from all current work on Foucault to the extent that I,
first, explore all three periods or “axes” through the lens of how Foucault argues that
these practices are shaping a field of possibilities for becoming a subject. Second, I
focus specifically on how biopower and mechanisms of security are influencing our
possibilities for subjectivity in the present. Third, I draw a comparison of Foucault’s
views with the work of Mill. Fourth, I show the implications of Foucault’s views for
contemporary healthcare ethics. As my objective in this Chapter is to explain how
Foucault argues throughout various stages of his career that subjectivity is constituted
through discursive practices, behavioral control, and practices of the self, I will focus
primarily on illustrating these concepts through a close reading of the primary texts. I
will draw on secondary literature when appropriate to highlight important concepts in
Foucault’s views on subjectivity.
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2

First Axis: Discursive Practices and Possible Knowledge in The Order of
Things and The Archaeology of Knowledge

2.1 The Order of Things

In The Government of Self and Others (GSO), Foucault says that in order to
study subjectivity as constituted through the axis of things he sought to:
[I]dentify the discursive practices which were able to constitute the matrices of
possible bodies of knowledge, and study the rules, the game of true and false,
and, more generally, the forms of veridiction in these discursive practices.196
In the texts that can be retrospectively interpreted as belonging to his first axis of study,
Foucault argues that the systems of thought we use to order and arrange objects of
possible knowledge are governed by justificatory frameworks (or rules) that operate
below the reflective awareness of individuals. These rules determine the boundaries of
what is able to be thought of and spoken about at a certain time. In The Order of Things
(OT) Foucault explores how precise historical changes led to new ways of thinking in
three different eras. These changes rearranged the ways we ordered and interpreted
potential objects of knowledge. Foucault says that any relationship between a subject
and an object necessarily takes place within an epistemological domain or a field of
knowledge, which he calls savoir. Knowledge as connaissance refers to a particular
corpus of knowledge such as biology or psychology. Knowledge as savoir refers to the
conditions and relations that allow connaissance to emerge:
By connaissance I mean the relation of the subject to the object and the formal
rules that govern it. Savoir refers to the conditions that are necessary in a
particular period for this or that type of object to be given to connaissance and
for this or that enunciation to be formulated.197
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Thus, a field of conditions for knowledge (savoir) is necessary for there to be subjects
and objects at all, as this field provides the conditions and categories for thought to take
place during this period. Foucault refers to this field of knowledge as each epoch’s
episteme. Foucault frames his central question as follows: “Generally speaking, what
does it mean, no longer being able to think a certain thought. Or to introduce a new
thought?”198 To answer this question he explores three different eras of thought to show
that each had very specific historical conditions of possibility.199 In this text, when
Foucault refers to “thought,” he does not mean the intentional conscious activity of an
individual’s mental deliberations, such as Sartre means with praxis. Rather, “thought”
refers to an anonymous field of material relations that allow us to distinguish objects of
knowledge.
In Iyer’s discussion of OT, he uses the phrase “crossing the threshold of
subjectivity and objectivity” to indicate that in different historical periods, there were
different standards, or thresholds, that subjects and objects were required to cross in
order to be distinguished and individuated.200 At the level of speaking and writing, a
field of knowledge manifests as a discursive formation: a complex group of elements
which make it possible for subjects to be subjects and for subjects to define objects. The
various elements that comprise a discursive formation cannot be considered purely
subjective, as existing only in human thought, nor objectively independent of our
thinking them. Rather, the discursive formation defines the boundaries between subjects
and objects. A discursive formation, that is to say, a system of thought, describes how
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different elements in each period are related to each other. A discursive formation
stipulates the boundaries between valid and invalid, truth and falsity, and subject and
object. As Iyer comments, “[I]t specifies the threshold an individual thought, belief, or
idea has to cross in order to be eligible for classification of true or false.”201 Discursive
formations are not consistent progressions in which subjects are able to give better
accounts of objects of knowledge. Rather, discursive formations are characterized by
rupture and historical breaks.202
In OT, Foucault examines the Renaissance, the Classical age (sixteenth to
eighteenth century) and the contemporary period (late eighteenth century to the first half
of the twentieth century). He traces the transitions of how subjects ordered and related
objects of knowledge in each of these periods, and the transitions in the conditions
enabling subjects to speak about and have knowledge of objects. Foucault believes it is
intuitive to assume a correspondence between the objects we perceive and the words we
use to describe them.203 However, he rejects this simplistic view of a correspondence
between the language we use and the objects that language is intended to represent.
Rather, subjects and objects define themselves within an episteme, an anonymous
framework of relations that determines their place in the order of things.204 Although
there is no way to return to previous forms of thought, Foucault suggests that exploring
the conditions for the possibility of thought will enable the possibility for us to think
differently.
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In OT, Foucault says that in the 16th century (the Renaissance period), people
understood and arranged objects in terms of similarities, resemblances, and oppositions.
Foucault comments, “The nature of things, their coexistence, the way in which they are
linked together and communicate is nothing other than their resemblance.”205 In these
passages, Foucault emphasizes that resemblance or similitude was the threshold of
determination, as Iyer would put it, through which both subjects and objects could be
distinguished. Things became nameable and susceptible to conceptualization through
relationships of similitude with other objects. Being a subject with beliefs about self and
the world was a matter of deciphering relationships between different types of objects.
One crossed the threshold of subjectivity by discovering “the hidden resemblances and
kinship, attraction, or secretly shared nature within them.”206 During this period, magic
and mythology were considered valid foundations for knowing, as they explained
resemblances between things and how they were related to each other.207
In the Classical period, beginning in the 17th century, Foucault argues that there
was a shift in the episteme. People began to understand and interpret things through
representation rather than resemblance. Magic and mythology were replaced with
scientific understanding. Foucault argues that this was not a moment of enlightenment
in which new thinkers began to interpret the world properly in contrast to their
predecessors. Instead, what occurred was a rupture in the discursive formations that
articulated the boundaries in which thought could take place. In the Classical period,
objects were now classified scientifically in ordered series and tables based on their
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complexity. Things were arranged by quality and quantity.208 Objects became objects,
or, as Iyer says, crossed the threshold of objectivity, when susceptible to scientific
analysis. Establishing oneself as a subject then became a matter of “providing oneself by
intuition with a distinct representation of things, and apprehending clearly the inevitable
connection between one element in a series with that which immediately follows it.”209
The meeting of subject and object now takes place on the level of intuition. Scientific
measurement becomes the new means of interpreting objects and the properties of an
object capable of objective measurement become the new threshold for knowledge.210
Foucault argues that at the end of the 18th century, thought undergoes another
rupture, one that is impossible to objectively describe because our own thinking is still
characterized by it. As order replaced resemblance in the Classical age, in the
contemporary age, order was replaced with History. In this episteme, objects gained a
new level of depth and complexity. Objects now become objects not through visible
measurement and order, but through their functions within human experience. We
began to interpret objects based on how they emerge and give rise to each other.211
Physical properties are no longer sufficient for things to be objects for us, as objects of
knowledge possess more depth. Studying living beings means studying organizational
systems. We are able to talk about an economics characterized by labor and production
rather than economics as quantifiably representing exchange of wealth. We are now able
to recognize a historicity to language and study how it changes over time.212
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These changes in the threshold of objectivity (how objects were established as
objects) were accompanied by changes in the threshold of subjectivity. The new mode of
subjectivity was being a “man” or a human being as understood by the new human
sciences. This was a new concept that did not exist in the previous episteme:
Before the end of the eighteenth century man did not exist—any more than the
potency of life, the fecundity of labor, or the historical density of language….It
has been too easy to imagine that he had been waiting for thousands of years in
the darkness for that moment of illumination in which he would finally be
known.213
In this passage, Foucault argues that the concept of a “human being” as now understood
by the human sciences is only a recent mode of being a subject, not a subject that has
been present all along but just not understood or discovered. In the modern episteme,
human beings are no longer just subjects who have knowledge of objects, but became
objects of knowledge themselves:
[N]o philosophy, no political or moral option, no empirical science of any kind,
no observation of the human body, no analysis of sensation, no imagination, or
the passions, had ever encountered, in the seventeenth or eighteenth century,
anything like man; for man did not exist (any more than life, or language, or
labour); and the human sciences did not appear when, as a result of some
pressing rationalism, some unresolved scientific problem, some practical
concern, it was decided to include man…among the objects of science…they
appeared when man constituted himself in Western culture as both that which
must be conceived of and that which is to be known.214
The depth gained by both subject and object in the modern episteme makes it so objects
are interpreted and organized through the complex categories of life, labor, and
language, which are not reducible to sortable physical properties. When people began to
understand humans both as possessors of knowledge and themselves susceptible to
observation and study, it was believed that these new bodies of knowledge were
213
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revealing previously uncovered truths about the nature of the human. Foucault, on the
contrary, emphasizes that the standards for knowing objects actually provided a change
in the conditions for thinking about objects at all, and placed us in a new position in
relation to objects.215
Foucault’s arguments in OT have implications for his vision of social and
historical subjectivity and its relation to practice. If our subjectivity is interwoven and
only emerges alongside the objects we are able to think and speak about, our social and
political practices are also formulated through these categories that make reasoning
possible. The thresholds for being a subject who knows and the establishment of human
beings as objects to be known also affect how we view and relate to others. Perhaps
most importantly, though, by showing that we used to think differently and that the
conditions for speaking, writing, and knowing have changed over time, Foucault’s
analyses enable a rejection of inevitability in the way we categorize objects, including
individuals. This allows us to question the nature of the concepts and justifications that
we use, and consequently also question the thinking behind our own practices.

2.2 The Archaeology of Knowledge
The second text that can be interpreted as belonging to Foucault’s first axis of
study is The Archaeology of Knowledge (AK).216 In this text, Foucault explores how the
ways we think and speak about objects is interwoven with precise historical conditions.
By examining the conditions for how things are spoken and written about, Foucault is
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simultaneously studying how our experiences of speaking and writing create
possibilities for us to be subjects. Foucault states that this book belongs to the “field in
which the questions of the human being, consciousness, origin, and the subject emerge,
intersect, mingle, and separate off.”217
In AK, Foucault introduces the term “archaeology” to refer to a historical
exploration of “archives,” or systems regulating speech and thought. As Foucault is not
interested in the logical or grammatical structures behind what we say and do, he
examines discourse in terms of statements rather than sentences. A statement, unlike a
sentence, cannot be written or spoken at any time, but occurs in a context. A statement
may not necessarily have the grammatical structure of a sentence or the logical structure
of a proposition, but it must have a referent (something to which it refers), a subject (one
who produces the statement), an associated field (rules for the body of knowledge it
belongs to), and a materiality (the means through which the statement can be expressed).
The statement:
[I]s a function of existence that properly belongs to signs and on the basis of
which one may then decide, through analysis or intuition, whether or not they
‘make sense,’ according to what rule they follow one another or are juxtaposed,
for what they are the sign, and what sort of act is carried out by their formulation
(oral or written).218
Statements occur in a context and are governed by informal rules that are created and
enforced through the practices of knowing subjects. They emerge in relation to existing
fields of knowledge, institutions, and authorities.
Statements take place within the context of a discursive practice. By discursive
practice, Foucault means “a body of anonymous, historical rules, always determined in
217
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the time and space that have defined a given period, and for a given social, economic,
geographical, or linguistic area.”219 Hence, we can speak of a “historical a priori” in
the sense of the conditions necessary for the emergence of true statements. The
historical a priori designates a group of rules that characterize a discursive practice.
These rules are not imposed from the outside, but are interwoven amidst the things they
regulate.220
Foucault says that archaeology focuses on how and in what form political
practice “takes part in [the] conditions of emergence, insertion, and functioning”221 of a
discourse. This refers to how the rules for speaking about something are formed at a
specific time. The body of rules governing discourse, Foucault argues, include “surfaces
of emergence,” which refers to the existing fields into which a new discourse emerges.
The rules also include “authorities of delimitation” which refers to those individuals and
institutions who are trusted to define the boundaries of what is true and false regarding
this object of knowledge. Further, the body of rules includes “grids of specification,” or,
the systems according to which the different types of the object are divided, contrasted,
related, or classified.222
For example, Foucault examines the concept of “madness” and how the rules
governing speaking and thinking about madness changed over time. We do not find
consistency, but rupture in the different ways that madness was considered an object to
be known:
The unity of the object ‘madness’ does not enable to individualize a group of
statements, and to establish between them a relation that is both constant and
219
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describable…The unity of discourses on madness…would be the interplay of the
rules that make possible the appearance of objects during a given period of time:
objects that are shaped by measures of discrimination and repression, objects that
are manifested in pathological descriptions, objects that are circumscribed by
medical codes, practices, treatment, and care.223
What provides unity and structure to a discourse is not the nature of the object of
knowledge, but the set of rules that governs the way the objects are thought about.
Madness as form of deviance or mental illness was not conceptualized over time through
purely objective descriptive statements about it. Rather, its boundaries emerged in the
different roles the concept played in societal practice.
In the 17th and 18th century, Foucault argues that madness was spoken about
using medical statements. The rules determining the truth about madness were derived
from the rules that were used to talk about other types of disease. Madness was
contained through confining people deemed to be mad in order to separate them from
the healthy public. In the 18th century, the surfaces of emergence were constituted by
family, social group, work situation, and religious community. Each of these fields was
normative and had different tolerance for deviance, “degrees of rationalization,
conceptual codes, and types of theory,”224 which determined what counted as mad. In
the 19th century, new surfaces began to function: art, sexuality, and penality. It was
during this time, Foucault says, that sexuality’s deviations first became subject to
psychiatric analysis and the object of madness became associated with sexual deviance.
Additionally, madness was previously carefully distinguished from criminality, but with
the new field of penality, criminals were seen as mad or mentally ill.225
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The 19th century also brought with it changes in the authorities of delimitation.
“In the nineteenth century, medicine…became the major authority in society that
delimited, designated, named, and established madness as an object.”226 By medicine,
Foucault means institutions, individuals who practice medicine, and medicine as a body
of knowledge and practice, which were viewed by the public and government officials
as authoritative sources. New authorities of delimitation also included agents of the
state, as madness was incorporated into the determination of appropriate punishment
with new definitions and categories affecting how people were sentenced. In the 19th
century new grids of specification also emerged and the object of madness took on a
new depth. Madness was classified in relation to the soul, the physical body, and the life
and history of individuals.227
These surfaces of emergence, authorities of delimitation, and grids of
specification do not provide fully formed objects of knowledge that are then then
susceptible to being known. Instead, they provide tools of differentiation that allow
madness as an object of knowledge to be possible. It was a web of relations between
medicine, the justice system, and how these fields were practiced that led to the
formation of a group of objects susceptible to conceptualization.228As a consequence of
Foucault’s argument, a subject cannot speak about any object at any time, nor do objects
present themselves to us without conditions. Objects do not wait to be discovered by us,
but emerge from “a complex group of relations.”229 When we examine the relations in a
discursive formation, “what we discover is neither a configuration, nor a form, but a
226
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group of rules that are immanent in a practice, and define it in its specificity.”230 Objects
that can be spoken about emerge from the practices of speaking, thinking subjects.
Subjects do not consciously, intentionally create these objects of thought. Subjects
become subjects with beliefs about themselves, the world, and others through interaction
with these practices and objects. The kinds of subjects we are and the kinds of things we
know and speak about cannot be separated from each other, but come to be concurrently.
Again, we can interpret AK in light of Foucault’s own retrospective overview of
his objectives. Discursive practices play a prominent role in shaping our lived
experiences. Through speaking with others, especially those perceived as authorities,
criteria emerge for understanding the truth about ourselves and others. Subjects are
constituted as subjects by the different roles that can be assumed within the discourse:
[A]ccording to a certain grid of explicit or implicit interrogations…[the subject]
is the questioning subject, and, according to a certain programme of information,
he is the listening subject; according to a table of characteristic features, he is the
seeing subject, and, according to a descriptive type, the observing subject.231
A system of formation for a particular discourse or group of statements does not stem
from a transcendental subject, rather, from a “regularity of practice.”232
In his axis of things, Foucault makes a convincing case for the historical
contingency of thought and discourse. He shows that discourse is a practice, resulting
from a complex web of relations, intertwined with individuals and institutions which
lead to categories through which objects come to be known and spoken about. Subjects
are both originators of those statements and objects of them. By assuming a position
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within these statements and objects, subjects develop beliefs about self, other, and
world.

3

Second Axis: Discipline, Biopower, and Mechanisms of Security

3.1 Discipline and Punish
Foucault’s second method for examining subjectivity involves “studying the
techniques and procedures by which one sets about conducting the conduct of others.”233
This is Foucault’s focus in his genealogical period, in which he traces the history of
modern social institutions such as prison systems. Whereas his archeological period
focused on the relations present in different episteme, his genealogical period was
focused on the question of why. Why were there transitions from one way of thinking to
another? The point of a genealogical analysis is to show the transformations from one
form of thinking to another, one type of practice to the next, and to reveal that systems
of thinking and regulation are the result of contingent historical changes.
The answer to the question of why is found in Foucault’s exploration of what he
calls “mechanisms of power.” Typically when power is discussed in philosophical
discourse it refers to intentional domination over or oppression of others, and is almost
always associated with the authority of the state or a group. Foucault’s conception of
power is much broader. Foucault calls power a “complex strategical situation in a
particular society”234 which involves methods for regulating conduct. This includes
direct limits placed on behavior or ways that subjects are conditioned to govern
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themselves. These methods “involve a set of rational techniques, and the efficiency of
those techniques is due to a subtle integration of coercion-technologies and selftechnologies.”235 In other words, subjects exercise power in their interaction with others
and are simultaneously submitted to power in any society with institutions and rules.
Power relationships, as Foucault understands them, are not external to other types of
relationships. Rather, they are immanent in all of our relationships. For example,
relationships between experts, teachers and students, family members, sexual partners,
doctors and patients, public officials, and citizens all involve power relations.236
Foucault further describes power as “the strategies, the networks, the mechanisms, all
those techniques by which a decision is accepted and by which that decision could not
but be taken in the way it was.”237 From this viewpoint, power parallels Sartre’s
practico-inert—systems, attitudes, and structures that no one individual designs or
intends. Foucault writes:
Power relations are both intentional and nonsubjective…there is no power that is
exercised without a series of aims and objectives. But this does not mean that it
results from the choice or decision of an individual subject…[its] logic is
perfectly clear, the aims decipherable, and yet it is often the case that no one is
there to have invented them, and few who can be said to have formulated
them.238
The mechanisms and techniques which lead subjects to behave and decide in a certain
way are, Foucault says, “not something invented by the individual himself. They are
models that he finds in his culture and are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by
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his culture, his society, and his social group.”239 Individuals are born into systems of
power and power relations operate in every societal context. It is only because of power
relations that bodies of knowledge (connaissance) can emerge.
According to Foucault, two modern forms of power operating since the 19th
century in Western society are discipline and biopower, although these two strategies are
intertwined and employ overlapping techniques. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault
exemplifies both disciplinary power and the roots of biopower by tracing the shift in
punitive mechanisms from public torture and execution to the modern system of
imprisonment. The common assumption is that this transition occurred because society
realized that imprisonment is a more humane way to punish than public execution.
Foucault calls this assumption into question and shows that the shift to imprisonment
was actually the result of precise historical changes in the way that behavior came to be
seen as controllable for public goals.240
Foucault argues that public torture and execution in the 17th and 18th century had
a specific set of aims: it was not meant to reform or correct behavior, but intended to
enact the vengeance of the law, display sovereign authority, and make an example of
what would happen if one trespassed against the ruling class.241 In the 18th and 19th
centuries, there was a shift in punitive mechanisms. Foucault traces some of the changes
in punitive measures to a change in the types of crimes that were committed—violent
crime decreased and economic crime increased. In response to this change, gentler
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punishments were introduced that were commeasurable with the crime committed.242
These new methods of control were not based on a newfound respect for the “humanity”
of criminals, but were motivated by an effort to increase control over the social body.
The aim of reform, ultimately, was “to make of the punishment and repression of the
illegalities a regular function, coextensive with society; not to punish less, but to punish
better.”243 According to Foucault, punitive techniques of this period established a new
set of individuals with the authority to punish. The new techniques were intended to
preemptively condition people’s thinking and behavior rather than only exerting
physical punishment on the body after a crime was committed, as was the aim of public
torture and execution. In other words, instead of seeking simply to physically punish
someone by inflicting pain on his or her body, discipline was a process of convincing
people to change their conduct.244
In addition to the introduction of new control over behavior, Foucault explains
that the 18th century also saw a new interest in the modification of the human body.245
Several new techniques of control were introduced: subtle coercions, gestures, and
attitudes which were controlled by isolating and observing prisoners and then motivating
or coercing them to act in a certain way. These new methods can be considered
“disciplines” and they paved the way for the emergence of the prison system. “The
human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down, and
rearranges it.”246 New methods were present in educational, disciplinary, and medical
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institutions such as schools, hospitals, and prisons. While each of these institutions had
different explicitly stated social aims, they employed overlapping techniques to achieve
their ends.
To illustrate this point, Foucault uses the example of military hospitals. He
argues that it is impossible to dissociate the disciplinary measures of the 18th century
from new advances in medicine and the way that disease was treated. Disease was now
treated by controlling bodies and influencing minds. Disciplinary and medical practices
developed alongside one another:
[A]n administrative and political space was articulated upon a therapeutic space;
it tended to individualize bodies, diseases, symptoms, lives and deaths; it
constituted a real table of juxtaposed and carefully distinct singularities. Out of
discipline, a medically useful space was born.247
Schools, hospitals, and prisons all introduced new, but similar, means of evaluation and
classification. Although there was some variation in implementation, Foucault identifies
three primary features of disciplinary apparatuses in these institutions: hierarchical
observation, normalizing judgment, and examination.
First, new mechanisms of observation were introduced in which observers could
watch or regulate without themselves being seen. Foucault says that this process “was
secretly preparing a new knowledge of man.”248 Hospital buildings allowed a controlled
environment for observation and separation of patients. Schools became structures of
observation, many having living quarters that enabled students’ behavior to be seen and
regulated.249 Through the power of functional surveillance, “disciplinary power became
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an ‘integrated’ system, linked from the inside to the aims of the mechanism in which it
was practiced.”250
New methods of surveillance and control allowed the establishment of
institutional standards and introduced processes of normalization. By normalization,
Foucault means the introduction of a prescriptive norm and the subsequent classification
of individuals based on their deviation from the norm. Normalization is integral to the
application of techniques of discipline. Foucault argues that within 18th century schools,
hospitals, and prisons, five new disciplinary operations came into play in order to bring
subjects in line with a specific behavioral standard—to normalize them. First, there
were strategies for comparing the actions or behavior of individuals to a standard
principle or rule to be followed regarding what could be said and done and at what
times. These standards could be educational (different methods of testing), medical
(quarantine, prescribed therapies), or punitive (isolation or required work in prison)
depending on the institution in which they were employed. Second, these procedures
differentiated individuals from each other by the extent to which they followed the
overall educational, behavioral, or medical standard. Third, authorities in these
institutions measured the value of abilities or nature of individuals in order form a plan
of correction. Fourth, a process of training and correction with measurable standards for
progress was introduced. This established a system for evaluating and categorizing
subjects as “good” and “bad” “healthy” and “sick” “normal” and “deviant.” Fifth, by
marking gaps, hierarchizing qualities, skills, and aptitudes, these various normalizing
processes established a limit that defined the boundaries of normal and abnormal
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subjects.251 If subjects were considered abnormal, behavioral controls were introduced
to bring them in line with the norm. Through a very precise system of controls, there
emerged a framework for individuals to understand themselves and others as normal or
abnormal.
Hierarchical observation and normalization within schools, hospitals, and prisons
were then combined to comprise techniques of examination. “It is a normalizing gaze, a
surveillance that makes it possible to qualify, to classify, and to punish.”252 The
examination involved the evaluation of individuals by experts designated to speak the
truth about them. These experts used standards of measurement to determine if the
individual was of normal intelligence for one’s grade level, of normal health, or
exhibited normal behavior.253 Individuals could be classified and categorized, and
comparative systems were established:
[I]t is the individual as he may be described, judged, measured, compared with
others, in his very individuality; and it is also the individual who has to be
trained or corrected, classified, normalized, excluded, etc.254
The system of disciplinary controls that emerged in the 19th century and permeated
several different institutions made specific lived experiences possible for individuals that
presented them with knowledge about themselves.
Through the new mechanisms of disciplinary power a new connaissance formed:
criminology, which studies the offender, the convict, the delinquent, and the dangerous
individual and constitutes them as objects of knowledge.255 Categories for classifying
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subjects emerged: some were considered psychologically deviant and incurable, some
with strong intellectual capacities that needed redirection, some whose delinquency
stemmed from lack of knowledge and therefore had to be educated, and some who were
simply incapable of functioning on their own and must be permanently integrated into
the prison.256 Subjects now could compare their own criminal case to others and formed
their beliefs through the new categories of normalcy and deviance established by
criminology.
The knowledge about and the ability to control facets of human life, which was
such an integral part of disciplinary power, was then applied at the level of populations.
This is what Foucault refers to as “biopower.”

3.2 Biopower: The History of Sexuality and Security, Territory, Population

Biopower incorporates the strategies of disciplinary power, but applies them to
human beings at the level of populations. Power manifested itself through the control of
human life processes with the aim of advancing the proliferation of life. For example,
power functioned to increase the possibilities for longevity and the health of populations
by regulating birthrates, organizing shared space, and vaccinating. This new
understanding of life as susceptible to manipulation and the accompanying strategies
introduced a historical break in thinking, speaking, and acting. According to Foucault,
this break fundamentally changed the way power was exercised by public officials:
Power would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects over whom the
ultimate dominion was death, but with living beings and the mastery it would be
able to exercise over them would have to be applied at the level of life itself; it
was the taking charge of life…one would have to speak of biopower to designate
256
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what brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and
made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life.257
With the emergence of new bodies of knowledge surrounding human life processes
came the power to regulate the human body. The flourishing of the human population
was the newly established goal:
If the question of man was raised—insofar as he was a specific living being, and
specifically related to other living beings—the reason for this is to be sought in
the new mode of relation between history and life: in this dual position of life
that placed it at the same time outside human history, in its biological
environment, and inside human historicity, penetrated by the latter’s techniques
of knowledge and power.258
Biopower introduced new historical era and an alteration in human historicity. The new
techniques of knowledge and power specific to this historical era understood subjects in
terms of our species’ biological life processes. As emphasized by Oksala, this new
knowledge became the rational principle behind Western governmental institutions.259
In Foucault’s 1977-1978 lecture series Security, Territory, and Population
(STP), he discusses how discipline and biopower were manifested in governmental
processes starting in the 18th century. By incorporating elements of disciplinary power
with the new understanding of the human species at the level of populations, society
from the 18th century forward was controlled through what Foucault refers to as
“mechanisms of security.”260 Mechanisms of security integrate techniques associated
with disciplinary power such as surveillance and normalization and apply these
techniques at the level of populations. Biopower utilizes the same techniques as
discipline, but the application of these techniques is governed by a different set of
257
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objectives. For example, biopower was at play when calculating average rates of
criminality, when statistically predicting theft in a specific town or region, when trying
to design penal systems which tended to reduce these rates, and costs of incarceration
weighed against cost of crime.261 The general objective became keeping a type of
criminality within an optimal average and acceptable limits.262 Mechanisms of security
identified not only a norm but also an optimal average. There was a standard with which
individuals should be brought into conformity, and thus an acceptable rate of failure.263
As Oksala correctly points out, mechanisms of security do not constitute a break
from previous forms of discipline, but need disciplinary strategies in order to function.264
To guarantee security in any given society:
[O]ne must appeal to a whole series of techniques for the surveillance of
individuals, the diagnosis of what they are, the classification of their mental
structure, of their specific pathology, and so on; in short one has to appeal to a
whole disciplinary series that proliferates under mechanisms of security and is
necessary to make them work.265
What characterizes the emergence of new technologies of biopower is that they are
strategies aimed at either distinct forms of social control, or directed at modifying
something in the biological destiny of the species.266
In his second axis, Foucault showed how transitions in thinking occurred and
new institutional practices were introduced. He did not argue that the new controls over
behavior were necessarily a transition to better ways of doing things. It was merely a
change in how people were conditioned to behave and relate to others. Discipline and
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biopower are important for understanding our subjectivity today, because our modern
epoch is still affected by this shift in power strategies. Just as we cannot objectively
describe our modern system of thought characterized by History, we cannot completely
divorce ourselves from strategies of biopower and discipline and think and act
independently of them.

4 The Third Axis: Practices of the Self and The Hermeneutics of the Subject
In contrast to Sartre, later in his career Foucault shifts his focus to individuals’
conscious experiences as his starting point. Foucault describes his third method for
examining subjectivity as follows: “[I]nstead of referring to a theory of the subject, it
seemed to me that one should try to analyze the different forms by which the individual
is led to constitute him or herself as a subject.”267 In a historical context very unlike his
study of the prisons, Foucault examines some of these forms of subjectivity in Greek,
Hellenistic, and early Christian culture in his lecture series The Hermeneutics of the
Subject. In these lectures, Foucault examines the philosophical attitude of “care of self”
through the different forms it took in each of these historical periods. In this study,
Foucault reveals that this philosophical attitude was a practice, a principle which formed
the rationale for various forms of conduct. Caring for self involved a range of tests,
meditative practices, and actions through which one attained self-knowledge.
Foucault argues that beginning with Plato and then solidifying with Descartes,
modern Western philosophy has understood the Greek proposition “know thyself”
(gnothi seauton) as the primary means of access to truth, while overlooking that in
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ancient thought, gnothi seauton was only possible in conjunction with “care of self”
(epieleia heautou). When Descartes introduced the self-evidence of the subject’s
existence as the foundation for knowledge, gnothi seauton became the sole starting point
for accessing the truth. Gnothi seauton, with Descartes, was no longer a form of
knowing oneself in terms of care of and self-knowledge, but a matter of the
impossibility of doubting one’s own existence.268 Foucault believes that the Greek
mandate to care for oneself played an equally important role in how the Greeks
understood the path to truth, as caring for oneself was the “justificatory framework,
ground, and foundation for the imperative ‘know yourself.’”269
Foucault argues that the era guided by the principle of “care of self” included a
sense of spirituality that we have lost today. Spirituality, he says, refers to the:
[S]earch, practice, and experience through which the subject carries out the
necessary transformations on himself in order to access the truth…[Spirituality]
postulates that the truth is not given to the subject by a simply act of knowledge
(connaissance)…It postulates that for the subject to have right of access to the
truth he must be changed, transformed, shifted, and become, to some extent and
up to a certain point, other than himself.270
In ancient Greek, Roman and Hellenistic thought, individuals did not simply receive the
truth by studying different bodies of knowledge. Subjects were required to perform
practices on themselves in order to be capable of receiving the truth. A philosophical
way of life that incorporated spirituality required active work upon oneself to make
oneself different and capable of receiving the truth.

After the Cartesian turn, access to

the truth became possible through the autonomous development of knowledge as
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connaissance, and no longer required preparing oneself to receive the truth.271 Thus,
while Foucault expresses admiration for care of self and the role it played in Greek,
Roman, and Hellenistic subjectivity, the requirement to change oneself in order to be
capable of knowing is not a part of our modern mode of thinking, speaking, and doing.
The care of self is, Foucault says, a way of considering things, behaving in the
world, and relating to others. Such a care was a careful examination of what we think
and what takes place in our thought. Further, it required a series of actions performed
upon oneself such as techniques of meditation, memorization, examination of
conscience, rites of purification, techniques of withdrawal, practices of endurance, and
preparation for death.272 Foucault is particularly drawn to the Hellenistic era of practices
of the self, referring to it as the “golden age in the history of the care of the self.”273 In
the Hellenistic period, care of the self became a universal principle, applicable to
everyone in every stage of life.274 Foucault believes that this was a privileged moment
in terms of the relationship of the subject to truth.
The Hellenistic period was characterized by self-conversion, which involved the
intention “to live with oneself, to ‘dwell in oneself’ and to remain there.”275 Through
this practice, subjects gained independence and self-control, and experienced self
enjoyment. Training to care for the self as a practice served several functions: a critical
function, in which one must rid oneself of bad habits and false opinions; a function of
struggle, in which the practice of self was conceived of as an ongoing battle for which
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one must be prepared to fight for one’s entire life; and a curative function, a matter of
healing the soul.276 For example, the Epicureans prepared for life’s possible events by
knowing the principles that govern the world, the nature of the gods, the laws of nature,
and the causes of life and death. These beliefs were accompanied by a system of
thought, expressed through discourse, about our place in the natural order of the world.
These discourses were meant to be available to subjects when they needed them and
were appropriated through various methods: memory, listening, reading, writing, and
mental exercises for retaining what one had learned.277 True ideas were not simply
passed from an expert to an individual who received them passively. The truth about us
and the world was not directly accessible, but was attainable only after subjects prepared
themselves to receive it.
For example, Foucault identifies the most famous thought exercise as the
meditation of future evils, which was practiced diligently by the Stoics. This practice
involved not only imagining the very worst thing that might happen, no matter how
unlikely, but also envisaging that this awful thing had already occurred, such as the
death of one’s child. Through this process, subjects could convince themselves that these
things were not actually real evils, but only appeared to be due to the individuals’
worldly attachments.278 For practices of testing oneself, Epictetus, for example,
introduces a method of controlling representations and being vigilant over one’s
thoughts, in order to practice reactions to specific situations, such as the death of a
relative:

276

Foucault, Hermeneutics, 496-497.
Ibid., 500.
278
Ibid., 469-473.
277

111

[T]he aim of this control of representations is not to decipher a hidden truth
beneath appearances, which would be the truth of the subject himself. Rather,
[Epictetus] finds in these representations, as they appear, the opportunity for
recalling a number of true principles concerning death, illness, suffering,
political life, etcetera.279
Foucault considers the meditation on or training for death as the very height of these
practices. The Hellenistic philosopher Seneca was very experienced in the death
meditation, ordering one to live each day as if it were the span of one’s whole life. One
assumes each day to be one’s last, but in assuming it, one reflects back on one’s life as a
whole. This exercise allowed the subject to see one’s present from above or
“immobilize the present in a snapshot.”280 This meditation also provides a retrospective
view of one’s whole life, enabling one to grasp the value of the present moment and
comprehend one’s life as a totality.281
In his third axis, Foucault exemplifies subjects’ own participation in the creation
of the truth about themselves, others, and the world. He also demonstrates how
differently thought, knowledge, and truth were conceived of and practiced in a previous
period. During this epoch, the justificatory framework for access to the truth was one of
active involvement and self-creation. Our contemporary modes of subjectivity, by
contrast, do not include this kind of spirituality and take place in an epoch where our
social practices are intertwined with mechanisms of discipline and biopower.
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5 Foucault and Freedom

By showing that our possibilities are constructed through historically specific
anonymous material relations and strategies of power, Foucault argues for a strong
influence of historical circumstances on our thoughts, words, and actions that may make
it difficult to see room for subjects to be free. However, by showing that many factors of
the world that people believe to be self-evident or universal are actually the product of
contingent historical circumstances, Foucault argues that he actually opens up new
possibilities for freedom. He says:
It is one of my targets to show people that a lot of things that are a part of their
landscape—that people think are universal—are the result of some very precise
historical changes. All my analyses are against the idea of universal necessities
in human existence. They show the arbitrariness of the institutions and the space
of freedom we can still enjoy and how many changes can still be made.282
In Foucault’s view, however, freedom is not an originary ontological characteristic of
all human consciousness as it is for Sartre. Instead, it is a practice in which subjects can
participate. Allen comments:
[F]reedom, for Foucault, takes place within an axis of immanent power
relations; it is an embodied practice; and it is connected to the spiral movement
by means of which thought breaks free of its own discursive and non-discursive
conditions of possibility.283
In two different stages of his career, Foucault describes two ways in which subjects can
exercise freedom: resistance and critical reflection.
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5.1 Freedom as Resistance

With respect to resistance, Foucault claims that it is only possible for power to
operate if participating subjects have some room for freedom. Power relations entail
different strategies for pushing back or defying strict mechanisms of control. In an
interview, he says:
In order for power relations to come into play, there must be a certain degree of
freedom on both sides…This means that in power relations there is necessarily
the possibility of resistance because if there were no possibility of resistance
there would be no power relations at all.284
Freedom as resistance requires that there are still options for subjects in terms of how
they behave and potentially resist against norms, even though the behavior chosen will
be interpreted and categorized based on the norms present in a power relation. Power
cannot operate in a framework of strict determinism—it is exercised by subjects, not
blind machines. Thus, there will always be some degree of consent, or lack thereof, from
other subjects:
Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are “free.”
By this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of
possibilities in which several kinds of conduct, several ways of reacting and
modes of behavior are available…there is not a face-to-face confrontation of
power and freedom as mutually exclusive facts…but a much more complicated
interplay. In this game, freedom may well appear as the condition for the
exercise of power (at the same time its precondition, since freedom must exist for
power to be exerted, and also its permanent support, since without the possibility
of recalcitrance power would be equivalent to a physical determination).285
Power as regulation of conduct always allows multiple reactions from individuals, even
if subjects are being encouraged or coerced to act or think in a certain way. The
existence of an authoritatively desirable way for subjects to think, speak or behave opens
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up the possibility of becoming a desirable or undesirable subject, or pushing back
against a particular category of desirability.
The prominence of resistance as a form of freedom in Foucault’s thought is
emphasized by Simons, who argues that for Foucault, resistance is the most pertinent
form of freedom within power mechanisms. According to Simons’ interpretation,
resistance occurs because power relations, even when dominating, never completely
render subjects without options. Power mechanisms are fragmented and operate through
different mechanisms with different focal points. While power relations are ubiquitous,
“the same system of power relations does not fill the whole field of forces.”286 One
individual can be constituted as several different types of subjects: a “mad subject” a
“deviant subject” or a “healthy subject” and these constitutions are not necessarily
exclusive. Simons points out that all power relations have limits. Even within situations
of political domination, there can be no power strategy so forceful that it can control the
conduct of individuals who do not fear death. When it comes to power that is being
exercised by the state or by public officials, enforcement through these mechanisms
requires cooperation from the ruled subjects. This also opens possibilities for resistance
in spite of, or because of, the presence of power mechanisms. Resistance can also take
the form of a refusal to accept strict categories and classifications of subjects. By
affirming identities previously understood as deviant, we can “dissolve the
categorizations or subjections that construct sexual or other natures.”287 The importance
of striving for things like liberation from stringent sexual categories is not to affirm a
different form of subjectivity, but to dissolve the boundaries for subjectivity in which
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only these constructed categories are recognized as possible. In a later interview about
his concept of power, Foucault again emphasizes that we must resist policies which
cause us to define ourselves deterministically, stating that we must instead “promote
new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality that has been
imposed on us for several centuries.”288 Locating and identifying possible resistances
brings us to the next potential exercise of freedom.

5.2

Freedom as Critical Historical Reflection

A second practice of freedom that Foucault identifies is specifically directed at
philosophers or intellectuals. In his essay “What is Enlightenment?” Foucault explores
the historical context of philosophy during the period of Enlightenment and he presents
a distinct task for philosophers today. He suggests that they adopt an inquisitive attitude
and questioning of historical events and practices that have structured the possibilities
for how we think, speak, and behave. He calls this a “historical ontology of
ourselves.”289 Foucault himself undertook this task with his archaeologies and
genealogies. This process of critical questioning must include:
[A] historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves
and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying.
[This critique] is not seeking to make possible a metaphysics which has finally
become a science; it is seeking to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible,
to the undefined work of freedom.290
When using the word “critical,” he explains, “I don’t mean a demolition job, one of
rejection or refusal, but a work of examination that consists of suspending as far as
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possible the system of values to which one refers when testing and assessing it.”291 This
mode of critical examination does not seek to uncover a metaphysics of human beings
which would then be translated into a scientific discourse of the truth about ourselves.
Instead, it would reveal our contingency. Foucault expresses a role for philosophers that
does not consist of telling others what should be done, but instead asking new questions
that are not currently being asked. Doing so enables the potential creation of new
possibilities for pushing the boundaries of how we currently think, speak, and behave.
This philosophical ethos, as Foucault calls it:
[O]pens up a realm of historical inquiry and put itself to the test of reality, of
contemporary reality, both to grasp the points where change is possible and
desirable, and to determine the precise form this change should take.292
He is careful not to advance the point of view that this historical ontology could give us
complete and definitive knowledge of ourselves and our historical limits, as it is
impossible to objectively remove ourselves from our current way of thinking.293 He
suggests that the criticism makes an indefinite number of inquiries into the following
questions: “How are we constituted as subjects of our own knowledge? How are we
constituted as subjects who exercise or submit to power relations? How are we
constituted as moral subjects of our own actions?”294 By posing these questions for
different historical epochs, we unveil the contingency of how we think, speak, and act.
The critical ontology of ourselves:
[H]as to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor seen as a
permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it has to be conceived as an
attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at
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one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us
and an experience with the possibility of going beyond them.295
This demonstrates that there is more to a Foucauldian view of freedom than only an
individual’s resistance to power mechanisms. Foucault considers his own philosophical
studies to be, in a sense, practices of freedom.
To conclude the Chapter and show the novelty of Foucault’s views on
subjectivity and freedom, I will compare his vision of the social and historical subject to
the subject found in the work of John Stuart Mill. Mill’s thought is at the core of
contemporary utilitarian approaches to healthcare ethics as well as the root of political
approaches that rely on negative liberty. I compare Foucault to Mill because Mill’s
views provide a substantial contrast, and, as I will show, Mill’s portrayal of the subject
can be interpreted through a Foucauldian lens as offering a set of “practices of the self.”
Because Foucault presents his philosophical thought through the use of analysis of
specific historical examples, I will use an example of a contemporary public practice to
illustrate the differences between Foucault and Mill.
6 Foucault’s Subject versus Mill’s Liberal Subject
6.1 Mill’s Utilitarianism and On Liberty

In his texts Utilitarianism and On Liberty, John Stuart Mill presents his case that
morality should seek to obtain the greatest good for the greatest number of people, and
that human beings flourish through freedom from intervention. He views freedom from
intervention necessary for developing individuality, which he views as both good for
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individuals and a means to a better society. This view is foundational for future political
theories and ethical thought that are grounded in the principle that people should
generally be left alone. Utilitarianism as an ethical theory aims at maximizing good
outcomes for the greatest number of people, rather than, for example, prescribing
universal maxims to guide action. The goal of rule-utilitarianism is to develop rules for
society that will lead to the greatest happiness for everyone. Actions are morally good
when they lead to consequences that make the most people happy or lead to their wellbeing.296 Mill argues in favor of formulating rules for society that result in more
happiness for more people. He suggests shaping our “conduct by a rule which all
rational beings might adopt with benefit to their collective interest.”297 This argument is
now referred to as “rule-utilitarianism” and introduces rules for society that, if followed
by everyone, lead to the greatest good for the greatest number. Mill’s thought can also
be extrapolated into a defense of a system of moral rights. In this view, rights are not
defended as ends in themselves, but because they are instrumental in realizing certain
desirable ends. Mill himself says that when we refer to something as a person’s right,
“we mean that he has a valid claim on society to protect him of possession of it, either
by the force of law or by that of education and opinion.”298 These rights are grounded in
general utility, that is to say, in the happiness they create for society as a whole.299
Mill’s ethical theory is founded on his assumptions about human beings’ nature and the
subject.
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In On Liberty, Mill’s main political text, he argues that freedom from state
intervention will produce the best outcomes for the greatest number of people. His
intention is to show the utility of what is generally referred to as negative freedom.
Negative freedom is the removal of barriers or constraints over behavior. This is in
contrast to positive freedom, which refers to collective interventions by the state or a
group intended to help people realize their full potential. An ethical vision founded on
negative freedom argues that it is morally good that individuals should generally be free
from limits over their behavior. Mill presents the thesis that individuals are happiest if
they are able to develop themselves independently of social and cultural customs. He
also argues that such individuality will lead to the greatest benefits for society, as social
progress results from the pursuit of a diversity of life paths.
Mill presents his thesis in On Liberty as follows:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is selfprotection…The only part of the conduct of anyone for which he is amenable to
society is that which concerns others.300
Let us call this the “no-harm-to-others principle.” At its core, it simply means that
individuals should be free to do as they please as long as they are not causing harm to
others. Their ability to make choices is what makes them distinctly human. When
individuals exercise their ability to choose, they flourish individually and collectively.
The “distinctive endowment of a human being,” Mill says, consists in our “faculties of
perception, judgement, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral
preference.” These faculties are “exercised only in making a choice.”301 Being able to
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make choices, on Mill’s view, fulfills our purpose as human beings. Because we are the
only creatures with the faculty of choice, Mill argues, human beings flourish when they
can make their own decisions:
[I]t is the privilege and proper condition of a human being, arrived at the
maturity of his faculties, to use and interpret experience in his own way. It is for
him to find out what part of recorded experience is properly applicable to his
own circumstances and character.302
According to Mill, human well-being is achieved through the pursuit of self-directed
ends, not from having our courses of action forced upon us through instructions or social
and cultural customs. “He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his
faculties.”303 If we are not using our rationality to be self-directed, according to Mill, we
are not distinguishing ourselves from other species. He considers letting one’s peers or
societal customs determine one’s life path as living an “ape-like one [life] of
imitation.”304
Although Mill acknowledges that culture and history do influence our
individuality, he thinks it is necessary to train oneself to think and act independently of
them. When people are able to do this, they can be said to have character:
A person whose desires and impulses are his own—are the expression of his own
nature, as it has been developed and modified by his own culture—is said to
have a character. One whose desires and impulses are not his own has no
character.305
According to Mill, character develops through choosing one’s own goals and life plans,
being creative, and not allowing oneself to be defined solely by societal custom. The
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possibilities to do so require the freedom to live as one chooses. Privacy and freedom
from interference are thus key to a good human life:
It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in themselves, but
by cultivating [individuality] and calling it forth, within the limits imposed by
the rights and interests of others, that human beings become a noble and
beautiful object of contemplation.306
In contrast to the Kantian subject, Mill’s subject cannot be considered purely ahistorical
because subjects are shaped by their own experiences and historicity. However, Mill
argues that the noblest form of human being removes oneself from socially and
historically specific influences and becoming self-directed, thereby obtaining
individuality. Developing individuality is foundational to human well-being and
constitutes flourishing of human being’s pre-given nature which persists throughout
changes in historical epochs and circumstances.
Because Foucault rejects a universal nature of human beings as I have
emphasized throughout the Chapter, Foucault would suggest that we understand this text
within its historical context and as part of a system of thought and strategic societal
arrangement. From a Foucauldian perspective of On Liberty, we could interpret Mill’s
prescriptions as a modern set of practices of the self. Michael Clifford argues that a
Foucauldian reading of On Liberty reveals it as a contemporary “manual for living,”
which prescribes a model of political subjectivation, or urges us to become political
subjects. This model works by encouraging individuals to interpret their actions,
practices, beliefs, and ideals in order to constitute a specific mode of being in the world,
what Clifford calls a “technology of political selfhood.”307 Clifford argues that Mill’s
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view of the individual in On Liberty emerges from a historical framework for truth,
knowledge, and ethics. Mill’s support of negative liberty in the text is intended to
“legitimize a space of emergence for the ‘private, autonomous individual.’”308
With the introduction of the no-harm-to-others principle, Mill delineates a social
framework in which freedom from interference provides a space for subjects to pursue
their own view of the good life. This unhindered realm of action will enable subjects to
develop their capacities. As Clifford reminds us, the telos of this model of subjectivity
can be summed up through one word: happiness: “This is the happiness of the fully
actualized human being, a being whose moral and mental faculties are developed to their
fullest potential.”309 It can be said that Mill’s prescriptive model for subjectivity is
guided by the justificatory principles of his historical epoch. During Mill’s period,
becoming a political subject entailed developing personal autonomy and individual
freedom from state control. The ethical vision offered in this text can be considered
useful to the extent that its principles are still operative in how we become subjects
today, but its limits should be acknowledged alongside its use.
Foucault shows through his analyses of language, institutions, and practices that
all thought and behavior are to some extent regulated from sources other than
individuals themselves. Mill’s argument that human nature flourishes best when it is
essentially left alone is challenged by Foucault’s observations that individuals and their
possibilities are always influenced by circumstances outside of their control. In Mill’s
discussion of the political subject, he sets up a divide between subjects and their
relationships with others and the societal practices of their time. Subjects exist first—
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there is no threshold they must pass in order to become a subject—and they possess a
pregiven nature. This is why the subject can be left alone, can be interfered with, can
interact with others, or stay away from them. In all cases, it is a subject’s power of
choice that defines him or her, and institutions, relationships, and practices are
secondary. Their existence either hinders or assists the freely choosing self. Although
Strozier’s analysis did not include discussion of Mill, Mill’s view of the subject could fit
into Strozier’s category of the “originating subject.”310 In Mill’s view, the subject is a
starting point which creates history and culture.
In contrast, according to Foucault’s analyses, subjects do not exist outside of or
prior to the mechanisms of power, bodies of knowledge, social practices, and
relationships with others that characterize their time. Power, knowledge, and practice
merge to form the categories for thinking. These conditioning factors enable the
possibility for someone to be a subject at all. When a political subject comparable to the
one offered by Mill is presupposed as a starting point for evaluating social practices, this
presupposition overlooks the ways this practice is forming the possibilities for us to be
subjects at all. The very frameworks through which we interpret normality and
abnormality, what it means to be political, knowledgeable, moral, and free, are
potentially affected by the practice.
Because Foucault’s philosophy is presented through specific empirical analysis
of examples, elucidating the difference between Mill’s and Foucault’s views of
subjectivity is best achieved through an analysis of a concrete example. Let us examine
a contemporary case which exemplifies current strategies of power and their influence
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on our subjectivity: the modern War on Drugs in the United States. I use the example of
the War on Drugs because it exemplifies very clearly Foucault’s concept of mechanisms
of security and how mechanisms of security affect an array of relationships and
frameworks for understanding ourselves. It is also a worthy example because
philosophical literature on the issue approaches it through the lens of contemporary
liberalism and the model of the subject found in Mill.

6.2 Foucault versus Mill: The War on Drugs
The “War on Drugs” in the United States began in the 1970s and continues to the
present. This example is particularly illustrative of Foucauldian mechanisms of security,
which refer to a series of disciplinary interventions aimed at the social body as a whole
with the intention of establishing a norm at the level of populations. The War on Drugs
is illustrative of mechanisms of security in four ways: First, a series of disciplinary
interventions rationalized in terms of the overall health of the population were
introduced. Second, the War on Drugs led to new ways of thinking and speaking about
the use of drugs, and introduced new experts qualified to speak the truth about drugs.
Third, this set of mechanisms significantly affected individuals’ perception of self and
their relationships with others. Fourth, it led to changes in police officers’ interactions
with the community. Fifth, it led to the categorizing of individuals as criminal or
delinquent because of their drug use. Through discussion of each of these points below,
it will become evident how the War on Drugs influences our contemporary possibilities
for thinking, speaking, and doing.
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First, the War on Drugs is a set of policies that was introduced out of concern for
the welfare of the population. The mechanisms of security exercised over individuals are
defended because they allegedly benefit the social whole. When Richard Nixon
launched the War on drugs in 1971, he referred to drug abuse as “America’s public
enemy number one.”311 The Drug Awareness Resistance Education (DARE) program,
founded in the mid-80s, cited “community safety” as the number one reason to oppose
drugs.312 The motivation for introducing tough drugs policies was not the harm drug
offenders inflicted only on themselves, but the harmful effects that individual drug use
could have on communities and the nation at large. If the concern was to prevent drug
use in an individual, this was due to the belief that one person’s use of drugs influenced
other people who may use drugs in turn.
Second, the War on Drugs led to the establishment of new ways of speaking
about drug use and to the establishment of new authorities who were trusted to speak the
truth about the effects of drugs. Slogans such as “Just Say No,” “Friends don’t let
friends do drugs,” “This is your brain on drugs,” and “Zero tolerance” were
communicated to parents and adolescents through experts such as doctors and police
officers, and were relayed through television commercials, billboards, and other forms
of media.313 Currently, over 25,000 police officers are employed solely to fight drug

311

PBS, “Thirty Years of America’s Drug War: A Chronology” 2014
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron/, accessed 12/9/2015. When
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act was signed in 1986, it appropriated over 1 billion dollars to fighting the
United States’ “drug crisis,” including money for education and building new prisons. This was
the beginning of a system based primarily on punishment and incarceration of drug offenders
rather than treatment.
312
National Institute of Justice, “Program Profile: Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE),”
accessed 12/9/2015, https://www.crimesolutions.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?ID=99.
313
Drug Policy Alliance, “Brief History of the Drug War,” accessed 12/9/2015,
http://www.drugpolicy.org/new-solutions-drug-policy/brief-history-drug-war.

126

usage.314 Additionally, U.S. elementary and middle schools became institutional,
disciplinary sites where children were informed of the truth about drugs by means of
training and testing. These programs focused on resisting peer pressure, being informed
of the effects of drugs, and, controversially, urging students to avoid individuals they
knew who used drugs or considered doing drugs.
Third, through educational policies advanced through the War on Drugs,
adolescents came to significantly associate their sense of self with the abstaining from or
using drugs or alcohol. The most widely-used program was the DARE program which
is still being used in many schools today. Lessons do not only target drug use but also
discuss other topics pertaining to children’s conception of self: personal rights and
safety, resistance to peer pressure, self-image and self-esteem, identifying positive
qualities in oneself and peers, managing stress, practicing assertiveness, role modeling,
and building friendships. These topics are taught alongside discussions about the
harmful effects of using drugs and gang activity, topics elementary school children may
not be thinking about without DARE.315 With a close documentation of student
behavior, public agencies are able to track the effects of the program on drug use in
adolescents and future adults.
Fourth, strategies employed through the War on Drugs, like all social practices,
influenced an array of other relationships. One of the relationships most affected was
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between police officers and citizens. In order to help police officers enforce strict,
punitive drug laws, the federal government provided surplus military equipment to
police departments beginning in 1996. Since then, many small-town police departments
are now equipped with military style weapons. This funneling of military equipment
changes the relationship with citizens who can be submitted to military weaponry like
potential enemies to be combatted, arrested, and defeated rather than treated as
individuals to be served and protected. This situation has in some instances caused an
erosion of the trust and respect in police officers, who are often perceived as
authoritarian oppressors by the groups targeted.316 This is especially true in minority
communities who have been disproportionally affected by drug laws.
Fifth, the criminalization of the use of drugs, and the categorization of
individuals who use or sell drugs as delinquents or criminals has had the result of an
increase in incarceration so much so that now the United States has the largest prison
population in the world. In addition, because of the stigma surrounding drug use and
possession, drug offenders who do complete their prison and parole time are afterwards
unemployable and denied full integration back into society. The strict punitive
mechanisms introduced for controlling drug use have created a new category of
criminality with very harsh penalties, an increase in incarceration rate, and an added
burden for rehabilitation.
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If we were to base our drug policy on a Millian approach grounded in his view of
the unencumbered subject, this would, I argue, entail removing restriction over
individuals as long as they are not causing harm to others. This would likely result in
the removal of prohibition against individual drug use for some currently prohibited
drugs that cause little harm, such as marijuana, as long as drug users are not putting
others at risk by driving or working while under the influence of drugs. In Mill’s
conception of liberty, whether or not to use drugs would be a matter of one’s own life
choice. With proper freedom of opinion, privacy, and association, Mill would likely
conclude that those who properly exercise their faculties would choose not to use drugs.
Because most individuals on their own would choose not to use drugs, and because
ending the War on Drugs could save money that could be put into other public services,
end mass incarceration, and combat the stigma surrounding addiction in the US, this
would lead to the greatest good for the greatest number.
This application of Mill is supported by a recent utilitarian argument from
Andrew Koppelman. Koppelman provides an explicitly Millian critique of our current
drug laws, advocating for a rights-based approach which “recognizes the rights of the
majority of drug users who are prudent and responsible.”317 Koppelman argues that this
is necessary for fostering the abilities of rational self-governance at the heart of modern
liberal thought. Koppelman argues that the liberal ideal that we have the right to direct
our own lives and the duty to respect others’ right to direct their lives “depends on the
existence of selves of the right kind: free, equal, self-governing agents who really do
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make choices about what ends to pursue.”318 The argument for drug prohibition is that
drug users are no longer living these lives because drugs impair or eliminate their
autonomy so that the state is justified in intervening. Koppelman argues that such
reasoning is based on extreme worst case scenarios which only occur in a small number
of addicts, not casual users.319 Thus, according to Koppelman’s interpretation of Mill’s
no-harm-to-others principle, casual drug users cause no harm to others and their own
autonomy is not stifled or denied. Koppelman concludes that an approach based on the
Millian conception of the liberal subject and the normative no-harm-to-others principle
results in decriminalizing the use of drugs. Because his analysis presupposes an
autonomous liberal self who is affected by drug policy, Koppelman does not consider
the extent to which public policies regarding drug use affect the field of possibilities for
becoming subjects at all.
If we look at the War on Drugs through a Foucauldian lens, identifying strategies
of power and mechanisms of security, it results in a more robust analysis that properly
accounts for the complexity of the issue. A Foucauldian analysis includes considering
the role of discursive practices, the strategies of power operative in our institutions, and
our relationships with others, as well as the ways that these conditioning forces influence
decisions to use or abstain from drugs. A Foucauldian approach enables us to see what is
at stake both in the current strategies surrounding the War on Drugs and the
shortcomings of a “hands-off” approach derived from Mill’s vision of the subject. First,
a Foucauldian analysis enables us to identify the rational principles and strategies of
power operating behind the current policy. Second, according to a Foucauldian analysis,
318
319

Koppelman, “Drug Policy,” 284.
Ibid., 292.

130

our regulation of drug usage affects categories for normalcy and deviance, and the labels
we use to understand ourselves and others. It also, as exemplified, affects power
relationships between various individuals, such as parents and children, police officers
and the community, adolescents and their peers. Third, a Foucauldian analysis allows us
to question the inherent necessity of current policies surrounding the current War on
Drugs, including the link between drug use and incarceration.
First, as explained above, the War on Drugs was initially developed with the
justification of the overall health of the social whole. Drug use was considered bad for
the population, so that a series of disciplinary interventions were introduced in order to
bring down drug usage rates. These interventions included: the legal standard, the
introduction of abstaining from drug use as integral to being a “good” or “normal” child,
and the incarceration and societal exclusion of offenders. It is important to note that if
these policies worked as intended, it would have resulted in a decrease in drug use and
abuse. Some studies show that the drug war has had no effect, while others suggest that
the rate of drug use has actually increased as much as 34%.320 The continued use of
drugs by individuals in spite of a legal standard designed to bring the population in line
with an intended norm exemplifies freedom as resistance. The fact that subjects directly
resist against the norm enforced by our modern institutions shows a counteraction of
power.
Second, from a Foucauldian perspective we must consider that changes in the
disciplinary interventions used will result in changes in our understanding of normality
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and abnormality. Additionally, changes in drug policy will result in changes in
relationships that could be harmful or beneficial. For example, a “hands-off” approach in
which drugs are legalized, such as advocated for by Koppelman, could run the risk of
more harmful drugs being perceived as normal or desirable. On the other side, removing
the legal prohibition could free up police officers to focus more on preventing violent
crime and seeing citizens as people who need protection. This could allow a rebuilding
of relationships of trust between neighborhoods and the local police.
Third, the most controversial aspect of the current War on Drugs is the
criminalization and incarceration of those who use drugs. Foucault challenges us to look
beyond necessities in our political and social landscape, and question if things need to be
the way they are. Understanding that incarceration has not led to the originally desired
effects (decrease in drug usage for the overall social whole), and is not the only option
for regulating drug use opens the possibility of envisioning new strategies. For example,
instead of incarcerating drug users, they could be offered treatment, reformation, and
reintegration into society through education and employment programs.321 I am not
arguing that Foucault himself would explicitly advocate for these specific reforms—his
philosophy was focused on uncovering or exposing rather than formulating normative
“oughts.” What is distinctly Foucauldian is identifying the historical contingency of our
practices and acknowledging that we become subjects with possibilities through these
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practices, not before or outside of them. This should inform our reasoning when
considering this important public policy that influences our contemporary subjectivity.
We thus see two stark contrasts between Foucault’s and Mill’s conceptions of
subjectivity and the application of their views: 1) Mill believes in an inherent human
nature grounded on autonomy and choice, which flourishes through lack of interference
and ability to choose one’s own life path. Mill argues that we are subjects prior to and
independent of the practices we participate in. Foucault, on the other hand, rejects a
universal human nature, arguing instead that human nature is made by historicity and the
discourses, practices, and power strategies of one’s time. 2) Because there is no
universal nature of a human being, for Foucault, there is no self-evident moral principle
that holds for all time. At most, the no-harm-to-others principle could be a historically
specific guideline. Instead, public practices must be addressed in their historical
specificity, while noting their contingency, and with consideration of how subjects’
relationships, modes of thinking, and categories for speaking and thinking about oneself
and others are affected.

Conclusion

In this Chapter we have seen that Foucault presents three different axes through
which subjects interpret their experiences and thus form their possibilities: systems of
thought and discourse, strategies of power such as discipline and biopower, and
practices of the self. Freedom for Foucault takes the form of resistance and critical
reflection. We have seen how the discourses, institutions, and practices of our
contemporary epoch manifest the import of discipline, biopower, and the accompanying
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mechanisms of security. Through the contrast between Foucault’s and Mill’s views we
have also seen how Foucault challenges assumptions about the subject present in
contemporary utilitarian theory. Specifically, Mill presents a view of the subject as prior
to conditioning forces such as history, culture, and power.
As will be emphasized in Chapter Five, Foucault’s views on biopower and
mechanisms of security are especially relevant for healthcare ethics. Foucault argues that
practices related to controlling or altering the human body have a substantial influence
on how our bodies and behavior are regulated and how we relate to others. Established
norms for health and accompanying categories of normality and abnormality introduce
frameworks for understanding oneself and others as potentially “healthy” or “diseased.”
Healthcare personnel such as doctors, public health officials, and healthcare agencies
such as the Center for Disease Control have been entrusted with the authority to produce
the truth about individuals’ health. Hospitals and clinics control space, bodies, and
behavior in a way conducive to producing outcomes related to the introduced norms.
Thus, a Foucauldian approach to healthcare ethics will provide a more encompassing
analysis that places more emphasis on the subject-forming dimension of our medical
practices than utilitarian approaches rooted in the thought of Mill.
The previous illustration of Foucault’s views on social and historical subjectivity
have laid the groundwork for comparing his views with Sartre’s. In the next Chapter, I
will begin by clearly identifying the differences between Sartre’s and Foucault’s
understanding of the subject. I will present the normative implications that follow from
both Sartre’s and Foucault’s views by introducing a model for ethical subjectivity based
on each thinkers’ later lectures on ethics. I will reaffirm what I have argued in these first
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two Chapters through my comparison with the liberal subject: both Sartre and Foucault
reject deontological and utilitarian ethics as commonly used in modern healthcare ethics.
Instead, they offer a model for creating oneself as a critically reflective, inventive,
engaged historical agent.
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Chapter Three: Ethical Subjectivity in Sartre and Foucault: An Ethics of SelfCreation for an Engaged Historical Agent

Introduction:
In the previous two Chapters I introduced Sartre’s and Foucault’s conceptions of
social and historical subjectivity, focusing on how history, materiality, and sociality
structure the possibilities for what we think, speak, and do. I demonstrated that for both
thinkers our freedom is conditioned and enabled through interaction with these
structuring forces. We are neither completely free nor completely determined, but
historical agents who shape social practices at the same time we are shaped by them. In
this Chapter I examine each thinker’s ethical views that correspond with the vision of
subjectivity outlined in the previous Chapters, focusing on lectures given in the latter
part of their careers. I argue that in these lectures, both philosophers provide the
conceptual foundations for a model of ethical subjectivity.
By ethical subjectivity I mean a mode of being-in-the-world characterized by
both an ethical orientation and ethical commitments. Ethical orientation refers to the
framing of ethical reflection and deliberation in terms of certain questions, attitudes, and
background assumptions. Ethical commitments refers to the result of ethical inquiry that
takes the form of concrete principles, maxims, rules, or positions.322 An ethics primarily
focused on commitments, such as we find in Kant and Mill, will be eager to make moral
judgments and formulate universal moral maxims. An ethics primarily structured on
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orientations, such as we find in Sartre and Foucault, will instead aim to situate our
possibilities for an ethical way of living in the present.
I begin by briefly summarizing the key differences between Sartre’s and
Foucault’s views on subjectivity: historical dialectic versus rupture, the degree of
freedom and autonomy granted to human agency, and their different reasons for
rejecting a theory of rights, such as found in contemporary deontological or utilitarian
theory. I present the alternative each thinker offers, building on the normative concepts
they introduce in their lectures on ethics. By tracing Sartre’s position through three of
his post-Critique of Dialectical Reason lectures, I introduce an ethical mode of being
characterized by the orientation of critical historical reflection, active empathy with the
vulnerable, and invention. Sartrean ethical subjectivity is further characterized by
commitments to integral humanity and mutual freedom, which are most effectively
realized through communal group praxis.
I then explore what Foucault says about ethics, focusing on his historical
analyses of care of the self and the ancient practice of parrhesia, or truth-telling. I argue
that a mode of ethical being with Foucauldian roots requires an ethical orientation
characterized by refusal of inevitabilities, a critical ontology of ourselves, and a
disposition toward innovation. I provide a close reading of Foucault’s lecture series on
care of self and ancient practices of parrhesia. Through his historical presentation of
previous epochs’ practices of ethics and truth, Foucault offers us a window into how
ethics was approached in the past. This descriptive looking back can help inform a
normative looking forward. I introduce a set of commitments based on care of self and
the philosophical way of life, acknowledging that Foucault himself does not explicitly
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advocate for these commitments, but that his historical philosophical analyses enable
their formulation. I include in my argument what these commitments mean for us in our
epoch of biopower and mechanisms of security.
My analysis will show that both Sartre and Foucault provide us with the
foundational concepts for a mode of ethical self-creation as engaged historical agents in
our own epoch. Both thinkers advocate for an ethical orientation that includes critical,
historical reflection, the theme of ethics as an ongoing “task,” and inventive selftransformation. At the level of ethical commitments, I show that Sartre explicitly
advocates for dedication to integral human needs and mutual freedom. Foucault, for his
part, does not explicitly advocate for any specific ethical commitments. I use the
conceptual tools that Foucault provides with his historical analyses in order to construct
what I think the commitments to care of self and the philosophical way of life require of
us in our epoch. I make suggestions for what each model of ethical subjectivity requires
of us in terms of our own individual actions and how it could function as a philosophical
approach to applied ethics or public policy.
Hence, the objective of this Chapter is fourfold: 1) to specify the important
differences between Sartre’s and Foucault’s views on subjectivity and their relevance for
ethics, 2) to reconstruct a model of ethical subjectivity based on each thinker’s lectures
on ethics, 3) to compare and contrast these models, and 4) to emphasize what these
models require of us in terms of our own individual actions and as a philosophical
approach to applied ethics or public policy. The lectures I focus on for Sartre include his
Cornell lecture notes titled Morality and History (MH),323 his Rome Lecture Notes

323

Excerpts from Sartre’s Cornell lecture notes, titled Morality and History, can be found in
Robert Stone and Elizabeth Bowman, “Sartre’s Morality and History: A First Look at the Notes

138

(RL),324 and a set of lectures titled A Plea for Intellectuals (A Plea).325 For Foucault, I
use his lecture series The Government of Self and Others (GSO)326 and The Courage of
Truth (CT).327

1

Social and Historical Subjectivity: The Dialectical Spiral vs. The Three
Axes

Sartre’s and Foucault’s views on subjectivity share several characteristics. First,
both thinkers argue that there is an absence of necessities in the social, material, and
historical field of possibilities. Second, they agree that there is not a singular,
unchanging nature of human beings. Rather, we develop through possibilities that are
presented to us by the unique discourses, practices, and norms of our historical epoch.
Third, both argue that we form a conception of self through our intersubjective
experience. Despite these similarities, there are also three key differences that must be
acknowledged, which have been elaborated on in depth by Thomas Flynn.328 I will only
briefly summarize them here in order to set up a backdrop to my discussion of ethics.
The first difference concerns the ontological nature of the interaction of the subject with
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the sources of conditioning. Sartre argues that history is incorporated into our project in
a dialectical way whereas Foucault argues that we develop as subjects through historical
breaks without dialectical continuity. The second major difference between the two
accounts concerns human agency, that is to say, the degree of freedom and deliberate
choice-making of the human subject. According to Sartre, agents have a greater degree
of freedom and conscious control over shaping our possibilities than Foucault allows.
The third difference concerns the reasons that each philosopher rejects a theory of rights
as a starting point for ethics and politics. Sartre rejects rights because he associates them
with a type of violence perpetrated against disadvantaged people by those with societal
power. Foucault rejects rights because, first, rights are introduced into a society that is
governed by a certain form of rationality and particular power mechanisms and, second,
rights are intended to produce a certain type of subject.

1.1

Dialectic versus Rupture

As we saw in Chapter One, Sartre considers manipulated nature, machines,
social institutions, class being, language, and ideas as “layers” of the practico-inert.
These structuring conditions are presented as the antithesis of praxis: they limit and
enable praxis. The practico-inert and praxis thus create a circular dialectic in which the
practico-inert encounters praxis and incorporates it into the practico-inert. Foucault, on
the other hand, does not posit the existence of an ontological realm with consistent
characteristics that functions in opposition to human consciousness throughout each
historical period, nor does he believe that the structuring conditions operate in a
dialectical relationship with human thought and action. Instead, each epoch is
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characterized by rupture, so that new modes of thinking, speaking, and doing replace the
old.329 Biopower and mechanisms of security are a good example. A new understanding
of human life processes ushered in a new era of rationalization and strategies for
controlling behavior, directed at the proliferation of life as a norm. These new strategies
represented a break from previous ways of thinking, speaking, and doing. We do not
find continuity, but rupture.
The difference between dialectic and rupture is relevant for each thinker’s moral
thought. Foucault does not believe that there are consistently applicable ethical
commitments that transcend historical epochs, while Sartre will ultimately argue that
there are. Sartre sees our field of possibilities as historically conditioned, but still sees
ontological and metaphysical consistency in the interaction of our consciousness with
structuring forces. Thus, he will be more eager to posit consistent ethical ideals that
transcend historical epoch. Because Foucault believes there are ruptures in the way we
think, speak, and act, the ethical commitments of past historical periods cannot be
directly transferred to ethical living in the present.

1.2

Freedom: Originary or Empirical?

The second major difference between Sartre and Foucault are their differing
views on human freedom, and consequently differing views on human agency. Human
agency in this context can be defined as the degree of intentional, autonomous choicemaking granted to each individual human being. This difference is rooted in the two
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thinkers’ incompatible views on freedom. Sartrean freedom is ontological and originary,
while Foucauldian freedom is empirical and nonfoundational.330
As we saw in Chapter One, Sartre sees some degree of freedom as an
unconditional aspect of our subjectivity. In Being and Nothingness, he argued that just
the comprehension of our own facticity is an act of freedom. Our engagement with
communal meanings, such as the act of speaking or riding in a subway, are acts of
freedom.331 With the introduction of the intermediary category of the practico-inert in
The Critique of Dialectical Reason, Volume 1, Sartre shows that our freedom operates
through an interplay with the worked matter of our epoch. However, he never fully
changes his view that our ability to imagine a state of affairs beyond the current one and
redirect our praxis accordingly means that we are always ontologically free. In a 1969
interview, Sartre says:
[T]he idea I have never ceased to develop is that in the end one is always
responsible for what is made of one. Even if one can do nothing else besides
assume this responsibility. For I believe that a man can always make something
out of what is made of him.332
Sartre never gives up on a robust sense of agency derived from a forward looking
“project” and the intentional, goal-oriented nature of conscious activity.
Even though Sartre admits that much of our thought is configured by the
practico-inert and serial reasoning, he nevertheless holds firm that any significant
transformation of the practico-inert field comes from communal, intentional goal-
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oriented praxis.333 He says, “praxis alone, in its dialectical freedom, [is] the real and
permanent foundation (in human history and up to the present) in all the inhuman
sentences which men have passed on men through worked matter.”334 While the
practico-inert saturates our experience with meanings we cannot help but take for
granted, those meanings are themselves the product of past praxis. As the practico-inert
is created by praxis, it is ultimately intentional human action that can take control.335
For Foucault, however, we experience our freedom through practicing it, not
through simply consciously experiencing the world. We exercise freedom by resisting
power mechanisms, or by performing active critical reflection. Our interpretation of our
situation is not itself an act of freedom, rather our freedom emerges through our
interaction with the practices of our time and our relationships with others. Our original
interpretation of our situation and our place is determined by the categories of our
episteme, and the frameworks for normality and abnormality that are presented to us, not
chosen. Our freedom emerges secondarily to these forces of conditioning. Thus,
Foucault’s sense of individual autonomy and agency is not originary and must be
developed through reflection and practice.336 This has implications for Foucault’s views

333

See for example, The Critique of Dialectical Reason Volume 1: A Theory of Practical
Ensembles, translated by Alan Sheridan-Smith (London: Verso, 2004), 739, 741-745.
334
Sartre, CDR, 332. Flynn calls this the “principle of the primacy of praxis” in Sartre’s work. See
Flynn, Sartre, Foucault 2, 258-260.
335
Flynn elaborates on this in depth in Sartre and Marxist Existentialism (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1984), 109-115.
336
See Flynn, Sartre, Foucault 2, 258-260. However, it is worth noting that for Sartre in CDR,
being able to consciously direct our praxis takes practice and experience using the dialectical
method. Thus, the two thinkers’ views on agency and freedom may not be as distant as Flynn
argues. Brian Seitz, for example, argues that there are distinct similarities in Sartre’s and
Foucault’s conceptions of freedom. Seitz says that for Sartre, freedom is not a freedom of
“disembodied intentions” but of conditioned possibilities. These conditioned possibilities can
be considered relations, or freedom manifesting itself in the form of a resistance. Seitz
comments, “If freedom is intimately associated with resistance, resistance is itself a network of

143

on ethics because if freedom is to play a role in ethical practice, it must be developed
and participated in.

1.3

Grounds for Rejecting the Theory of Rights

The last comparative issue bears directly on the normative dimensions of their
thought that will be explored in the rest of the Chapter. Both Sartre and Foucault reject a
moral or political theory of rights, although they reject it for slightly different reasons.
Chapters One and Two discussed how the Sartrean and Foucauldian subjects are
significantly different from the view of the subject rooted in the thought of Kant or Mill.
While Kantian and Millian thought provide two different forms of moral justification for
behavior, both thinkers’ philosophies are used to justify an ethical system of rights. For
Kant, human’s rational capacities make them worthy of inherent dignity and respect.
Thus a common ethical route taken is to introduce a system which places limits on
behavior in order to protect the dignity of each individual. Utilitarian reasoning is also
used to justify a system of rights. In a utilitarian framework, introducing guaranteed
protections to each individual allows them to flourish, be happy, and leads to the greatest
good for the greatest number. While the normative principle for introducing rights is
different in these two cases, they both result in a moral framework in which each person
is entitled to certain basic protections. Limitations are placed on everyone’s behavior in
order to ensure these basic protections for each rights-holder.
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Both Sartre and Foucault reject theories of rights. Sartre rejects rights because he
associates them with violence done against disadvantaged people. This is because of his
strong emphasis on class as an untranscendable element of the practico-inert. Sartre
argues that rights introduced in any given society have the tendency to be used to trump
any claims for other types of freedom. In Sartre’s view, rights are introduced into
society by the rule-makers, that is to say, those who hold political power. The rights are
introduced in order to benefit the upper class and reinforce the status quo. Those in
lower classes are then blamed for not taking advantage of rights to which they never had
concrete access to begin with.337 Rights are interpreted to be timeless and ahistorical
and thus do not seek to make any changes to the practico-inert.338 This rejection of a
rights-based approach is partially due to Sartre’s deep concern with the exploited and
disadvantaged people.
For example, a commonly accepted moral right is the right to education.339 In
the United States, our legal system reflects this in the form of a legal right to free public
education from kindergarten through high school. Additionally, through merit and
government aid or loans, it is argued that students can further their education after high
school with proper academic diligence. This is portrayed as an equalizer that entitles
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each person to the same initial resources, and then allows everyone who is willing to
invest the time and effort to study at a public university for a cost that is manageable
with government aid and loans. However, many states fund public schools through
property taxes. This means that the public schools in poor (often minority)
neighborhoods have significantly less funding than neighborhood schools located in
areas with expensive property. Free public schooling, which is portrayed as giving
everyone an equal start, actually gives those who can afford to live in upper class
neighborhoods significant advantages. When students who must attend public schools in
poorer areas do not have the grades or tests scores to get into college, or if they are
admitted to college but do not have the academic skills to succeed, they are then blamed
for not properly taking advantage of their right to education. Clearly the argument to be
made is that there should be changes in the ways that schools are funded so that
everyone truly has an equal right to education, not necessarily that this right should
disappear. But Sartre’s point is that these new changes will be introduced by those in a
position of power who have no real desire to change the status quo. Rights function
within the practico-inert realm and will always reflect a given society’s social
hierarchies.
In Foucault’s view, rights are introduced into a society that is governed by a
certain form of rationality and particular power mechanisms. This means that the rights
will be intended to shape a certain type of subject, not protect a subject that already
exists. The introduction of rights reinforces existing social norms and run the risk of
discouraging the type of active critical reflection that Foucault believes is an important
practice of freedom. For example, in Society Must be Defended, Foucault says:
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I have been trying…to show not only that right is an instrument of
domination…but also how, to what extent, and in what form right…serves as a
vehicle for and implements relations that are not only relations of sovereignty,
but relations of domination.340
Foucault does not argue that rights are inherently good or bad, but that they are often
thought to be protecting universal features of human beings. For Foucault there are no
such features, and the rights granted will always be reflective of that society’s power
strategies and will produce a thinking, speaking, acting subject. A rights-based ethics or
political system runs the risk of imposing forms of normality that can be stifling of
freedom and limit possibilities if they are perceived as universal.341
For example, in Chapter Two I introduced Mill’s basic right to be left alone as
long as one is not harming anyone else. In modern political and moral discourse, this is
known as the right to liberty.342 If I have a right to liberty, this right places obligations
on other individuals not to interfere with my behavior unless I am causing harm. While
rights-based theorists claim that this is an inherent right that is protecting human beings
and allowing their innate nature to flourish, Foucault on the contrary argues that this
right is introducing categories for normality aimed at producing a certain type of subject.
The subject to be produced through a right to liberty is one who functions well on one’s
own, is generally self-sufficient and responsible without interference from the state, and
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makes one’s own decisions based on his or her individual desires and not based on
coercion. Foucault argues that we must recognize that rights are creating subjects, not
protecting existing subjects. This is not inherently bad, but has the potential to be
dangerous.
For example, consider at-will employment contracts. At-will employment
contracts allow companies or organizations to fire a person for no cause or bad cause,
without leaving this person any options to contest his or her termination. These contracts
are often argued to be morally justifiable because of the moral right to liberty: no one
should place limits on what kind of a contract a company and employee want to freely
enter in to.343 At-will employment contracts leave working individuals with no job
security or protection against unfair termination. Some people who enter into these
contracts are desperate for work and are willing to accept any position. Thus, the right
for individuals to freely enter into an employment-at-will contract can lead to benefits
for companies and businesses, while rendering workers limited in their options. Foucault
would not necessarily take a stand against at-will employment contracts, but would
caution us to remember that employment-at-will contracts emerge among power
relations and are introduced to produce a certain type of subject: in this case, a subject
who values the individual freedom to enter into desired contracts over collective
bargaining power and job security.
With these important differences between Sartre and Foucault in mind, I will
now explore ethics in each philosopher’s thought as it relates to their theories of
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subjectivity. I show how we can draw from important concepts in their thought and offer
alternatives to traditional utilitarian or deontological approaches that may include the
introduction of rights. I begin with textual examination of each thinker’s lectures to
introduce the philosophical concepts, then introduce my own insights to construct a
model for an orientation and commitments.

2

Sartre and Ethical Subjectivity

Sartre’s visions of ethics, that is to say, the question of how we ought to live, is
interwoven with his political vision. Ethics and political philosophy are considered
different, though related, disciplines in traditional philosophical discussion. Ethics, the
speculation on how an individual is to live, is kept theoretically distinct from the
political, which focuses on how society should be arranged to meet demands of justice.
However the distinction between ethics and political philosophy is blurred in Sartre’s
thought. As we discuss his moral writings we see that for Sartre, being is automatically
being-in-the-world and being-with-others, so being an ethical person and being a person
involved in building a more just society are inseparable.
Philosophical literature on Sartre’s post-CDR ethics comes from Thomas
Anderson,344 Robert Stone and Elisabeth Bowman,345 and Kristian Klockars.346
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Anderson traces Sartre’s ethical thought through the entirety of Sartre’s career, detailing
his earlier “ethics of authenticity” as well as Sartre’s later shift in focus to integral
human needs in The Rome Lecture (RL) and The Family Idiot.347 Anderson provides
groundbreaking explanatory work and also argues that Sartre’s later ethics is a
significant improvement over the ethics he presents earlier in his career. My analysis is
different from Anderson’s because I focus only on Sartre’s ethics compatible with his
later model of the subject, include Sartre’s lectures Morality and History (MH) and A
Plea, and offer a model strengthened with my own insights for an ethical mode of being
that can be used in contemporary discussions of ethics.
Robert Stone and Elisabeth Bowman offered the first, and currently some of the
only, presentations of Morality and History (MH) and The Rome Lecture (RL) to the
public. As both lectures are currently unpublished, Stone’s and Bowman’s analyses
provided important exegetical work that made Sartre’s arguments in these two lectures
accessible for the first time. I will rely on Stone’s and Bowman’s exegetical work for
my discussion of MH. My project will go beyond their work because I identity key
common concepts in Sartre’s lectures that connect them, strengthen Sartre’s discussion
with my own insights, and show how his ethical thought can be applied.
Kristian Klockars presents a reconstruction of a normative framework derived
from Sartre’s later ethical thought that goes beyond exegesis. Klockars includes RL,
MH, and A Plea in his analysis. In his reconstructive project, he argues that for Sartre,
morality concerns values chosen by concrete individuals in their praxis. This means that
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morality is necessarily inscribed in history, and moral reflection must always include a
diagnosis of one’s social and historical situation. Klockars interprets Sartre as saying
that the question of morality “concerns our possibilities to reflectively take the
conditions revealed into account in our praxis.”348 Normative ethical commitment, in
Klockars’ interpretation of Sartre, is based on a conscious attitude of reflection toward
one’s own condition and using this reflection in one’s praxis. Ethical reflection should
include deciphering the impact of a specific value to social reality and deciding which
values are justified in historical praxis.349 I am in agreement with Klockars’ evaluation
of A Plea and agree that critical historical reflection is an integral component of Sartre’s
later ethical thought. My project will go beyond Klockars’ because I detail how active
empathy and invention are also an integral part of Sartre’s later ethics, and show how
Sartre’s thought can be used to approach contemporary moral problems. As my focus
throughout this section is to introduce the key concepts from Sartre’s later lectures on
ethics that are important for the model of ethical subjectivity I suggest, I will rely
primarily on a close reading of primary texts. I will draw on the work completed by
Anderson, Stone and Bowman, and Klockars when appropriate.

2.1 Morality and History: The Experience of the Ethical
Morality and History350 (MH) is a set of lecture notes that was prepared for
Cornell College students, although Sartre canceled the lecture at the last minute to
protest the United States’ involvement in Vietnam. This attitude is illustrative of his own
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personal ethical and political commitments. MH is worth examining for my purposes
because Sartre discusses our experience of the normative and how ethics manifests in
praxis, and alludes to the possibility of moral norms that transcend historical epoch. The
important concepts introduced in this lecture include the influence of the experience of
morality on our possibilities and the necessity for subjects to use their freedom and
autonomy to look beyond existing practico-inert moral norms.
Sartre begins with an account of the phenomenological structure of the ethical.351
Sartre offers the important insight that the normative is a human experience that offers
us possibilities for our projects. Norms are, Sartre says, widespread and pre-reflexive
social structures that aim at regulating human relationships. Sartre argues that all norms
pose determinate ends to be pursued and present these determined ends as
“unconditionally possible.”352 “Unconditionally possible” means whatever the
conditions may be. This does not mean that the norm will always be realized or that it is
always historically possible. But norms have a compelling force on us because they
present themselves as commands we are to follow, no matter what. Sartre appeals to the
example of a survey of young female schoolchildren. Asked if they believed that lying
should be morally condemned, 95% said yes. When questioned if they themselves lie,
90% of them admitted that they do, in fact, lie. Sartre believes that this is evidence that
we want the moral ideal to exist even if we consistently fail to live up to it. The
existence of the unconditionally possible means that the opportunity to be a moral
person remains open to us at all times.353
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Sartre says we live norms and values easily when the practico-inert favors the
realization of these norms. It is in difficult cases that he argues our “moral comfort” is
upset. Sartre gives the example of a husband and wife in a Puritanical society. The wife
has been diagnosed with cancer and will be dead within a year. The husband alone
knows the truth about her condition and experiences moral conflict regarding whether or
not to tell her. Knowing that her death will come within a year would mean that the
strict relationship of deference between them would be upset. The man would have to
“invent” a new relationship with his wife. The man chooses to lie to his wife to
maintain their current way of life until her death, choosing a practical way out of the
moral conflict in order to avoid the difficult task of “self-invention.”354 As Sartre argues,
the man’s failure to invent a new relationship with his wife makes him a “man of
repetition,”355 that is to say, one who lets his behavior be determined by practico-inert
norms. The man chooses repetitive praxis instead of inventive praxis.
Invention or inventive praxis is emphasized throughout the lecture. Sartre argues
that the structure of the ethical is founded on the “moment of invention” which is
present in all praxis.356 The moment of invention is when human consciousness
restructures the given field of possibilities in a light of a future end. It is human praxis,
which first, destructures an impossibility confronting us in the present moment and
simultaneously restructures the given field into a field of possibilities for achieving the
end. Invention, Sartre says, is the moment present in all human action that reveals the
susceptibility of all things to rearrangement into new hierarchies according to a chosen
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human end. “Invention as a fundamental moment of praxis qualifies all work as the
transformation of the impossible into the possible by the modification of present
conditions of possibility based on the goal to be realized.”357 All human actions have an
ethical moment, Sartre says, even if the result of the actions when they become historical
praxis are not the intended result.358
To illustrate how one uses the unconditionally possible in order to restructure the
present, Sartre uses the example of Pierre Brossolette, a member of the French socialist
party who jumped out a window to his death after one session of being tortured. Sartre
says that because Brossolette feared he may talk after being tortured once, he sought
death in order to achieve the unconditional possibility of silence. Unlike the Puritan who
chose to lie to his wife, Brossolette uses his autonomy to invent:359
At this level, the true meaning of unconditionality is revealed: it is the possibility
in me of producing myself as an autonomy which affirms itself by dominating
external circumstances instead of being dominated by them; or, if you prefer, it is
the possibility of producing myself as a pure subject of interiority.360
Sartre calls this an “ethical radicalism” in which the historical agent integrates the
entirety of his praxis into the means to achieve the chosen end:
Ethics envisaged as a determination of activity appears at first as an essential but
provisional moment of all praxis: indeed praxis tears itself away from the
given—that is, from the present conditions—by transcending it toward a
nonbeing from which praxis returns to the given in order to invent its own
conditions of possibility. In this moment of invention, praxis posits its goal as
unconditional.361
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By striving to create oneself in accordance with a norm one conceives as
unconditionally possible, for example, as one who does not lie or does not speak under
torture, the fundamental inventive moment has the same structure. Subjects attempt to be
“pure subjects of interiority” who control external circumstances rather than being
determined by them. This is reflective of the robust sense of freedom Sartre grants to
individual agency.
There are three important concepts to derive from Sartre’s discussion in MH.
First, morality offers us existential possibilities. It presents us with a conception of a
good person and allows us the possibility of becoming that good person. We want this
possibility to remain open for us even if we fail to live up to the standard. Second,
Sartre advocates for inventive praxis rather than repetitive praxis, urging us to pursue
new values beyond those of the practico-inert realm. Third, praxis has an inventive
moment because of the nature of human beings’ forward-looking conscious experience.
We rearrange our present possibilities as a means for achieving the future goal.
However, practico-inert societal moralities are not sufficient on their own and often
reflect the seriality embedded in the practico-inert. Consequently, we must look
elsewhere for ethical ideals that transcend existing practico-inert structures.

2.2: The Rome Lecture: Integral Human Need and Mutual Freedom
The second lecture which offers content for an ethical foundation is Sartre’s
Rome Lecture, which introduces ethical ideals that transcend specific societies. In RL,
Sartre argues that at the heart of every societally specific practico-inert value system,
there is a striving towards a “true ethic,” that is to say, a nonalienated morality that
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transcends individual systems. This is a morality based on what Sartre describes as
universal human needs. Sartre argues that human beings in every historical context have
certain universal needs in common and, based on this empirical fact, we can derive a
universal moral value: the fulfillment of needs.362 Sartre states that a “true ethic” must
go beyond the given moral rules of any particular society. “The true ethic establishes
and dissolves the alienated moralities, in that it is the sense of history, i.e. the refusal of
all repetition in the name of the unconditional possibility of making man.”363 The true
ethic cannot be repetitive social systems which merely solidify the given prejudice of
one’s day into codified rules for behavior.
Sartre argues that ethics is not grounded in an external absolute. It must, instead,
simply refer back to ourselves—human beings—and to what we all have in common.364
The commonality found in the depth of human reality is “integral humanity” and Sartre
says that it is rooted in human needs. “The root of morality is in need, that is, in the
animality of man. Need posits man as his own end.”365 Sartre argues that in our most
basic interaction with our environment the possibilities for praxis are interpreted and
organized around meeting our needs. When these things are not met, our conscious
activity is always directed at fulfilling them.366 Sartre says that fulfillment of need, as the
“true ethic,” is actually at the heart of all alienated moralities. Individual systems of
morality become alienated because of the practico-inert.367
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According to Sartre, historical agents should strive to work together for a society
in which as many people have their needs met as possible, and this will allow them to
invent new ends. This enables the achievement of the second moral ideal: the mutual
recognition of freedom. Sartre says that when basic needs are fulfilled, human beings
can maximally utilize their own freedom and direct it at ends other than fulfilling needs.
But the mutual freedom ideal is only actualized through cooperation with others:
There will be no integral man as long as the practico-inert alienates man, that is,
as long as men, instead of being their product, are only the products of their
products, as long as they do not unite into an autonomous praxis which will
submit the world to the satisfaction of their needs without being enslaved and
divided by their practical objectification. There will be no integral man as long as
each man is not totally a man for all men.368
Here it is clear that in order to avoid alienation of the practico-inert that leaves humans
existing only in a series, it is imperative that we join together to work to satisfy physical,
social, and emotional needs to enhance the possibilities for everyone. Sartre says that
the ethical individual must recognize in others our common integral humanity. When
we do this, we are able to relate to each other through communal goals and collective
praxis rather than through seriality. We also recognize and enable each other’s freedom
to pursue creative praxis. We understand that our individual projects are susceptible to
interpretation by others. If we want our free praxis to have the meaning we want it to
have, these meanings are dependent on others for their recognition. Our social
possibilities come to be alongside others and we gain possibilities through recognizing
each other’s mutual freedom. Thus, the mutual recognition of freedom is a moral ideal
to be pursued alongside integral humanity.
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Sartre argues that we should establish a “pure unconditioned norm” which is not
alienated by the practico-inert. Sartre suggests that this morality is found in solidarity
with exploited people because they seek a “future beyond the system.”369 Sartre then
makes a bold call for “subhuman” agents, that is to say, those who live in a society with
alienated morality, to overthrow systems in order to become fully human and produce a
future that will enable autonomous, integral, and whole humanity.370 He describes such
as society as one in which individuals would unite in communal praxis to dissolve the
practico-inert as soon as it is formed. In this society humans use cooperative action to
produce themselves autonomously rather than being produced by the oppressive
economic systems and alienated moral norms of the practico-inert.371
While RL introduces some normative ethical content for properly aligning our
inventive praxis, the work also has some serious deficiencies in terms of constituting a
completed ethics. By establishing human needs as a foundation for ethics, Sartre offers a
convincing alternative to theories which ground morality in absolute, eternal essences,
such as Kant or Mill, and those that lead to complete subjectivism or relativism.
However, there are also several weaknesses.372 For example, Thomas Anderson argues
that while Sartre identifies integral humanity as the unconditioned future goal, human
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beings inevitably must give integral humanity structured conditions.373 Communal
praxis that dissolves all practico-inert structures is not possible, as CDR shows that the
practico-inert is a necessary part of the structure of human experience.
While it does not constitute a structured ethics all on its own, the RL formulates
two consistent ethical commitments: a dedication to fulfilling universal human needs
and a commitment to acknowledging one another’s mutual freedom. In order to fill in
the remaining pieces, though, we must also incorporate the third lecture, A Plea to
Intellectuals. In this lecture, Sartre speaks directly to our interaction with existing
practico-inert structures. Additionally he articulates what is demanded of us as
individuals if we are to engage in autonomous, inventive praxis directed toward the true
ethic.

2.3 A Plea to Intellectuals

A Plea to Intellectuals (A Plea) consists of three lectures delivered by Sartre at
Tokyo and Kyoto in September-October of 1965, thus given after both MH and RL. A
Plea is directed at a very specific demographic among society: experts of a practical
knowledge, who become consciously aware that they are supposed to be uncovering
universalist knowledge, but who simultaneously represent the ideologies through which
they were academically trained. Sartre’s discussions in the lecture actually represent his
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overall vision of subjectivity, the practico-inert (especially seriality and class-being), and
offer normative content that is applicable beyond the examples he discusses.
Sartre defines intellectuals as trained or academically-oriented professionals,
such as doctors, lawyers, engineers, scientists, and academics who also speak out
publicly on issues of public moral concern.374 Contemporary intellectuals, according to
Sartre, are predefined in their being by the jobs they pursue. The pursuit of a job as a
technician of practical knowledge submits students to a “specific structuration of the
field of their possibilities, of studies to be undertaken, and at the same time, a
destiny.”375 The training they take on is presented as universal and objective, but the
individuals are inevitably instilled with ideologies and educated to preserve tradition.
They are trusted by the dominant class to reinforce values that are to its benefit and
reject the values of the lower economic classes.
Sartre argues that technicians of practical knowledge eventually become aware
of what he calls a “fundamental contradiction” regarding their status in society. This
contradiction is threefold: First, the technicians have likely been humanists their entire
lives and will profess that all human beings deserve equal respect and opportunity.
However the technicians themselves are living proof that all human beings do not have
equal opportunities, as they occupy privileged positions many never have access to.
Second, these professionals are charged with seeking universal forms of knowledge, but
they can only do so within an obedience to an ideology and political policy.376 Third,
technicians are supposed to find what is useful for all, not just one social group.

374

Sartre, A Plea, 230.
Ibid.
376
Ibid., 242.
375

160

However, the reality is that their profession operates within the practico-inert field of
scarcity and relations defined by the pursuit of profit, so the knowledge gained is used
only to benefit the dominant class at the expense of disadvantaged people.377 As Sartre
points out, these individuals come to a turning point and do one of two things: either
accept the dominant ideology and adapt themselves to it, or become intellectuals who
call into question the very system that creates intellectuals such as themselves.378 At this
point, Sartre says, intellectuals investigate themselves first, as an attempt to rid
themselves of their contradictions. But doing so requires an investigation of the
ideologies, structures, options, and praxis of the society of which they are the
products.379
Sartre argues that intellectuals should use the dialectical method to investigate
their own contradictions. The dialectic will uncover what the intellectuals are in their
specific historical moment in relation to the specific systems that have created them.380
In the critical exploration of themselves and the world, intellectuals will, Sartre argues,
perceive many things that are in contradiction with the ideologies upon which they have
been educated. “[H]e will perceive that man does not exist.”381 By this, Sartre means
that intellectuals will perceive that a universal humanism does not currently exist. Sartre
now introduces the idea of ethics as a task to be taken up. Intellectuals will come to
grasp “man as a task….an intellectual who achieves self-awareness necessarily comes to
see both his own singularity and its adumbration of man, as the distant goal of a
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practical and daily enterprise.”382 Intellectuals will grasp the subhuman and realize that
the human is an ongoing, distant goal toward which they must strive. Sartre argues that
intellectuals in their unique positions are obligated to be involved in the issues of their
time:383
[H]e labours in order that a social universality may one day be possible where all
men will be truly free, equal and fraternal, certain in his knowledge that one day,
and not before, the intellectual as a species will disappear, and men will at last
acquire practical knowledge in liberty and harmony.384
It is unclear whether Sartre believes the time will actually happen or whether it merely
an ideal. Be it is as it may, Sartre believes the place of the intellectual is at the side of
those most exploited in society.385
In order for intellectuals to know their contradictions, Sartre argues, they must
remove themselves from their situations and immerse themselves in the experiences of
those who have not had access to the same life privileges. “It follows that if he wishes
to understand the society in which he lives, he has only one course open to him and that
is to adopt the point of view of its most underprivileged members.”386 Sartre makes the
controversial argument that members of the exploited class are characterized by an
“objective intelligence” that is a product of their viewpoint of society.387 If intellectuals
adopt the viewpoint of individuals who endure a multitude of different types of violence,
they can see themselves from below, truly understanding the ambiguity of their
positions.388
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In order to struggle against the ideologies that have created intellectuals and act
as a vehicles for helping exploited people, Sartre suggests that intellectuals practice two
things: perpetual self-criticism and a concrete and unconditional alignment with the
actions of the underprivileged classes. First, regarding the perpetual self-criticism, Sartre
writes:
He must strive to remain aware that he is a petty-bourgeois breaking out of his
mold, constantly tempted to renourish the thoughts of his class. He must remind
himself that he is never secure from the danger of lapsing into universalism.389
And second, regarding the alignment with the underprivileged, Sartre says:
The role of the intellectual is thus not to judge an action before it has begun, nor
to urge that it be undertaken, nor to supervise its development. On the contrary,
it is to join it in mid-course in its elemental forms, to integrate himself in it,
participate in it physically, allow himself to be captured and borne along by it,
and only then, to the extent that he judges it necessary, to decipher its nature and
illuminate its meanings and possibilities.390
The work of intellectuals should be accompanied by constant critical self-reflection and
active participation alongside the most exploited members of one’s society.
Sartre recognizes that the implications of his talk go beyond the current
discussion, stating that “on closer inspection we find that the intellectual’s contradictions
are inherent in each one of us and in the whole society.”391 He argues that the
contradictions he has discussed in a very narrow context are at play in much larger
interactions. He continues, “Our ends are robbed from all of us—we are all means
towards ends which escape us, ends which are fundamentally inhuman; we are all torn
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between objective thought and ideology.”392 What is unique about the intellectual is
that most people lack a reflective consciousness of their own situation.
In A Plea, we see the reoccurring themes from Sartre’s account of subjectivity,
as well as some new normative commitments. First, his discussion of how the
intellectual becomes educated into a contradiction shows the relationship between
ideology, institution, and how these form individuals’ possibilities. Second, his strong
emphasis on the exploited classes returns to his discussion of class in CDR. Third, we
see a return to the themes of the Rome Lecture: we currently live in a society with
alienated morality that produces subhumans, whose integral human needs are not being
met.393 A Plea is also important because it presents us with a method: we are called to
first look inward at ourselves into our own contradictions. Only afterwards can we
ethically respond. Ethical action must be preceded by ethical self-introspection.
Klockars, for example, argues that the take away from A Plea is that intellectuals must
combine an ethical concern about universal values with a concrete social and historical
diagnosis of their current situation.394
Examination of these three lectures by Sartre provides us with the ethical
concepts needed to outline of a mode of being that is relevant for ethical living in the
present. In MH Sartre emphasizes how the normative influences our possibilities and the
importance of using human freedom and autonomy to transcend societally specific
moral norms. In RL, Sartre introduces commitment to the ethical ideals of integral
humanity and mutual freedom, which are foundational to being human in all historical
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time periods and thus are not practico-inert norms. In A Plea, he shows how the
exercise of freedom and autonomy and the mutual freedom and integral humanity ideals
should be applied in a concrete example, emphasizes the need for critical reflection, and
he offers a method for this reflection. I now use this background discussion to introduce
a structured model for a mode of ethical being in the present based on Sartrean thought.

2.4 Sartrean Ethical Subjectivity

I argue that a model of ethical subjectivity can be constructed on the basis of
Sartre’s discussions, although he does not explicitly put it this way. The “mode of
being” I suggest is grounded in an orientation of critical historical reflection, active
empathy with the vulnerable, and invention. While the ethical orientation has primacy, it
is accompanied by ethical commitments to integral human needs and mutual freedom,
which are best achieved through communal, group praxis.
First, the ethical orientation is characterized by critical historical reflection. The
entirety of CDR was a critical reflection on how Sartre believes humans are made within
history. This point is again emphasized in A Plea, in which Sartre emphasizes the need
for intellectuals to be critically aware of themselves and the forces that made them.
Intellectuals, who he believes all occupy a place of privilege in society, must maintain a
constant awareness of the advantages they have. However, he does not limit the mandate
to reflect only to intellectuals, arguing that we can find the intellectual’s contradictions
inherent in all of us, to the extent that most people lack a reflective consciousness of
their situation.395 Critical historical reflection must include reflection on our own
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“constituent contradiction.” This means uncovering discrepancies between our professed
beliefs about ourselves and the world, on the one hand, and the way the world actually
is, on the other.
For example, in A Plea Sartre returns to the example of racism, which he
discussed in detail as a practico-inert discourse in CDR. He shows how racism infiltrates
the thoughts of even the most educated and well-intentioned individuals. He says:
[R]acism is a concrete everyday attitude, and consequently a man can sincerely
hold anti-racist opinions of a universal type, while in his deepest recesses, under
the influence of his childhood, he remains a racist—so that one day he will
involuntarily behave like one in ordinary life.396
In this situation the ethical orientation requires an admission that we have biases and a
willingness to identify them and the conditions which have led to them. The task of
reflection also requires the realization that our own experiences of the world are not
universal, and that others may have very different perceptions of the same practico-inert
structures depending on how they have experienced them.
Second, the ethical orientation requires active empathy with those who Sartre
considers exploited. These can be marginalized or disadvantaged people in any society.
Sartre focuses his analysis on the economically exploited, due to his focus on class
being. I suggest that we seek active empathy with the vulnerable rather than the
“oppressed” or “poor.” By vulnerable, I mean people who are more susceptible to being
harmed by others and whose economic, educational, vocational, physical, and
intellectual possibilities are more limited by practico-inert structures. Actively
empathizing with vulnerable people rather than limiting it to the economically exploited
still encompasses those who are economically disadvantaged while also making room
396
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for other ways that people are rendered vulnerable in a given society. Vulnerable people
in the United States include, but are certainly not limited to, the intellectually or
physically disabled, the elderly or terminally ill, undocumented immigrants, minority
ethnic groups, children, especially those in foster care, victims of violence and abuse,
and the homeless. Sartre explicitly calls for a direct alignment with the experiences of
the exploited or vulnerable. Thus, part of the ethical orientation is to actively seek out
opportunities to gain insight into the experience of people who are rendered vulnerable
by the practico-inert structures in any society. At the same time, the ethical orientation
requires acknowledgement that we can never fully understand what it is like to be in
their place.
Third, the ethical orientation requires a general attitude and orientation toward
invention, which requires exercising freedom. The concept of invention serves a twofold purpose in Sartre’s ethical thought. First, invention is utilizing one’s free
consciousness to look beyond practico-inert structures and imagine new possibilities for
arranging our environment, envisioning practices or structures in which fewer people are
rendered vulnerable. Second, invention requires a willingness to choose possibilities that
may be a direct rupture with the choices we have made in the past which affirmed
practico-inert morality. This requires creativity, courage, and a willingness to upset our
own moral comfort.
Recall Sartre’s example in Morality and History of the man who failed to
“invent” a new relationship with his wife. Letting his wife know that she had a terminal
diagnosis would have forced him to take on the burden of caring for her in her final year.
The potential rearrangement of the possibilities this man would have had to endure was
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unbearable for him. This can be translated into a broader social context. Taking up
different practico-inert structures as a concrete future goal, we have to “invent” by
restructuring our given field into new possibilities. This can be very uncomfortable if
existing practico-inert structures already benefit us. In these situations we may be
tempted to “lie to our spouses,” so to speak. For Sartre, we are obligated as ethical
subjects to use our autonomy and freedom to envision ways we could meet human needs
within existing practico-inert structures. In addition to inventing ourselves by pursuing
new ends, we must “invent” a new relationship with each other within the realm of
historical possibility.
The ethical orientation of critical historical reflection, active empathy, and
invention is accompanied by ethical commitments to integral humanity and mutual
freedom, which we are best achieved through communal group praxis. In RL and A Plea
it is clear that a dedication to integral human needs is at the root of Sartre’s ethical
commitments. We can extrapolate the basic needs that would fall into this category, as
Sartre himself fails to do so. It is clear that integral human needs for Sartre include
access to basic material resources, educational opportunities, health care, economic
stability, and respect and recognition of oneself as a free human. With regard to the
second ethical commitment of mutual freedom, the ethical agent must be committed to
recognizing and enabling the other’s freedom and realizing that one’s freedom is
interwoven with the freedom of others. Our own projects are susceptible to be
interpreted by others, so the mutual recognition of the meaning of what we do enables
our own freedom.397 Our possibilities to realize the meaning intended in our actions
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depend on the meanings and significations of the action in relation to other persons and
on their recognition of our projects. We gain possibilities for everyone when we make
room for the freedom of others.
The commitments to integral humanity and mutual freedom are best actualized in
the historical world through “group praxis.” In CDR, Sartre argues that the most active
response to the feebleness and impotency of a series is for individuals to bond together
to form a group. Group formation allows individuals to have more control over the
practico-inert forces that condition their existence. Members of groups remain
ontologically distinct individuals; however they are not as isolated as members in a
series because they are united through common goals.398 A pledged group is a group
which is deliberately chosen by individuals who make a pledge to one another to uphold
the common praxis of the group. Sartre calls the pledged group “the victory of man as
common freedom over seriality.”399 The primary characteristic of a pledged group is that
individuals come together freely and make a pledge to each other reciprocally. “I give
my pledge to all the third parties of forming the group of which I am a member, and it is
the group which enables everyone to guarantee the statute of permanence to
everyone.”400 Through the pledge, each member agrees to limits on his or her practical
freedom, but these limits ensure proper utilization of resources for the group as a whole.
The formation of a pledged group allows individuals to engage in collective praxis and
move beyond seriality. In order to build a society which reflects Sartre’s ethical ideals
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of integral humanity or mutual freedom, it is imperative that individuals intentionally
choose to bond together and direct their praxis toward shared ends.
Sartrean ethical subjectivity as a mode of being-in-the-world requires several
things from us at the level of our individual actions and at the level of our approaches to
public policy. At the level of our individual existential project, Sartrean ethical
subjectivity, first, commits us to critical historical reflection on ourselves, or an
investigation in our own contradictions. Second, it requires active participation
alongside those who are vulnerable in order to understand their experience of the world.
Third, it requires the courage to invent by looking beyond practico-inert moralities.
Fourth, it demands a willingness to use our freedom and autonomy to break from our
personal pasts and choose new possibilities in the present. Fifth, it calls us to recognize
that we gain possibilities through our interactions with others, and that our actions
influence others’ possibilities. Last, it requires a commitment to meeting integral human
needs and recognizing mutual freedom within our historical moment.
Sartrean ethical subjectivity can also serve as a philosophical framework for
evaluating the worthiness of public policies or ethical practices. This means when we
are morally evaluating a public policy, we must, first, approach the policy in its
historical singularity rather than at the universal or abstract level. Second, we should
examine how this practice is shaping discourses, ideas, and the practical field of options
that comprise the field of possibilities. Third, we should ask if this policy is practicoinert and contributing to seriality or if it renders individuals vulnerable. Fourth, we must
be willing to envision creative solutions that go beyond existing practico-inert structures
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and look beyond practico-inert moralities. Fifth, we must make sure our policies are
compatible with the ideals of integral human needs and mutual freedom.
In this section I have offered a model for an ethical subjectivity derived from the
ethical concepts Sartre offers in his post-CDR lectures. It is a mode of being
characterized by an orientation of critical reflection, active empathy, and invention. It is
characterized by the commitments to integral human needs and mutual freedom, which
should be pursued through pledged group praxis. I now turn to Foucault’s discussion of
historical practices of ethics.

3

Foucault and Ethical Subjectivity

Foucault’s philosophy includes little normative content, as Foucault was more
interested in uncovering than legislating. However, when he was questioned about
ethics, there are common themes in Foucault’s answers that can provide an ethical
foundation to build on. I argue that through his discussion of historical practices of care
of the self in the Hellenistic period as well as parrhesia or truth-telling in Ancient Greek
and Roman life, Foucault provides a window to see how ethics functioned historically in
relation to the truth and as a practice of caring for self and others. While Foucault does
not explicitly advocate that any view is better than another, I argue that his historical
exploration itself calls us to understand how ethics relates to truth and caring for others
in our own epoch, and this should inform our contemporary moral reasoning.
Ethical subjectivity in Foucault has become a topic of discussion in recent
philosophical literature. The most comprehensive analysis of a model of ethical
subjectivity in Foucault comes from Colin Koopman who presents a model of
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Foucauldian self-transformation as an ethical orientation. Koopman argues that
Foucault offers a vision of ethics which is oriented towards self-transformation in the
sense of reworking and re-creation of the self. Koopman also identifies two implicit
ethical commitments: care of self and a philosophical way of life.401 While I do not
argue that Foucault explicitly advocates for commitments to care of self and the
philosophical way of life, I do think that these commitments are compatible with, and in
the spirit of, Foucault’s thought. However, we must be careful to apply them through the
context of his ethical orientation and in the context of our contemporary epoch’s
framework of truth.
In a 1980 interview with Michael Bess, when questioned about ethics, Foucault
replied that ethical practice should rely on “refusal, curiosity, and innovation.”402 This is
the ethical orientation that, in my view, Foucauldian ethical subjectivity requires: refusal
as a critically reflective practice, curiosity as a critical ontology of ourselves, and
innovation as a general openness to change and transformation. The ethical subjectivity
model I suggest requires the commitments to care of self and the philosophical way of
life in our epoch characterized by biopower and mechanisms of security, although
Foucault does not explicitly advocate for them. To unpack these orientation and
commitments, we must look at two different lecture series that Foucault gave at the end
of his life: The Government of Self and Others and The Courage of Truth.
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3.1 The Government of Self and Others

In The Government of Self and Others (GSO), Foucault studies the relationship
between politics and philosophy in Ancient Greece and Rome, and early Christianity. He
focuses on the concept of parrhesia, which can be translated as “frank-speech” or “truth
telling.” By posing the question of what it means to govern oneself and others in the
Ancient world, Foucault looks to uncover “how truth-telling, the obligation and
possibility of telling the truth in procedures of government can show how the individual
is constituted as a subject in relationship to self and the relationship to others.”403
Reviewing the different forms of parrhesia that Foucault discusses will serve three
objectives. First, it will show how morality was linked to telling the truth in different
historical epochs, setting up a background for a discussion of how this link functions
today. Second, it will show how Foucault describes historical truth-telling as a process
of self-transformation, which is an important part of his ethical orientation. Third, a
descriptive looking back can help illuminate what is at stake for a prescriptive going
forward.
In late Antiquity and the first two centuries BCE, Foucault says there was a
development of a technique of telling the truth in which one could not properly care for
oneself without a relationship to another person. The role of this person was to tell the
truth.404 Truth-telling (parrhesia) is situated within a:
[M]eeting point of the obligation to speak the truth, procedures and techniques of
governmentality, and the constitution of the relationship to self. Truth-telling by
the other, as an essential component of how he governs us, is one of the essential
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conditions for us to be able to form the right kind of relationship with ourselves
that will give us virtue and happiness.405
Telling the truth was not about revealing timeless metaphysical facts about ourselves or
the world, but had to do with the way one related to self and others in processes of
government. Thus, according to Foucault’s interpretation, the Ancients possessed an
awareness of the historicity of ethics.
For example, Foucault looks at the relationship of parrhesia to democracy,
arguing that the “good parrhesia” of the 4th century Greece BCE is exemplified in the
figure of Pericles as presented in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War.406
During this time period, good parrhesia required four “poles”: the pole of democracy,
the pole of ascendancy, the pole of a rational logos, and the pole of courage. Democracy
was required so all people could speak freely and take part in decision making. For
good parrhesia, the speaker needed some level of authority or superiority over others to
get them to listen. The third pole required a rational logos, for the one who rose to a
level of ascendancy in order to speak and exercise power over others must present a
discourse of truth. Last, parrhesia required moral courage, because when parrhesia
took place in a democracy, it was bound to be met with opposition. Thus, the one who
spoke the truth must have courage in the face of opposition.407 The parrhesiast, in a
good democracy, must be one who sees the truth, is capable of telling it, is devoted to
the general interest, and is reliable and honest.408
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The next stage of parrhesia Foucault examines is the philosophical parrhesia
through a focus on Plato’s Seventh Letter. Foucault explains that there was a
deterioration of the connection between democracy and parrhesia, insofar as democracy,
which allowed everyone to speak equally, came to narrow the space where parrhesia
could be practiced. Parrhesia was in danger of being indistinguishable from flattery.
This is why, Plato argues, philosophers must come to power.409 It is to be noted that the
type of philosophy advocated for was not a transmission of knowledge, but rather “a
mode of life, a way of being, a practical relationship to oneself through which one
elaborates oneself and works on oneself.”410 This mode of being was characterized by
taking part in an active philosophical task (ergon). According to this task, the
philosopher should be concerned with the affairs of the city and the governing of others.
Foucault says that Plato’s Seventh Letter poses the question of the reality of
philosophy.411 Foucault argues that philosophy was not a form of truth-telling that
legislated. Philosophy was not meant to prescribe a type of government or particular
rules for conduct, but to function in relation to whatever political system was already
operative in a society. If philosophy intervened in politics, it was to help those who
govern and those who were governed to learn to care for themselves and others. By first
turning their gazes inward and knowing themselves, rulers were then able to perceive
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things like the foundations of a concept of justice.412 Importantly, philosophy was
viewed as a constant work performed on the self:
[T]he test of philosophy in politics directs us to this: the reality of philosophy is
found in the relationship of self to self. And it is indeed in setting out the
problem of the government of self and the government of others that philosophy,
here, in this text, formulates its ergon, at once its task and its reality.413
The self described in this passage does not refer to an unchanging metaphysical reality,
but a subject that is constantly produced and transformed. The task and reality of
philosophy was to perform work on oneself and to become more balanced and reflective
when governing oneself and others.
In his historical analysis in GSO, Foucault demonstrates that telling the truth
functioned alongside ethical practices. The process of telling the truth necessarily
involved interaction with and help from others. The philosopher played a role of
exposing and assisting others to come to decisions on their own, not through legislating
or prescribing. The idea was not to demonstrate that something was morally right or
wrong or true or false, but instead to change social and cultural attitudes and behaviors
through the practice of truth-telling. Foucault does not advocate for a return to these
practices, but his historical insight enables us to envision ethics as an ongoing process of
transformation and reflection, in which people participated alongside the political
practices in one’s epoch. The relationship between parrhesia and caring for the self, as
well as a different vision of what a philosophical life is, can again be found in The
Courage of Truth.
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3.2 The Courage of Truth

In The Courage of Truth (CT) Foucault begins with the assertion that at the end
of the 4th century and beginning of the 5th century in Athens, there was a political
climate that no longer allowed for public parrhesia. Then, parrhesia became a matter of
work on the individual prince’s soul. With the help of a philosophical counselor, the
prince aimed to establish a relationship with the truth that allowed him to have
knowledge of how to govern himself and others well. It was through practices of
parrhesia that the prince potentially became capable of ethical differentiation in his
ruling life. “[T]hrough true discourse, one can instill in it the ethos which will make him
capable of grasping the truth and of conducting himself in conformity with this truth.”414
The question of ethos was always posed, according to Foucault’s interpretation,
alongside the question of how to access the truth. The parrhesiastic standpoint:
[T]ries to bring the question of truth back to the question of its political
conditions and the ethical differentiation which gives access to it; which
constantly and always brings the question of power back to the question of its
relation to truth and knowledge on the one hand, and to ethical differentiation on
the other; the standpoint, finally, which constantly brings the question of the
moral subject back to the question of the true discourse in which this moral
subject constitutes itself and to the question of the relations of power in which
this subject is formed.415
Ethics, in the sense of how to live, was a problem that had to be contemplated and posed
alongside the existing framework of truth and power. This point is crucial to the ethical
mode of being I suggest.
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Foucault then presents his interpretation of The Apology, in which he argues that
Socrates’ message before his death was to encourage the citizens of Athens to take care
of themselves:
By encouraging you to take care of yourselves I am useful to the whole city…It
is in the city’s interest to protect the true discourse, the courageous veridiction
which encourages citizens to take care of themselves…Through his concern
about himself, this leads him to concern himself with others.416
According to Foucault, the entire theme of the Apology is linked to a theme of care, both
for oneself and for others. But this care involved a relationship to a truth that was
produced within a set of conditions that justified what counted as true. One must care for
one’s own soul by contemplating how one’s soul was linked to the truth.417 The Socratic
discourse focused on presenting an account of what is good in how one lives and was an
“organizing and formative principle of one’s mode of life.”418
Foucault then turns to a different form of parrhesia that can be found in the
philosophical life practiced by the Cynics. The Cynic life was characterized by
intentional poverty, begging, and roaming. This “mode of life,” as Foucault calls it, was
for the Cynics the condition of the possibility of telling the truth.419 With Cynicism, the
mode of life itself made space for the truth to be told. Making the truth was to be visible
in one’s behavior. “Cynicism makes life, existence, bios, what could be called an
alethurgy, a manifestation of truth.”420 One’s concrete and material life such as one’s
body, dress, and general conduct was intended to give witness to the truth.
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According to Foucault, the Cynics took the Greek principles for a “true life” and
took them to their extreme. The “true life” in Ancient Greek thought could be
characterized according to four principles. First, the true life was unconcealed, in the
sense of a way of being that does not hide its intentions and aims. Second, the true life
was unalloyed, that is to say, without mixture of good and evil, pleasure and suffering,
vice and virtue. Third, the true life was a straight life, or a life lived within norms and
principles of conduct. And fourth, the true life was unchanging, a life without
disturbance or corruption.421 Foucault does not believe that Cynicism broke with this
concept of a true life, but rather, took these themes “to their extreme consequence, as an
extrapolation of the themes of the true life rather than as external to them.”422 The Cynic
life was still based on the four themes of Greek truth, but they took these themes and
lived them to the extreme:
The Cynic game shows that this life, which truly applies the principles of the true
life, is other than the life led by men in general and by philosophers in particular.
With this idea that the true life is an other life, I think we arrive at a particularly
important point in the history of philosophy, certainly in the history of Western
ethics.423
The Cynic interpretation of the unconcealed life was a life lived concretely and
materially in front of others.424 The unalloyed life under the Cynic interpretation was
characterized by a real material poverty without possessions. It was an active poverty
that sought more than just lack of concern for wealth.425 The straight life, for the
Cynics, was a life that conformed to the principles of nature, embracing animality and
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others types of brute existence. These three changes in the unconcealed, unalloyed, and
straight life are what Foucault calls the “Cynic reversal.” The last characteristic of a
“true life” as an unchanging or incorruptible life, took the form of a sovereign life. The
sovereign was a philosopher king who by nature cared for others, to the extent that he
would be willing to sacrifice himself for others.426 Foucault calls this the Cynic
scandal, which was not a refutation of the Greek conception of a good life, but rather
took the Greek principles to their extreme and lived them openly.
This form of life will look not only to change oneself, but also the world, all of
humanity. The aim of Cynic life, according to Foucault, is not just to say what the world
is in its truth:
Its aim, its final aim, is to show that the world will be able to get back to its truth,
will be able to transfigure itself and become other in order to get back to what it
is in its truth, only at the price of a change, a complete alteration, the complete
change and alteration in the relation one has to self.427
In this passage we see that the Cynic life was an ethical process of self-creation and
being-in-the-world. To tell the truth meant to supervise others, to watch what others do
and think, and to watch over all of humanity. Since each person is part of humanity, this
was an aspect of caring for both the self and others simultaneously.428 This is what a
Foucauldian analysis makes possible for us today—we cannot recover the Cynic life, but
we can formulate a mode of ethical self-transformation for us, in our current framework
of truth and power.
In CT, we see important themes for how Foucault sees the orientation of an
ethical life, although he does not advocate that we simply return to Greek or Cynic
426

Foucault, CT, 278-279.
Ibid., 315.
428
Ibid., 310-312.
427

180

practices. From this discussion of the different forms that parrhesia took throughout
historical periods, it is evident that Foucault sees a link between how we should live and
our epoch’s relationship for receiving and telling the truth. In each period, he sees
parrhesia as requiring courage and willingness to change. He presents us with different
models for being an ethical subject, showing that ethics was a transformational way of
life. He shows that the political conditions for telling the truth varied in particular time
periods in relationship to the rational principles governing each epoch. In the next
section, I will use this historical exploration to suggest a set of ethical commitments that
can be considered Foucauldian if we take care to apply them within the framework of
Foucault’s orientation. I will begin by briefly examining secondary literature on the
ethical subject in Foucault before offering my own model.

3.3. Foucauldian Ethical Subjectivity
While Foucault’s ethical framework is more abstract and implicit than Sartre’s,
the concept of Foucauldian “ethical subjectivity” has received much attention in recent
Foucault scholarship. For example, recent work comes from Justen Infinito,429 Lynne
Huffer,430 Mark Kelly,431 Nancy Luxon,432 and Colin Koopman.433 Infinito, Kelly,
Luxon, and Koopman all offer similar analyses that describe a Foucauldian ethical
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orientation. Infinito, for example, suggests that Foucauldian ethical subjectivity involves
creating an environment that encourages experimentation of the self, an awareness of
oneself as a product of one’s historical moment, and an attitude or disposition to
critique.434 I agree that this in an integral part of the ethical orientation we find in
Foucault and we will see evidence of this in the model I suggest. I will go further in
arguing for a set of commitments in our epoch of biopower. Kelly argues that ethical
subjectivity for Foucault is a type of self-constitution which focuses on recovering the
Greek conception of “care for yourself” rather than the modern concern with “know
yourself.” Kelly argues that modern practices of ethics are focused on attempts to
ground them in a scientific truth about ourselves. Foucault suggests an ethics that
recovers a practice of creating oneself as a work of art rather than following maxims
based on scientific truths that we believe have revealed standards of behavior.435
Luxon, for her part, argues that Foucault’s lectures on parrhesia offer a model of
“expressive subjectivity” composed of practices of self-governance. Expressive
subjectivity is a body of practices that do not refer to any binding external order.436 She
argues that we can draw from Foucault’s lectures on parrhesia a mandate for an “ethical
steadiness” or point of reference for ethical practice, precisely because ethics can never
be achieved once and for all. If our relationships to each other and to the social issues of
our time are to have an ethical steadiness, they require commitment to certain discourses
and self-practice.437 The model I suggest below is not in conflict with any of the
aforementioned models and is compatible with their insights. My model will go further,
434

Infinito, “Ethical Self-Formation,” 168.
Kelly, “Foucault, Subjectivity,” 517-521.
436
Luxon, “Ethics and Subjectivity,” 379.
437
Ibid., 398-399.
435

182

however, in that I systematically offer an ethical orientation and commitments, and
specify how these are applicable in our current epoch of biopower and mechanisms of
security.438
Let us return to Foucault’s discussion of ethics as “refusal, curiosity and
innovation.” When the questioner pressured Foucault because his answer was too
vague, Foucault responded:
I’m not a prophet. I’m not an organizer. I don’t want to tell people what they
should do. I’m not going to tell them: “this is good for you, this is bad for you!” I
try to analyze a real situation in its various complexities, with the goal of
allowing refusal, and curiosity, and innovation.439
I believe these sentiments characterize Foucault’s ethical orientation. When Foucault
says that ethics should rely on “refusal,” I argue that he is referring back to his assertions
that we must not accept our current social or political landscape as inevitable. One
should not accept any contemporary practice or claim to truth without first submitting it
to scrutiny. This does not necessarily mean that our current political landscape is
“wrong” or necessarily bad, but that we should not accept it as inevitable. When
Foucault discusses parrhesia as it functioned in Plato’s Seventh Letter, he said that
philosophers helped those who governed turn their gazes inward in order to first know
themselves. By doing so, they were able to independently envision foundations for

438

Huffer’s analysis is unique as she makes an effort to directly connect Foucault’s conception
of ethics to our epoch of biopower. She proposes a “Foucauldian ethics of eros as a
transformative thinking-feeling of life in biopower,” (438). Huffer suggests a Foucauldian
ethical subjectivity characterized by a mode of living which is an uncertain, embodied, and
disruptive encounter with other subjects. She calls this an “erotic retraversal” which is an
“ethical, self-transformative, self-undoing labor that exposes the Cartesian ‘I’ to its own limits
as rational subject,” (451). Ultimately she grounds this subjectivity in certain modes of
sexuality. Limiting ethical self-formation to different sexual practices, however, has limited
application for conversations in applied ethics and our general relationships with others. See
“Foucault’s Eros.”
439
Foucault, “Power, Moral Values, and the Intellectual,” 13

183

concepts of justice regarding how politics should operate, and then direct that
knowledge outwards, to govern others. This serves as a historical example of refusal.
Refusal as an orientation pertaining to our relationships with others means that we must
not tell others what to do, but help them see the contingency and lack of necessity in our
practices. In the following passage from The Politics of Truth, Foucault argues that we
should never complacently accept our own certainties. I suggest this passage
exemplifies the attitude of refusal:
Never consent to be completely comfortable with your own certainties. Never let
them sleep, but never believe either that a new fact will be enough to reverse
them. Never imagine that one can change them like arbitrary axioms. Remember
that, in order to give them an indispensable mobility, one must see far, but also
close-up and right around oneself. One must clearly feel that everything
perceived is only evident when surrounded by a familiar and poorly known
horizon, that each certitude is only sure because of the support offered by
unexplored ground. The most fragile instant has roots.440
Drawing from this passage, we can extrapolate refusal to mean a willingness to
challenge our assumptions, while simultaneously realizing that we cannot instantly
reverse them. They should be mobile and subject to revision, but we also must
acknowledge that they are part of who we are. Additionally, we must be willing to look
outward, at our social landscape, as well as inward, at ourselves.
We can connect Foucault’s talk of “curiosity,” with the critical ontology of
ourselves that he introduces in “What is Enlightenment?” As we recall, Foucault
suggests that we make inquiries into the following questions: “How are we constituted
as subjects of our own knowledge? How are we constituted as subjects who exercise or
submit to power relations? How are we constituted as moral subjects of our own
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actions?”441 He is careful not to advance the point of view that this historical ontology
could give us complete and definitive knowledge of ourselves and our historical limits,
as it is impossible to objectively remove ourselves from our current way of thinking.442
Foucault shows that by posing these questions for different historical epochs, we can
reveal the contingency of how we currently think, speak, and act. We can identify
particular shifts, for example, the shift to strategies of biopower and discipline in the
recent past, to understand how those concepts may still be influencing our mode of
subjectivity today. Curiosity is important to the Foucauldian ethical orientation because
there is no normative looking forward without a descriptive looking back.443
Foucauldian “innovation” is primarily characterized by a general orientation
towards transformation. In his discussion of the reality of philosophy in the ancient
world, Foucault reveals a time when philosophy functioned as an ongoing work on the
self:
The reality of philosophy is its practice…That is to say, it is the relation to self,
in the work of self on self, in the work on oneself, in this mode of activity of self
on self that philosophy’s reality will actually be demonstrated and attested.444
I argue that the attitude of innovation should look to recover the sentiment of
philosophy as a practice and work on ourselves. This includes a willingness to perform
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this work in order to be different. It requires a realization that self-transformation is
never achieved once and for all, but is ongoing. We cannot recover the practices of the
Greeks, because we live in an epoch of biopower and mechanisms of security. We can,
however, adopt a general orientation toward innovation and self-transformation that was
present during this time and is in line with the spirit of Foucault’s philosophy.
In his analysis of Foucauldian ethical subjectivity, Koopman argues that a
Foucauldian orientation requires a general disposition towards transformation. He argues
that there are two different forms of transformation in Foucault’s portrayal of historical
parrhesia: a social transformation and an individual transformation. On the social level,
parrhesia is portrayed not as a transmission of the knowledge that social practices are
unjust, but “rather transforming our conceptions of justice such that we can come to
recognize certain practice as possibly unjust.”445 Parrhesia as a political practice of
truth-telling does not reveal what is true or false about society but, rather, “transforms
the conditions of the possibility of showing something to be true or false.”446 On the
level of individual transformation, Koopman argues that parrhesia “functions to
reflexively effect transformations in our selves: one way of taking care of ourselves.”447
Through critical examination of our assumptions about what is true, we exhibit a
willingness to become different if this is where our investigation leads us. Koopman
argues that this is a process of ongoing transformation and reworking of the self.
The mode of being with Foucauldian roots that I suggest, therefore, is
characterized by an orientation of a courageous refusal to accept practices as inevitable
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or immediately assume them good or bad, by a curious attitude that results in a historical
ontology of ourselves, and by an orientation toward transformation and innovation that
is never achieved once and for all. I argue that this mode of being should also include
ethical commitments, even though Foucault did not explicitly advocate for them himself.
These should include caring for others as part of care of self and a philosophical life of
truth-telling in our epoch of biopower and mechanisms of security. In congruence with
the explicitly Foucauldian ethical orientation, these commitments must be “innovative”
to the extent that we allow flexibility and openness to change in their application. I
define care of self as a commitment to one’s own well-being, as well as caring about the
well-being of others alongside ourselves. By first turning our gaze inward, we can help
others see the lack of necessities in their landscape without telling them what to do. I
will define the philosophical way of life as a commitment to recovering philosophy as an
ongoing process of working on oneself, characterized by a courage to live the truth.
Discussing how these commitments could potentially operate in contemporary society
will bring them into greater clarity.
Recall that biopower refers to a set of controls that were introduced when
Western society came to conceive of human beings as a species with a body that could
be mastered and manipulated. Biopower is the underlying rational justification behind
many of our current medical and disciplinary practices. Mechanisms of security refer to
disciplinary mechanisms that were introduced on the basis of this new understanding of
biopower and aimed at making changes in the norm at the level of populations. The
question, then, is the following: what do commitments to “care of self” and the
“philosophical way of life” entail for us in the epoch of biopower? In what follows I
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make some suggestions for answering this question, keeping in mind that these
commitments must be flexible in their application. This is my own development of
Foucauldian concepts rather than a view for which Foucault himself explicitly
advocated.
Foucault’s historical analyses showed that historically care of self included
practices performed to make one capable of receiving and knowing the truth. He
demonstrates that in different periods knowing the truth included a duty to supervise
others, watch what others do and think, and watch over all of humanity. As each person
was part of humanity, one cared for self and others at the same time.448 I argue for a
commitment to care of self in our epoch which focuses on how practices of biopower
and mechanisms of security affect our possibilities. We should strive to understand the
categories of normality and abnormality through which we form beliefs about ourselves
and our relationships with others. We should acknowledge how new practices of
biopower or discipline will create categories for normality and abnormality. This ethical
commitment includes a dedication to exploring how our practices affect our possibilities
and a commitment to changing our behavior when appropriate. It also includes a
commitment to helping others see these changes in possibilities as well. This does not
mean telling others what they should do, but assisting people in reaching the relevant
knowledge to decide for themselves. I argue that care of self as a practice requires this to
be an active, intentional process that we perform alongside others. This view is not
explicitly Foucauldian, but is opened by his historical analyses and can be applied within
the context of his ethical orientation.
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The second commitment I argue is made possible by Foucault’s analyses is a
philosophical way of life in our current epoch. As Koopman argues convincingly, the
practice of parrhesia does not consist in demonstrating that something is morally right
or wrong or true or false, but instead in influencing social and cultural attitudes and
behaviors through the practice of truth-telling.449 Foucault focuses on the Cynic version
of the true life, which was a manifestation of the self, a physical model of truth, and
speech spoken with conviction and persuasion.450 The aim of the Cynic life was to
“transfigure itself and become other in order to get back to what it is in its truth, only at
the price of a change, a complete alteration, the complete change and alteration in the
relation one has to self.”451
Although we cannot return to the Cynic life of truth in our current ways of
thinking and doing, I suggest our contemporary mode of ethical being strive to recover
philosophy as a work on ourselves, and rediscover life as a manifestation of the truth in
our doing and being. In our epoch of biopower and mechanisms of security, this would
mean bearing the truth of our possibilities, maintaining a reflective awareness of how we
become subjects through these practices, and a willing acceptance to become different
through changes in these practices. Additionally, the courage to tell the truth requires
speaking out appropriately in the proper contexts when a practice is changing categories
for normality and potentially stifling possibilities for certain groups. For us, this means
bearing witness to the truth of how medical and disciplinary practices are shaping the
field of possibilities in our epoch.
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The model I have suggested is intended to serve as a guideline for creating
oneself as an engaged historical agent in our epoch, based on Foucauldian thought. The
following table will help organize explicitly what comes from Foucault and what I add
that is not explicitly present in Foucault’s work.
Explicitly Foucault’s

Orientation or Commitment

Engels’ Addition

Orientation: Refusal



Refusal of necessities in
our social and political
landscape.



Orientation: Curiosity



We should perform a
critical historical
ontology of ourselves
that explores how we
are constituted as
subjects of knowledge,
power, and our own
actions.
No normative looking
forward without a
descriptive looking
back.



Ongoing willingness for
change and selftransformation.
Recognition that
historical ontology of
ourselves reveals new
possibilities.
Historically people
cared for ourselves
when they took up a
relationship with the
truth.
We can care for others
alongside ourselves by
helping them seek the
relevant knowledge to
decide for themselves.



Shows that philosophy
previously functioned as
a practice and work of
self on self.
Implicitly advocates a
historically relevant





Orientation: Innovation




Commitment: Care of Self





Philosophical way of life












We should refuse many
necessities about
ourselves and our own
possibilities without
submitting to scrutiny.
This critical historical
ontology must explore
how we are constituted
as subjects through
practices of biopower
and mechanisms of
security.
Must explore how
changing these practices
will change the
conceptual framework
through which we
emerge.
There must be
flexibility and openness
in our ethical
commitments.

Care of self necessitates
exploration of how our
possibilities are shaped
by our epoch of
biopower and
mechanisms of security.
Caring for others
requires helping them
see as well.
This should be an
active, intentional
process.
Maintaining a reflective
awareness of how we
become subjects
through biopower and
mechanisms of security.
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relationship with telling
the truth.







Actively willing to
become different
through the changes of
these practices.
Commitment to speak
up and speak out
appropriately in the
proper contexts when a
practice is changing
categories for
normality.
Willingness to
illuminate models of
thinking and acting that
were previously closed
off or unexplored.

An ethical mode of being with Foucauldian roots demands several things of us at
the level of our individual subjectivity and at the level of public policy. In terms of our
individual actions, it requires, first, refusing to accept that our social and political
landscape is inevitable. Second, it requires we recognize ourselves as historically
situated, socially constructed beings. We are called to critically examine how
mechanisms of power have influenced the possibilities for being subjects, including
biopower. As Foucault shows through his historical analyses, ethical practices emerge
alongside an epoch’s justificatory framework for truth. Third, it requires practicing
freedom through a general willingness to become different through reflection and
practice. Fourth, it requires that we care about others’ possibilities alongside our own
and recognize that we gain or lose possibilities through interaction with each other.
Fifth, in our personal reflection and social interaction it requires a willingness to expose
new models for thinking and acting that were previously unexplored or considered
impossible.

191

When using Foucauldian ethical subjectivity as a philosophical approach to
evaluating public policy, it should affect our analysis as follows: First, we must
descriptively look back in order to normatively look forward, which means considering
the historical context of a practice. Second, we must ask how a particular practice is
changing discursive practices, establishing categories for normality and abnormality,
and creating a conceptual framework through which subjects form a conception of self
and others. Third, proposed solutions or changes should be innovative and flexible.
Fourth, the method should take care to recognize that ethical responses arise alongside
our epoch’s practices and framework of truth. Fifth, the method should seek primarily
to uncover and expose new ways of thinking or responding rather than legislating.
A Foucauldian ethics, even with my alterations, will always appear to be lacking
to some because of its general openness and absence of fixed, straightforward
commitments. But this is a fundamental characteristic of Foucault’s philosophy.
Foucault does not tell us what to do, but through his work, he offers us the philosophical
tools to decide for ourselves. This is how I interpret the commitments to care of self and
philosophical way of life: Foucault does not say that we must adopt these principles or
tell us how to adopt them, but his analyses and ethical orientation provide us with the
tools to make the argument ourselves.

4

Sartre and Foucault Compared

Both Sartre and Foucault present us with the philosophical groundwork for
creating ourselves as engaged historical agents in our own epoch. For both thinkers,
ethical subjectivity is primarily characterized by an emphasis on orientation rather than
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commitments. The key similarities of this orientation are, first, critical, historicallysituated reflection, second, the theme of ethics as a “task,” and, third, invention or
innovation, which requires moral courage.
First, as I have demonstrated in both thinkers, ethical subjectivity requires an
orientation of critical historical reflection. This includes a refusal to accept the
conventional moral norms of one’s epoch without submitting them to scrutiny. The
ethical orientation requires critical reflection on how historical and social condition—
such as discourses, materiality, conceptual frameworks, institutions, and economic
systems—have structured our possibilities for being subjects at all. It requires an
understanding that being ethical is historically situated. For both thinkers this critical
reflection is related to freedom. For Sartre, it is a product of intentional, free praxis, and
for Foucault, it is an empirical practice of freedom, or what he calls a critical ontology of
ourselves.
The second commonality between the two thinkers’ ethical orientation is the
general theme of ethics as an ongoing “task” rather than mere moral speculation that
results in a set of maxims that is settled once and for all. By task, I mean a piece of work
or project that we are obligated to take up. For both the task can never be achieved and
then abandoned, but is an ongoing process. In A Plea, Sartre writes that the intellectual,
when becoming cognizant of one’s contradictions, will grasp:
[M]an as a task…an intellectual who achieves self-awareness necessarily comes
to see both his own singularity and its adumbration of man, as the distant goal of
a practical and daily enterprise.452
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In grasping the goal of humanity as a task, we reorganize our current possibilities as a
means for pursuing the task. Foucault’s discussion of task is more implicit than an
actual mandate to pursue a particular task. But his analyses enables us to recall a time in
which the ergon, or task of philosophy was considered a mode of life, in which the
philosopher was concerned with the affairs of the city and the governing of others.
Recall this passage:
[T]he test of philosophy in politics directs us to this: the reality of philosophy is
found in the relationship of self to self. And it is indeed in setting out the
problem of the government of self and the government of others that philosophy,
here, in this text, formulates its ergon, at once its task and its reality.453
Here Foucault presents the ethical as an ongoing task. When this is put in the context of
how he conceived of his own philosophical task to expose the contingency of the
present, we see a commonality with Sartre.
The third similarity is a focus on invention and transformation that includes
exercising freedom. Sartre emphasizes that ethics requires a courage to invent, upset our
own moral comfort, and look beyond existing practico-inert structures. Invention is both
an invention of a system other than the current practio-inert system and a restructuring
of our own personal possibilities. By reinventing the practico-inert, we reinvent
ourselves. Foucault, too, shows a general attitude of innovation or self-transformation.
Foucault speaks of a courage to think something different than we thought before. He
also offers us a window into a time when one had to make oneself different in order to
be capable of receiving the truth. Thus, both thinkers share the view that ethical
orientation should involve a willingness and courage to exercise freedom, become
different, and transform oneself.
453
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There are also two primary differences in the thinkers’ ethical orientations. The
first difference is the scope of the historical reflection. For Sartre, critical historical
reflection examines the dialectical interaction between praxis and the practico-inert,
while, for Foucault, critical historical reflection is characterized by identifying historical
breaks. This is important because Sartre thinks that there is a pattern in the way we
interact with history, while Foucault believes it to be characterized by rupture. Thus,
according to Foucault, we should not look to uncover commonalities between our
present and previous epochs. This should not be confused with Foucault’s argument that
our own ways of thinking and doing are historically specific. But it means we cannot
look to the past ways of thinking and doing to understand our own. We can contrast our
present with previous periods, but we cannot characterize it in its specific features. This
is why care of self and philosophical way of life cannot be recovered in the present in
the same way they were practiced in the past. As we saw, Sartre’s vision of
commitments, while they will interact with historically specific practico-inert structures,
have more constancy throughout history.
The second difference concerns the criteria for invention in each thinker’s
orientation. The variation is primarily due to the differences between the two
philosophers’ views on freedom and agency. For Sartre, since praxis is free and has
primacy over the practico-inert, invention can look beyond existing practico-inert
categories and imagine a future with different structures. More importantly, because of
our intentional praxis, we can rearrange our possibilities in the present in such a way that
we can potentially use the practico-inert to our advantage. Invention can involve a direct
break or rupture from our own personal past, which is possible given the robust sense of
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agency that Sartre grants to praxis. For Foucault, we cannot objectively reflect on our
current episteme, because it is our blind spot, so to speak. Consequently we are not in a
position to envision a future that transcends our historical limits. Invention is primarily
about new modes of governing ourselves, relating to others and the relationship we
choose to have with telling the truth in our epoch. While it requires a general
willingness and courage to become different, we do not have the same degree of
freedom and control over the conditioning forces that offer us possibilities for thinking,
doing, and being.
While we see several shared principles in each philosopher’s ethical orientation,
at the level of commitments there is a more direct divergence in views. This is primarily
because Foucault does not explicitly advocate for any commitments, and his ethical
orientation cautions against assuming any point of view to be a privileged one. Foucault
stands firm on his point that the task of philosophy should be to uncover rather than to
legislate, and the philosopher should not advocate for any particular ethical or political
system over another. While Sartre rejects an inherent human essence, he does argue for
universal human needs and for a strong duty for those in positions of privilege to
advocate for vulnerable people. More importantly, the robust sense of human freedom
that he retains even in his later period leads to the recognition of mutual freedom as an
important ethical commitment.
As will be exemplified in the next two Chapters, using a Sartrean or Foucauldian
ethical subjectivity model to analyze contemporary issues in applied healthcare ethics
will not entail doing away with current debates, which rely on a system of moral rights.
Because ethical subjectivity is historically situated, we have to work with existing
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models that structure our political and moral thinking. The Sartrean and Foucauldian
analyses will, however, make us critically aware of the dangers of relying only on rightsbased justifications. Sartrean and Foucauldian analyses can complement rather than
replace existing discussions in healthcare ethics.

Conclusion
In this Chapter I have traced Sartre’s and Foucault’s position on ethics
throughout their later lectures. I have shown that their visions for ethical subjectivity are
primarily characterized by a similar orientation, and diverge on the nature of ethical
commitments. Both offer normative content based on a critical, historical reflection and
an active engagement with the specific historical practices of our epoch. They diverge
on important points regarding the freedom that is possible in self-formation and the
content of our ethical commitments. Specifically, Sartre’s vision requires commitment to
vulnerable human beings and political participation based on his vision of mutual
freedom and human needs. Foucault’s vision is more flexible and warns against
assuming any point of view as an inherently privileged point of view or any political
system as inherently desirable.
In the next two Chapters I show how these models of ethical subjectivity can be
applied to issues being discussed in contemporary healthcare ethics. I will show how
Sartre’s and Foucault’s ethical visions provide two separate and unique models for
innovative conversations in ethics. Because healthcare is interwoven with basic human
needs and foundational human issues concerning life and death, healthcare practices are
distinctly subject-forming. Thus, the models introduced in this Chapter are especially
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fruitful for contributing to conversations in healthcare. In Chapter Four, I will apply the
Sartrean model and in Chapter Five the Foucauldian model. In each Chapter I will begin
by showing how the ethical subjectivity model is different from the approaches in
applied ethics that are rooted in Kant or Mill. I will rely on the comparative work I did
in Chapters One and Two, and bolster the previous discussion with more focus on
Kant’s and Mill’s normative conclusions. After showing how each of these models
could contribute to an applied ethics debate, I will conclude by emphasizing the
originality of each approach and making suggestions for continuing the use of social,
historical, ethical subjectivity in future conversations in ethics, especially healthcare
ethics.
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Chapter Four: Sartrean Ethical Subjectivity and Conscience-based Refusals in
Healthcare
Introduction
In Chapter One, I presented Sartre’s vision of a dialectical, spiraling subjectivity
that is characterized by socially, historically, and materially situated possibilities. In
Chapter Three, I examined his post-Critique of Dialectical Reason lectures on ethics,
and suggested a model for an ethical mode of being, or ethical subjectivity, consistent
with his views. This included an ethical orientation characterized by critical historical
reflection, active empathy, and invention, in addition to ethical commitments to mutual
freedom and integral humanity. I showed that, for Sartre, these ideals are best actualized
through communal praxis, which Sartre refers to as pledged group praxis. I showed that
this normative model has implications both for individuals and for approaching public
policy. In this Chapter, I will show how the model I developed in Chapter Three can
offer an alternative to contemporary approaches to healthcare ethics that are rooted in
the deontological and utilitarian thought of Kant or Mill, respectively. To do so, I will
evaluate a contemporary issue of public concern through the Sartrean framework,
showing the contrast it offers to how the debate is currently framed.
Conscientious objection or conscience-based refusals (CBRs) in healthcare refers
to the controversial practice of healthcare providers (HCPs) refusing to perform
procedures or provide services because doing so would conflict with their core moral
beliefs. This has become a growing issue of concern and debate in terms of law,
healthcare facility policy, professional codes of ethics, and employer rules. Many states
in the US have “conscience clauses” which exempt healthcare providers (HCPs) from
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lawsuits or employer disciplinary action if they refuse to perform certain medical
procedures because doing so would violate moral principles they consider key to their
identities.454 This issue gained media attention and public awareness in incidents
involving pharmacists who refused to fill emergency contraception prescriptions due to
their moral beliefs that life should be respected at the fertilization of an egg. With the
passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010, the issue again rose to public
awareness when many religious employers or religiously affiliated healthcare centers
argued that the government requirements for HCPs and employers were too strong and
would force individuals to act against their core moral beliefs. Thus, conscience-based
refusals (CBRs) are a controversial issue in public discourse and in applied medical
ethics literature, and are a pressing moral concern of our time.
The debate about CBRs in the healthcare ethics literature is generally set up in
one of the three following ways: The first approach to the debate frames the issue as a
conflict regarding competing claims to the right to liberty. In this framing of the debate,
a HCP’s freedom to act in accordance with his or her conscience is weighed against a
patient’s right to choose legal, medically appropriate treatments or procedures.
Literature in this field of the debate focuses on the importance of a right to conscience
and freedom of religion in a liberal society and the importance of respecting the moral
integrity of HCPs, weighed against the importance of patient autonomy. The second
way the philosophical debate is framed is in terms of role morality and professionalism.
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These arguments focus on whether HCPs voluntarily give up their right to conscience or
liberty when they freely choose to work in the field of healthcare. This literature focuses
on the acceptability of role morality in general and on what role morality requires in a
field like healthcare in which personal well-being and life and death are at stake. The
third approach to the debate about CBRs focuses on giving an account of the nature and
function of conscience, and what role, if any, it should play in the delivery and practice
of medicine.
These debates generally result in commentators arguing for one of three
positions: conscience absolutism, the incompatibility approach, or a compromise
approach. Conscience absolutism argues that HCPs are not morally or legally required
to perform actions that violate their conscience, nor are they obligated to refer the patient
to a willing provider. Incompatibility approaches argue that refusing to perform
procedures due to personal moral beliefs is a serious default on HCPs’ professional
obligations. Simply put, if HCPs do not want to perform a job task, they should get
another job. Compromise approaches, the most popular in the literature, attempt to
forge a middle ground between these two extremes. These approaches argue for the
allowance of some CBRs as long as a HCP’s refusal does not result in excessive harms
or burdens to a patient. These arguments seek to maintain the primacy of patient care
while also arguing that the right of conscience and moral integrity are important for
HCPs.
In this Chapter I will show how the Sartrean model of ethical subjectivity I
constructed in Chapter Three can be used to morally evaluate this issue of public
concern. I will make a case for what Sartrean ethical subjectivity demands of individual
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healthcare providers as well as showing how a Sartrean analysis could be applied at the
level of policy. Drawing on Sartre’s vision of social, historical, and materially situated
subjectivity, along with the model of ethical being-in-the-world I developed in Chapter
Three, I show how this practice shapes the possibilities of both HCPs and patients, and
how this should affect our moral approach. I explain why none of the current approaches
are properly accounting for the subject-forming dimension of CBRs and how this should
influence our response. Conscientious objection in healthcare is not just a debate about
whether to prioritize a HCP’s right to conscience or the well-being of patients, nor is it
only a matter of role morality or professionalism. Possibilities for subjectivity emerge
through healthcare practice and patient/provider interaction.
Thus, the objectives of this Chapter are as follows: 1) to differentiate the Sartrean
ethical subjectivity model I introduced in Chapter Three from contemporary approaches
to applied ethics, 2) to show how conscience-based refusals (CBRs) are currently
approached in the philosophical literature, 3) to elucidate how CBRs affect both
patients’ and healthcare providers’ (HCPs) possibilities, 4) to use the Sartrean model of
ethical subjectivity to argue what is required of individual HCPs, and 5) make
recommendations for public policy based on this analysis.
1

Sartrean Ethical Subjectivity versus Contemporary Deontological and
Utilitarian Approaches

I will begin with a brief overview of the contemporary deontological and
utilitarian rights-based approaches to applied ethics and will highlight the important
differences with Sartre’s account. Specifically, I show that Sartre’s account takes into
consideration how subjects’ possibilities are shaped by practices, instead of only
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focusing on protecting an existing subject. In Chapters One and Two I introduced Kant’s
and Mill’s visions of the subject. Kant’s subject is characterized by objective
rationality, an ahistorical “noumenal self,” and the freedom to obey or disobey the
universal moral law. Mill’s subject is characterized by autonomy, the ability to flourish
when generally left alone, and fulfills its purpose when using faculties of reason to lead
a self-determining life. Both philosophers posit a universal, ahistorical vision of human
nature that transcends historical epoch. Consequently, they also introduce systems of
morality that are intended to be universal and ahistorical as well.
Kant’s ethical thought is characterized by his three formulations of the
Categorical Imperative. Because Kant believes that all human beings have universal
faculties of reason, he believes them to be capable of deducing and following the moral
law through the use of reason alone. Morality, for Kant, is not found in our experience
of the world, but derivable from our universal capacity to reason. The Categorical
Imperative is formulated by Kant in three different ways. First, one should act only
according to a maxim that is universalizable and does not lead to a logical
contradiction.455 Second, each person should treat other human beings as ends in
themselves, and never only as a means to an end. As autonomous decision-making
agents, human beings should be treated as fellow decision makers, not as things or
tools.456 Third, each person should act as both a legislator and follower of the moral
law. In other words, human beings bring morality into the world through our capacity to
reason, and are simultaneously bound to obey the moral law.457
455
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A common extrapolation of Kant’s thought in contemporary ethics, including in
healthcare ethics literature, is the introduction of rights to protect each individual. These
approaches are often referred to as “patient-centered” deontological approaches and
focus on implementing Kant’s second imperative. In this context, “moral patient” refers
to a being worthy of moral concern, not just to a medical patient. Kant’s second
formulation of the Categorical Imperative is that human beings, as inherently worthy of
respect, should not be treated as a means only. Because human beings possess universal
powers of reason and choice, they are entitled to certain protections. Each individual
has a right not to be used purely for others’ benefit. For example, individuals cannot use
another’s body, labor, or talent without that person’s consent. Rights involve placing
limits on the behavior of everyone in order to protect the interests of the rights-holder.
Rights usually introduced under a deontological framework include, but are not limited
to, the right to life, to liberty, to bodily autonomy, to freedom of speech, to privacy, to
be compensated for one’s work, and to property.
For example, a modern approach to deontological rights come from Robert
Nozick.458 Nozick focuses his argument on the grounds that each person, as an
autonomous decision-making agent, has the capacity to shape one’s own life in
accordance with one’s own plans, goals, and meaning. This capacity, according to
Nozick, means that there are constraints on the ways we can treat beings who have the
ability to shape their own lives. These constraints take the form of rights granted to the
moral patient. Nozick focuses on negative rights and the limits of the state to interfere
with individuals’ ability to shape their own lives.459 Another notable deontological
458
459
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rights-based approach comes from Hillel Steiner.460 Steiner argues that human beings, as
self-determining ends in themselves, have two original rights: to unencumbered selfownership and an equal share of initially unowned things. The right to self-ownership
entitles one to, among other things, be paid for one’s labor, and the right to equal share
of unowned things is used to justify a distributive economic system.461
Mill’s ethical thought is not based on universal moral laws derivable from reason
alone, but rather on the consequences that lead to the best results for the most people.
Actions are morally good when they lead to consequences that make the most people
happy or lead to their well-being.462 Mill argues in favor of formulating rules for society
that result in more happiness for more people. He suggests shaping our “conduct by a
rule which all rational beings might adopt with benefit to their collective interest.”463
This argument is now referred to as “rule-utilitarianism” and introduces rules for society
that, if followed by everyone, lead to the greatest good for the greatest number. As we
saw in Chapter Two, Mill believes that human beings are most happy when they are
generally left alone. Thus, he argues for a vision of justice based on negative liberty and
the no-harm-to-others principle. The basic idea is that everyone is left alone as long as
they are doing no harm to others. When individuals are allowed to flourish without
interference, they develop character and individuality.
Mill’s thought can also be extrapolated into defense of a system of moral
rights.464 In this view, rights are not introduced to protect humans as ends in themselves,
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but because they are instrumental in realizing certain desirable ends. Mill himself says
that when we refer to something as a person’s right, “we mean that he has a valid claim
on society to protect him of possession of it, either by the force of law or by that of
education and opinion.”465 These rights are grounded in general utility, or the happiness
they create for society as a whole.466 When two rights appear to be in conflict, it is
necessary to frame the moral evaluation in terms of which right produces more utility. If
a right to free speech conflicts with a right to life, we must ask if a general right to life
leads to greater utility than free speech.
One notable modern defense of a utilitarian account of rights comes from
Richard Brandt,467 who argues on the basis of rule-utilitarianism. Brandt makes room
in his account for both positive and negative rights, arguing that moral agents ought to
follow “moral principles, the acceptance of which in society would maximize expectable
utility.”468 This is to be accompanied by an emphasis on following the “utility
maximizing code” over producing utility in particular situations. This allows for the
concept of “a right” that cannot be overridden by marginal additions to individual
welfare. To argue that individuals have rights, according to Brandt, is to:
[S]ay that the most desirable moral code for the society would require that one
refrain from interfering with others' doing certain things, and positively to enable
them to do them, sometimes when so doing will not maximize expectable utility
in a particular situation.469
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In other words, in utilitarian theory, rights are introduced to serve a function.
Individuals are either prohibited from performing certain acts against others, or required
to treat others in a certain way, because these prohibitions or requirements maximize
utility. For example, the right not to be tortured is introduced because even if torture
could lead to increased utility in a particular situation, a societal rule against torture
leads to greater happiness for society as a whole. Examples of negative rights are the
right to freedom of speech and the right to privacy. Examples of positive rights for
Brandt are the right to healthcare and the right to education. In sum, utilitarian rightsbased approaches are founded on the idea that the best consequences for the most people
are produced when people are protected by rules or rights.
The key conceptual difference between Kant’s and Mill’s models is that for
deontological approaches to rights, the rights are in place to protect intrinsic human
ends, such as Kant’s respect for inherent dignity or Nozick’s duty not to interfere with a
being who shapes his or her own life. By contrast, in utilitarian approaches to rights,
rights are introduced as instrumental for human welfare. Thus, utilitarian approaches to
rights justify the existence of rights as instrumental to increased human happiness, not as
protecting humans as ends in themselves. This brief discussion of rights as they are
justified by both deontological and utilitarian ethical frameworks is only meant as a
background against which I discuss Sartre’s views. I will discuss the key differences
between Sartre’s approach and deontological and utilitarian rights-based theories
because these theories currently dominate much of the discussion in healthcare ethics.470
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The debate about CBRs in healthcare in particular is framed as a conflict between
patients’ and providers’ rights: a patient’s right to bodily autonomy versus a provider’s
right to liberty or freedom of conscience.
Sartrean ethical subjectivity is a model for subjects as moral agents to create
themselves according to an ethical orientation and ethical commitments. It is a model
both for how we as agents should orient ourselves in the world, as well as how we are
obligated to treat others. However, this model recognizes that human beings are
historically situated, that is to say, they exist in a given historical, social, and material
field of possibilities. Thus, we cannot completely dismiss rights claims because of the
role they play in our society: the concept of rights supports our legal system and
patients’ and providers’ rights help guide discussion in biomedical ethics. At the same
time, Sartre explicitly rejects relying only on a moral theory of rights because of the way
that rights are used to trump other claims for freedom. Sartre’s deep concern for the
vulnerable led him to the observation that rights are often introduced by the most
powerful in society and then used to blame vulnerable people for failing to take
advantage of rights to which they never actually had access to begin with. Ethical
subjectivity, then, requires attention to this importance concern, that we be willing to
question systems of rights and do not assume that rights-based language is the “be-all
and end-all” of ethics.
Second, rights-based theories are moral patient centered: they focus on what
treatment human beings are entitled to as beings worthy of moral concern. Sartrean
ethical subjectivity is also concerned with the development of moral agency and what it

Conscientious Care: Providing Abortion Care when Law and Conscience Collide,” Hasting Center
Report 46 (2016): 22-30.
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means to be ethical subjects, which includes, but is not limited to, how we treat others.
For example, Sartrean ethical subjectivity focuses on the orientation of our conscious
experience and existential possibilities, and the framing of our ethical reflection, not just
the protections each person is entitled to. Thus, Sartrean ethical subjectivity puts more
focus on the development of the moral agent than the rights of moral patients.
Third, we have the following contrast: deontological and utilitarian rights-based
approaches to ethics are interested in protecting or legislating the liberal subject and
introduce constraints on behavior as a means of doing so. Sartrean ethical subjectivity,
by contrast, recognizes that we become subjects with possibilities through our
experiences and the interplay of our free consciousness with the given situation. Thus,
for Sartre, ethics is a process of building oneself in reference to an orientation and
recognizing that we affect the possibilities of others, rather than protecting or legislating
an existing self. We are subjects to be protected, but also subjects that emerge.
At the level of commitments, Sartre’s commitment to the mutual recognition of
freedom has commonalities with Kant’s assertion that we recognize each other as
autonomous decision-making agents. Sartre argues that mutually recognizing each
other’s freedom leads to increased freedom for everyone. However, for Sartre, the
mutual recognition of freedom is important because the meaning of our projects is
dependent upon the freedom of others for recognizing our projects and the meanings we
want them to have. Thus, Sartre’s vision of mutual freedom is grounded in our
interdependence with each other and the fact that we interact with others through
communal meanings. The meaning of our own projects is dependent upon others who
interpret those projects. This matters because if we want our projects to have the
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meanings we intend, we are reliant on others to recognize this meaning. At the same
time, the meaning of others’ projects is dependent upon us, who will recognize that
meaning. Thus, Sartre’s view is not that a universal rationality or power of selflegislation guarantees that we are all entitled not to be used only as a means. Rather, he
emphasizes that the interdependence of our existential projects require that we recognize
the freedom of the Other.
Sartre’s commitment to integral human needs holds commonalities with Mill’s
view of utility. For example, Mill would likely have no problem with Sartre’s
commitment to integral humanity, because having fundamental needs met for as many
people as possible will increase utility and lead to more happiness overall. Sartreaninspired conclusions regarding contemporary ethical problems will not always be in
conflict with Kantian or Millian conclusions. The difference I would like to highlight is
that both the utilitarian and deontological approaches, which are often extrapolated into
moral rights, primarily focus on protecting the liberal subject, while for Sartre, the key
focus is the development of the moral agent, which includes recognizing how our praxis
affects the given field of possibilities of others. Thus, Sartrean ethical subjectivity is not
necessarily meant to replace the current discussion, but to add to the conversation by
taking into account Sartre’s view of human nature.
In the following discussion, I will demonstrate how (CBRs) in healthcare are
currently being discussed in healthcare ethics literature before moving on to what a
Sartrean analysis can add to the debate.
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2

Conscience-Based Refusals in Healthcare: Overview and Current
Approaches

Conscience based refusals (CBRs) are currently one of the most debated moral
issues related to healthcare delivery in the United States. The issue is both timely and
important. A 2007 study showed that 40 million people in the United States (1 in 7) find
themselves under the care of healthcare providers (HCPs) who are undecided or believe
they do not have to disclose information about medically available treatments if they
find them morally objectionable.471 The standard definition of conscientious objection in
healthcare that is used in the literature comes from James Childress, who defines it as a
refusal to comply with a medical request based on personal moral or religious reasons.472
Contemporary medical ethicist Mark Wicclair echoes this notion, confirming that
conscientious objection occurs when providers refuse to perform an action or provide a
service because it goes against their core personal moral beliefs.473
Common examples of CBRs include doctors or nurses who refuse to perform
legal abortions, including in cases of severe fetal abnormality. A second example refers
to pharmacists who refuse to fill prescriptions for emergency contraception (EC)
because of moral beliefs that life begins at the fertilization of an egg. A third refers to
doctors who refuse to put suffering patients into unconscious, pain-free states until
passing away, otherwise known as palliative sedation, because doing so could hasten
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patients’ deaths. As physician-assisted death (PAD) for terminal patients (also known as
Death with Dignity) is now legal in several states,474 this accounts for a growing number
of CBRs. Other, though rarer, CBRs include providers refusing to prescribe artificial
contraceptives, perform sterilizations, or offer fertility treatment for gay or lesbian
couples.

2.1 Conscience-Based Refusals: Rights-Based and Deontological Approaches

In contemporary philosophical discussion, there are several different debates
surrounding CBRs. One approach is to evaluate the phenomenon in terms of two
conflicting rights: a provider’s right to conscience (often argued as a component of a
right to liberty or a right to religious freedom) and a patient’s right to choose or refuse
treatment. In this framework, what is at stake are two different rights-claims that are
binding on others: HCPs’ right not to be coerced into acting in ways that go against their
core moral or religious beliefs, and a patient’s right to access legal, safe, medically
accepted procedures of his or her choosing. An example of a rights-based approach
comes from Thomas May,475 who seeks to clarify and delineate the nature and scope of a
HCP’s right to conscience. May argues that a liberal society such as the United States
should be concerned with protecting an individual’s moral conscience. HCPs, in May’s
view, do not forfeit the right to conscience simply because they are HCPs.476
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May argues that a right of conscience in health care should be legally permitted
and morally permissible when the refusal is framed around the type of procedure
requested, not a moral judgment of the patient. Specifically, May argues that
conscience-based refusals are justified when “the type of activity required is inconsistent
with the professional’s understanding of her role as a health care professional.”477 May
uses the example of physician-assisted death (PAD) as a “type” of activity that a
reasonable HCP would find incompatible with professional role, because it arguably
violates the principle of non-maleficence, the do-no-harm principle. May ultimately
argues that liberal society demands respect for a robust right to conscience for the
provider, arguing that:
[W]e need to recognize both the obligations of health care professionals to frame
the evaluation of the effects of treatment on the patient’s quality of life in terms
of the patient’s values, and the right of the professional to frame her role as a
healthcare professional in the context of her own values.478
In May’s rights-based approach, he frames the argument in terms of what rights should
be protected for the liberal subject, and which rights should override the other.
Another commentator framing the debate in terms of conflicting rights is Renee
Mirkes,479 who argues that conscience is “an inalienable requirement to human
dignity”480 and examines what she calls a conflict between religious liberty and sexual
liberty. Mirkes discusses CBRs in the context of HCPs being prohibited from
discriminating against gay and lesbian patients. She argues that in cases of nonemergent assistance, providers should have a right to refuse gay and lesbian patients
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certain services, such as fertility counseling, based on beliefs that gay lifestyles are
inherently immoral.481 According to Mirkes, requiring providers to perform these
services if they are morally opposed to them discourages providers from staying in
medicine, suppresses personal autonomy, and fosters callousness in providers that makes
it harder to empathize with patients. She argues for dialogue rather than coercion, and
asserts that forcing HCPs to act against their consciences will harm both patient and
provider. She argues that providers will suffer from moral injury and patients will not
receive the best care because HCPs will be resentful about treating them and unable to
properly do their jobs.482
There are also approaches that look to solve the problem using straightforward
deontological reasoning without the introduction of rights. Two recent deontological
approaches to solve the problem actually come to different conclusions. Brian Burke483
and Bernard Dickens484 both draw on Kantian philosophy in order to argue for their
respective views. Burke argues that the loss of a HCP’s freedom of conscience
simultaneously results in a breakdown of patient autonomy. Trust and mutual respect are
the cornerstone of the patient/provider relationship. If a HCP is required to violate his or
her conscience beliefs, there is a “moral inequality” between the two individuals. Kant’s
universalizability requirement demands, in Burke’s application, that both patient and
provider be granted equal respect for their values. “Forcing a physician to violate his
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conscience breaks this bond of trust and indicates an inequality of freedom within the
relationship, thus destroying the foundation for the principle of autonomy.”485 In
Kantian ethical thought, all moral duties apply to all agents equally. Consequently,
Burke argues that a mutual respect of each other’s autonomy means HCPs and patients
must respect each other’s value systems equally.486
Dickens, for his part, argues that conscience-base refusals by providers are not
justified on Kantian grounds. According to Dickens, conscience-based refusals violate
Kant’s imperative that patients should not be treated as means to an end. Conscientious
objection is unethical if healthcare practitioners treat patients only as means to their own
spiritual ends.487 According to Dickens, HCPs refusing to provide contraceptive or
abortion services based on their religious beliefs constitutes using them as a means to
their spiritual ends. “[I]f healthcare providers’ principal goal is promoting their own
spiritual worth through the offer of care to those in need, they may be using sick,
dependent people instrumentally.”488 In the disagreement between Dickens and Burke,
we see that Kantian philosophy that relies on universalizability and inherent respect for
the individual may lead people to two different conclusions about the moral
permissibility of CBRs.

2.2 Conscience-Based Refusals and Professionalism

Apart from arguments that frame the debate in terms of competing claims to the
right to liberty, others argue that the key point is the demands of professionalism: HCPs
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agree to perform certain practices as part of professional role, and refusing to perform
these services is a default on their professional obligations. For example, Joseph
Meaney, Marina Casini, and Antonio Spagnolo489 argue that the debate should not be
viewed in terms of equal, competing claims to right to freedom, because HCPs have
obligations that go beyond those of ordinary individuals given the nature of their
professions. Doctors in particular, they argue, are gatekeepers to many services and
products that are vital to other human beings’ health.490 Meaney, Casini, and Spagnolo
argue that only under a specific set of circumstances should CBRs be tolerated: “[W]hen
the objection is based on principles that are fundamental to the medical profession and
the legal system.”491 This does not provide protection for objections based on a HCP’s
religious beliefs, but does include objections based on principles such as “respect for
human life,” which Meaney, Casini, and Spagnolo argue is an integral principle of
medicine.492 Thus, CBRs based on respect for the right to life for human beings is a
“properly grounded appeal to conscience that can be justified as ethically, medically,
and legally sound.”493 Consequently, they argue that HCPs are justified in
conscientiously objecting to abortion and PAD, as long as their objection is motivated in
a value fundamental to the medical profession, in this case, respect for life.494 While
Meaney, Casini, and Spagnolo come out strongly in favor of professionalism, they also
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argue in favor of allowing a broad range of refusals, so long as they are, in the HCPs’
minds, based on principles integral to the practice of medicine.
A stronger version of professionalism comes from Julian Savelescu,495 who
advocates for the importance of HCPs performing job tasks required by the roles they
freely take on. Savelescu argues that a HCP’s conscience should not be allowed to
interfere with medical care. In Savelescu’s view, all HCPs should be made aware of
their responsibility to provide all legal and beneficial care. HCPs who compromise the
care of their patients to satisfy their conscience should be disciplined. Savulescu argues
that a failure to provide all legal and beneficial services to patients is a failure to perform
a HCP’s essential role and a default on professional obligations. If HCPs do not want to
perform the services their jobs demand, Savelescu argues, they should quit. When it
comes to professional role, legality is more important than each individual’s personal
view of morality.496
2.3 The Nature of Conscience and Moral Integrity in Healthcare

Another important discussion in the literature has to do with the nature and
functioning of conscience and moral integrity. For example, Morten Magelssen gives a
strong defense of the importance of moral integrity in healthcare and society in general.
Magelssen defines moral integrity as “having an internally consistent set of basic moral
ideas and principles, and being able to live and act in accordance with these.”497 Moral
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integrity, on Magelssen’s account, concerns moral beliefs we consider integral to our
identity. Making moral decisions is what makes us who we are, for better or for worse.
When one acts against his or her conscience, it has been shown to lead to burnout,
fatigue, and general emotional exhaustion.498 Magelssen argues that moral integrity is
important because, first, it benefits not only the possessor but the people the possessor of
moral integrity interacts with. Second, society has a special opportunity for promoting
moral integrity, and this is especially true when delivering a public good like healthcare.
Third, as the profession of healthcare is of central importance to society, and HCPs are
often faced with difficult moral dilemmas, moral integrity is especially important for the
smooth functioning of healthcare. Thus, preserving HCPs’ moral integrity is important
for the public good.499
In an attempt to reframe the issue, Natasha Morton and Kenneth
Kirkwood500give an account of the nature and function of conscience to argue that there
must be some tolerance for CBRs in healthcare. Morton and Kirkwood, like Magelssen,
assert that conscience plays an important role in healthcare, and that it is contradictory to
ask healthcare professionals to act in accordance with their conscience in some cases but
not others. Conscience, they say, is a mental process that alerts an individual to potential
violations of his or her values, and attempts to prevent these violations by persistently
badgering the individual until the violations are remedied or the person becomes
desensitized to the alerts of his or her conscience.501 Core moral beliefs, which may or
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may not have religious origins, are beliefs which take a central role in the identity of an
individual. If a person is coerced to act against those core beliefs, it leads to moral
distress, which is one’s conscience serving its role by inflicting distress. Coercing people
to act against conscience can be harmful to individuals in the long run, as they learn to
simply “turn off” their conscience or become immune to its effects.502
Morton and Kirkwood argue that this phenomenon is particularly undesirable for
HCPs, as conscience plays an important role in the decisions providers make each day.
Ethical health care delivery relies on the judgment of individuals who must often make
difficult decisions in the heat of the moment. Additionally, Morton and Kirkwood
present an objection to the argument that HCPs who do not want to perform certain
services should simply not go into medicine to begin with. This is problematic, in their
view, because conscience grows, develops, and changes as a person experiences new
things, and individuals entering the medical profession at a young age cannot fully
conceive of all the ways they might morally object to a practice later on.503 Additionally,
medical practices change over time and new procedures become legal or accepted. In a
multi-cultural society like the United States, the values that a provider develops over
time will inevitably lead to conflicts with a patient’s values. Morton and Kirkwood do
not argue that this leads to the conclusion that HCPs have an unrestricted right to
conscience. Rather, they suggest that HCPs receive ongoing trainings and education on
examining, defending, and correcting HCPs’ values.504
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2.4 Solutions: Conscience Absolutism, Incompatibility, or Compromise
Commentators on the issue generally advocate for one of three approaches to
how the issue should be approached in the public realm. These three positions have
been labeled the incompatibility approach, the conscience absolutism approach, and
compromise approaches. The incompatibility approach argues that individuals who are
not willing to provide a healthcare service should simply choose another profession.
This claim is based on professionalism, and argues that refusals to provide all legally
permitted goods and services that a professional is competent to perform is incompatible
with that worker’s professional obligations.505 Conscience absolutism, on the other hand,
claims that providers have no obligation to provide a service that violates their
conscience, nor do they have the duty to refer patients to other providers. Robert Orr, for
example, argues that not only do HCPs have a strong right to refuse, they are
additionally under no obligation to refer if they feel that a referral would make them
complicit in an act that fundamentally violates their conscience.506 Orr argues that these
include, but are not limited to, abortion, contraception, sterilization, assisted
reproductive technologies, end of life care, genetic research, and prisoner interrogation.
A third approach in the literature, which is the most popular approach, takes a
middle ground between conscience absolutism and the incompatibility approach. These
accounts are consequentialist and generally argue that CBRs should not result in harms
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or burdens to the patient beyond an acceptable limit. This position focuses on the
consequences of the actions and how CBRs can potentially harm patients. If a patient
will suffer unreasonable harms or burdens as a result of the HCP’s refusal, then the
provider has a moral obligation to perform the act. However if there is another provider
who can perform the act or service without resulting in severe harm of the patient, the
provider is justified in refusing.507 Magelssen, for example, argues that conscience-based
refusals should be tolerated when all of the following conditions are met: providing care
would seriously damage the HCP’s moral integrity by constituting a serious violation of
a deeply held conviction, the objection has plausible moral or religious rationale,
treatment is not considered an essential part of the HCP’s work, the burdens to the
patient are acceptably small, and measures are taken to reduce the burdens to the patient
and to colleagues. The claim for the CBR’s justification is strengthened, according to
Magelssen, when the objection is founded in medicine’s values and when the medical
procedure in question is new or of debated moral status.508
We see from this discussion that the most common way of framing the debate is
in terms of competing freedom claims between HCPs and patients. Solutions offered
take the form of balancing the competing claims to liberty (in order to prevent or reduce
potential patient harm) or in terms of the obligations of professionalism. I argue that
these approaches are insufficient on their own for several reasons. First, framing the
issue in terms of competing rights claims assumes that the liberal conception of
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subjectivity is correct. Thus, these approaches do not discuss the way that CBRs shape a
field of possibilities for becoming subjects. Second, discussing the issue in terms of
HCPs’ right to liberty or right to conscience does not include a moral analysis of the
content of their refusal and the nature of the act they refuse to perform. Framing the
debate around the right to conscience or liberty ignores criteria for judging the actual
moral content of HCPs’ refusals. An argument that everyone’s conscience be respected
equally is ultimately grounded in an ethical subjectivism in which everyone’s moral
beliefs are equally worthy of consideration. This leads to classic undesirable
consequences of moral subjectivism or relativism, in which we have no solid ground to
make moral claims that are binding on others. Lastly, the competing rights claims
approach does not recognize that patients are in positions of vulnerability and that HCPs
have additional duties when serving in a role as gatekeeper to medical services.
Framing the issue purely in terms of a matter of professionalism is also
insufficient. The argument that HCPs should perform actions that are required by their
jobs does not account for the important role that conscience plays in healthcare and the
importance of HCPs maintaining reflective awareness of moral standards in a field such
as healthcare. History is rife with examples of medical professionals engaging in
abhorrent tasks because they were taking orders for their jobs. For example, doctors
participated in experiments in Nazi Germany, HCPs in the United States have performed
experiments on intellectually disabled patients without their consent, and HCPs
participated in drafting the guidelines for the United States’ “enhanced interrogation
program,” now known as torture, of terrorist suspects. What is legal and what is moral
do not always coincide, and the argument that HCPs must perform all legal procedures,
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such as advanced by Savelescu, could lead to the undesirable consequence of HCPs
failing to speak out against practices like torture or experimentation without consent. It
seems clear, then, that it is important for HCPs to have a moral compass and conscience
that accompanies it, rather than performing acts only because their jobs demand it.
Lastly, professionalism does not introduce any criteria for judging the moral
acceptability of the job tasks to which HCPs potentially object.
The analysis that I develop below will be different from the traditional discussion
in several ways. First, the previous approaches rely on the viewpoint of protecting the
moral rights of the liberal subject, without recognizing that subjectivity is being formed
through healthcare practices and CBRs. I demonstrate how we can take a new starting
point of analysis when evaluating the issue through the lens of Sartre’s view of human
essence. Second, I make a case that the social, historical, and material context in which
CBRs take place must be taken into consideration. Third, I argue that HCPs should
approach their professional role not on the basis of straightforward deontological or
utilitarian reasoning, but on the basis of an ethical, inventive subjectivity. Fourth, I
introduce standards for judging the professional tasks of HCPs, or healthcare praxis,
based on Sartre’s ethical commitments, the goals of medicine, and the principles of
healthcare. Fifth, I make recommendations for public policy based on a commitment to
mutual freedom and integral human needs, but only after situating these commitments in
the specific context of liberal society in which this problem occurs.
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3

Conscience-Based Refusals and Sartrean Spiraling Subjectivity

In this section, I show how CBRs are subject-forming for both HCPs and
patients. As patients are heavily dependent on their providers for obtaining care, the
refusal of a HCP to assist or perform a procedure can severely limit a patient’s practical
and economic possibilities. As patients rely on HCPs for receiving care that is vital to
their physical, emotional, and mental well-being, they are vulnerable in relation to
HCPs. If patients feel that they are morally judged or viewed negatively by HCPs, this
can influence the patient’s perception of self and general experience of healthcare. At
the same time, HCPs’ possibilities are affected when they are coerced to act against their
conscience. I show that according to Sartre’s view of subjectivity and freedom,
conscience, as a facet of our continuously dialectical subjectivity, emerges over time and
in response to experiences and relationships. As Sartre shows in Morality and History,
the experience of morality is subject-forming. Being coerced to act against one’s
conscience has effects on HCP’s conception of self, their perceptions of patients, and
attitudes toward their careers.
I also discuss how CBRs are related to the practico-inert and the potential
seriality that accompanies it. I show how some CBRs are the result of practico-inert
beliefs and why this is generally harmful in healthcare. I also show how professional
codes of ethics can become practico-inert and resistant to moral progress and medical
advancement. I argue that CBRs run the risk of contributing to seriality if HCPs are
consequently estranged from patients or their colleagues. Additionally, I show that
CBRs can render patients especially vulnerable, as HCPs are the gatekeepers to medical
services and treatments. To demonstrate the alternate viewpoint, I show that coercing
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HCPs to act against their consciences can also lead to seriality and feelings of
interchangeability and isolation. I will use the example of physician-assisted death
(PAD), as this is currently a growing issue of debate. Six states now allow PAD as a
legally available option for patients, and this is a procedure about which many HCPs
have strong moral beliefs.

3.1 Healthcare Providers and Their Possibilities

The first way that the issue of CBRs is subject forming is that CBRs are made in
light of HCPs’ core moral beliefs, that is to say, beliefs that are integral to their selfidentity. Recall that, in Morality and History, Sartre discusses the role of moral norms
in subject-formation. In this text, he says that the existence of the norm offers a vision
of how to be a good, moral person. He draws on the example of a survey of
schoolchildren in which the majority admitted to lying even though they also thought
that lying should be condemned.509 The existence of the moral standard means that the
possibility of being a moral person remains open at all times. HCPs have moral beliefs
with different origins. If we consider HCPs’ decision processes in light of Sartre’s
views in MH, HCPs interpret these norms as unconditionally possible—standards they
are to follow no matter the conditions.510 This includes conditions from social pressure
such as professional role. From a Sartrean framework, when HCPs feel pressure to act
against their conscience because of social circumstances, this leads to moral anguish.
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We want norms to exist even if we fail to live up to them because they offer us a clear
picture of right and wrong. Thus, as long as the possibility of conforming to the norm
remains open, the possibility of being moral remains open as well.
If we follow Sartre’s view of the subject, we could say that HCPs have an image
of themselves, a project, which they use to organize their current possibilities. Most
HCPs believe certain moral principles to be integral to their jobs. Commonly accepted
goals of healthcare endorsed by contemporary ethicists and members of the medical
community include the alleviation of suffering, the prolongation of life, the promotion of
well-being, and the prevention of disease.511 Additionally, there are strongly supported
principles for healthcare ethics: the principle of non-maleficence (do no harm), the
principle of beneficence (patients should be benefitted and healed), the principle of
autonomy (patients’ self-determination should be respected) and principle of justice (no
patient is given unfair preference over another).512 HCPs, especially those who go
through long periods of education and training, see their profession as integral to their
personal identity. Consequently, they will not easily separate a professional role
morality from their personal integrity and beliefs. The actions they take in the present
(including potentially refusing job tasks) are a product of a vision they have of
themselves as upholders of the principles of medicine. They may view a practice such
as PAD as incompatible with their core project. It is often the case that those HCPs who
are morally opposed to helping a patient obtain PAD believe that the procedure violates
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the medical principle of non-maleficence or that it runs contra to the goal of healthcare
to preserve and prolong life.
As Sartre’s vision of subjectivity shows us, the possibilities for our ideal self, or
project, are presented to us by our situation and the practico-inert. For example, HCPs’
projects may come from historically conceived goals of medicine, the codes of the
American Medical Association, or their educational training. In other situations, the core
beliefs of one’s project are rooted in values that are unrelated to the practice of medicine
and are instead rooted in religious tradition, spiritual belief, or cultural norm.513 While
these norms are often not given as much standing in healthcare ethics literature, they can
be equally compelling for individuals who are committed to these norms and view them
as unconditionally possible.
The second way that CBRs are subject-forming for HCPs is that conscience itself
is a component of subjectivity. Conscience is a function of consciousness that develops
and progresses through time, experience, and relationships. Many HCPs do not
necessarily come to the table with fully formed moral beliefs about these practices, but
form their viewpoints over time and in reaction to situations that arise while they are on
the job.514 As human consciousness is always free to take up a place, one’s moral
compass is similarly molded as one encounters new experiences and situations. For
example, an experience with a terminal man who is in extreme pain and who can clearly
communicate his reasons for wanting to end his life early through PAD can lead to a
change in an HCP’s moral beliefs. While previously the provider may have wanted to
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reaffirm the simplicity of the principle “do no harm,” through the experience with the
patient, the provider may come to believe that the patient being able to retain his
autonomy in the face of a terminal diagnosis was the best way to avoid harming him.
Sartre’s view of subjectivity allows for the possibility of change and transcendence in
our overall project in relation to new experiences.
The third way that CBRs are subject-forming is related to HCPs being forced to
act against their conscience. This can lead to moral injury or general feelings resentment.
HCPs may feel a lack of freedom and limited in their possibilities for acting in their
professional role. Some studies have shown that HCPs who are coerced to act against
their conscience often feel resentful toward their fellow providers and patients for
putting them in situations when they have to act against their conscience. For example,
two different studies of surveys of nurses showed that nurses felt resentment toward
physicians for making them act in ways that violated their conscience.515 This included
incidents such as assisting in an abortion, but also incidents such as refusing to treat
patients who could not pay or did not have insurance. Some nurses said they thought
physicians ordered them to treat patients without fully informing patients of the risks
and benefits of procedures. Recall that Sartre argues that seriality, a form of group-think
in which individuals receive ideas passively, occurs when individuals are loosely
grouped together and have no core unifying bond. In order for healthcare to serve as a
form of group praxis and not a series, there must be cooperation and shared goals
between providers. When HCPs refuse to perform services that are required by their jobs
515
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and pass on the task to a fellow provider, this can lead to alienation, isolation, and the
thwarting of group praxis. When HCPs are forced to perform actions that they feel are
morally wrong against their will, this also makes them feel interchangeable, atomic, and
lacking genuine human bonds, all factors that contribute to seriality.

3.2 Patients and Their Possibilities
CBRs also affect patients’ possibilities. HCPs refusing to provide patient care
can affect patients’ practical, economical, physical, emotional, and intellectual
possibilities. First and foremost, patients come to HCPs because of physical ailments or
medical predicaments. HCPs’ cooperation, or lack thereof, affect patients’ possibilities
for treatment. Even referring a patient to another provider can result in a serious change
in the patient’s options for treatment.
Healthcare in the United States takes place in the context of scarcity and the
practico-inert. The high financial costs of healthcare in conjunction with the private
insurance system already leave many patients with extremely limited options for care.
Private health insurance plans limit available providers, prescriptions, and procedures
that patients can access. Thus, referring a patient to another provider can lead to delays
in care or difficulty finding another provider who is covered by the insurance plan.
Some patients with financial limitations or physical disabilities rely on public
transportation to travel to and from healthcare facilities, making referral difficult and
burdensome.
Patients receiving the healthcare services they need is integral to their physical
possibilities, which in turn open many other possibilities. Patients are already in a
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position of vulnerability when meeting with the provider. They are suffering from an
undesirable condition and are seeking help from trained professionals who are the
gatekeepers to the services they need. Seriously ill or terminal patients may have
significant difficulty communicating and understanding their treatment options. They
are even more dependent on HCPs to make all available options known to them and to
provide these services if patients make the informed decision to choose them. When a
HCP refuses a patient’s request for a medically accepted procedure, this can severely
affect the patient’s physical, emotional, and practical possibilities.
For example, PAD usually consists of either a provider removing life-sustaining
treatment or a provider prescribing a medication that will painlessly end the patient’s
life. While the physician must prescribe the lethal drug for the patient, the patient is the
one who administers the fatal dose. In all six states, to qualify for PAD patients must
have a diagnosis of less than six months to live.516 Patients seeking PAD are almost
always in extreme discomfort or pain and simply wish to die in a way that is dignified
and on their own terms. They seek to retain some sense of freedom and control over the
way they end their lives. These patients are often bedridden, receiving care from a
primary provider covered by their insurance plans, and have difficulty moving or being
transferred without pain. If a HCP in a state with legal PAD fails to inform terminal
patients of their legal options to use PAD to end their lives, or if the HCP informs
patients that they have a legal right to this service but the physician will not perform it,
this makes terminal patients, whose options are already very limited, even more
constrained in their remaining possibilities. Not being able to find a HCP to assist with
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the procedure can prolong their suffering and pain. We see here that patients, already in
a position of vulnerability, can become even more vulnerable through CBRs.

3.3 Intersubjective Possibilities: The Meeting of Patient and Provider

Sartre argues that our encounters with others give rise to intersubjective
possibilities, which are also social possibilities, through which individuals realize
themselves as objects for others. The look of the other puts us in a position in which our
possibilities are inevitability changed. Before encountering the other, we conceived of
ourselves as free subjects for whom the world is at our disposal. In a direct encounter
with another person, what was once an environment there for me becomes an
environment that is also there for the Other.517 This causes a rearrangement in our
interpretation of our environment. What I originally perceive as there for me is also
there for others.
Through the process of the medical examination, patients are studied as scientific
objects. HCPs must, by nature of their professions, scientifically diagnose the patient’s
condition. In an examination, patients cannot help perceiving themselves as objects.
The HCP’s approach can make the difference between perceiving oneself as a specimen
and perceiving oneself as a free, autonomous human. Several characteristics improve
the patient/provider encounter and make patients feel less like objects and more like
fellow subjects. Vital to this process is an establishment of trust. In a successful
patient/provider relationship, patients must trust that HCPs are giving them the best,
most accurate information about their health that they can. They trust the provider not to
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divulge personal, sometimes embarrassing or extremely private information unless
medically necessary. Patients trust their provider to offer them the available services
vital to their well-being. Patients trust that HCPs will inform them of the potential risks
and benefits of the available procedures. Lastly, patients trust HCPs to respect their
right to choose their own course of treatment after they have been informed of the
options, risks, and benefits. Patients must feel that the HCPs respects them as fellow free
decision-making subjects. In turn, for HCPs to perform their jobs most effectively,
patients must respect their professional advice.
For example, a terminally ill woman may have trusted her family physician for
her whole life and assume that the physician will, as in the past, inform her of all of her
treatment options once she has a terminal diagnosis. She will also trust the physician to
respect her autonomy to make her own informed decision about what treatment is best
for her, after getting the physician’s input and advice. If the physician fails to tell the
patient about her legal right to PAD, or else refuses to assist her if the patient chooses
this procedure, the patient will, in her most vulnerable condition, lose trust and respect
for her provider.
Another strain on the relationship of trust and respect between patients and
providers is a HCP introducing moral judgments about the patient’s character or
behavior that are not related to the patient’s health. When patients feel their personal
choices judged by providers’ personal, non-medically related beliefs, the mutual trust
and respect between the two individuals breaks down. Patients are vulnerable in relation
to providers and a negative judgment about the patient can significantly affect their
perception of self. The patient may feel shame, anger, or embarrassment.
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From the contrary perspective, when HCPs feel that patients are asking for
treatments that violate their core moral beliefs, providers may resent patients for putting
them in a position in which they are being asked to act against their conscience. They
may feel a lack of their own freedom, which may affect the way they view patients.
They may perceive themselves as objects, whose autonomous ends have been taken
away from them. As previously mentioned, HCPs have expressed resentment and
frustration when forced to act in ways they perceive as morally impermissible.518 This
could lead to a loss of desire to offer the patient the best care or, as also mentioned, a
disconnect between their conscience and their conscious life as HCPs. If their
conscience becomes weakened or “turned off,” so to speak, HCPs may not be inclined to
speak out when seeing a patient being mistreated or in another ethically concerning
situation.
This discussion shows that CBRs take place within a web of individuals’
possibilities and that both the act of refusing and the act of performing services against
one’s conscience are subject-forming. Thus, solutions to the problem must consider the
effects that allowing HCPs to refuse or coercing them to act against their conscience
have on the possibilities of HCPs, patients, and the patient/provider relationship. In the
next section, I will discuss what Sartrean ethical subjectivity as presented in Chapter
Three implies for HCPs in their professional roles.
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4

Sartrean Ethical Subjectivity and Conscience-Based Refusals

In this section I provide the normative analysis, arguing what ethical subjectivity
requires of providers. First, HCPs are obligated to perform critical reflection on why
they hold the beliefs that they do, and what conditions have engendered them. Because
some beliefs are more rationally justified than others, ethical subjectivity demands that
we critically examine where our beliefs come from. Second, I argue that HCPs should
attempt to empathize with their patients, who are, by definition, in positions of
vulnerability and highly dependent on HCPs for their care. Third, the ethical mode of
being requires that HCPs be willing to potentially break from their past forms of
thinking and doing, what Sartre calls “to invent.” This may require rearranging their
possibilities in the present in light of a new future goal, which could include a rethinking
of their professional role.
I show that framing the debate in terms of competing rights to liberty ultimately
leads to a moral subjectivism about the nature of the acts the HCPs either provide or
refuse. Ultimately I argue that the goals pursued should be integral human needs and
mutual freedom through the communal praxis of medicine. Ethical subjectivity for
providers in relation to CBRs must consider several things. First, it must consider how
healthcare can be considered a form of group praxis, to the extent that it is a profession
dedicated to healing, curing, comforting, and benefitting sick or injured human beings. It
must explore how HCPs as members of a pledged group of medicine must orient their
ethical reasoning according to Sartre’s guidelines of reflection, empathy, and invention.
Last, it must show how the Sartrean commitments to integral humanity and mutual
freedom should be reflected in the group praxis.
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4.1 Healthcare as Pledged Group Praxis

In Chapter Three, I showed that in The Critique of Dialectical Reason (CDR),
the formation of groups is portrayed as a potential way for people with common needs to
bond together to combat against scarcity and increase the ability of more people to meet
basic human needs. I showed that integral humanity and mutual freedom are most
efficiently pursued through communal praxis. The most basic social collective that
Sartre identifies, discussed significantly in Chapters One and Three, is a series. In a
series, individuals remain alone and atomic, and have no united purpose or cause. In
such a grouping, people often interpret themselves as interchangeable and dispensable,
as individuals bound to and controlled by the practico-inert.519 HCPs who see
themselves united with other workers only as members of an institution with no chosen
communal goals tend to remain in a series. Seriality can increase the alienating factors
of the practico-inert. This is exemplified in a workplace in which individuals are
primarily motivated by a paycheck and feel no connection to the purpose of the
organization. HCPs are usually motivated by a deeper dedication to human welfare and,
thus, can and should move beyond seriality to group praxis.
As mentioned in Chapter Three, Sartre argues that the most active response to
the feebleness of a series is for individuals to bond together to form a group. Group
formation allows individuals to have more control over the practico-inert forces that
condition their existence. Members of groups remain ontologically distinct individuals;
however they are not as isolated as members in a series because they are united through
519
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common goals.520 A pledged group is a group that is deliberately chosen by individuals
who make a pledge to one another to uphold the common praxis of the group. Sartre
calls the pledged group “the victory of man as common freedom over seriality.”521 The
primary characteristic of a pledged group is that individuals come together freely and
make a pledge to each other reciprocally.522 Through the pledge, each member agrees to
limits on one’s practical freedom, but these limits at the same time maximize the proper
use of resources for the group as a whole. If we conceive of the profession of healthcare
as a pledged group, HCPs can overcome serial relations and commit to common goals.
However, the concept of a pledged group makes one wary that if individual
responsibility is deferred to the group, this may lead to unquestioned praxis. This could
amount to nothing more than slavish obedience to workplace rules, professional codes,
or a boss’s orders. I previously mentioned the shortcomings of relying on
professionalism alone for determining HCPs’ moral responses. Because what is legal is
not always aligned with what is moral, we must include the standards for reflecting on
the worthiness of a pledged group’s praxis. These standards are found in Sartre’s
commitments to mutual freedom and integral humanity. Sartre argues that the ultimate
moral goal of group praxis should be for people to have as many of their needs met in
order to be fulfilled as human. This maximizes their practical options for freedom and
identity formation.523 Practical freedom cannot be fully realized if there is not fulfillment

520

Sartre, CDR, 377.
Ibid., 437.
522
Ibid., 421.
523
Jean Paul Sartre, The Rome Lecture Notes: May 1964 at the Instituto Gramsci, translated by
Elizabeth Bowman and Robert Stone, accessed September 7-20, 2015, at the Biblothèque
nationale de Paris.
521

236

of needs, which can only come about through cooperation with others. Recall the
following passage from The Rome Lecture Notes:
There will be no integral man as long as the practico-inert alienates man, that is,
as long as men, instead of being their product, are only the products of their
products, as long as they do not unite into an autonomous praxis which will
submit the world to the satisfaction of their needs without being enslaved and
divided by their practical objectification. There will be no integral man as long as
each man is not totally a man for all men.524
Here it is clear that in order to avoid the alienation of the practico-inert that leaves
humans existing only in a series, it is imperative that we join together into groups that
work to satisfy physical, social, and emotional needs to enhance the practical
possibilities for everyone. The consequence of The Rome Lecture Notes on the pledged
group is that the group must consistently make sure their praxis is in line with the
promotion of the mutual recognition of freedom and integral humanity. This will avoid
situations in which HCPs participate in practices that clearly violate these commitments,
such as experimentation without informed consent or torture.
Sartrean ethical subjectivity demands that HCPs see their actions in healthcare as
directed at the ends of group praxis aimed at integral humanity and the mutual
recognition of freedom. This means that identification with role is acceptable to the
extent that each person places limits on his or her own freedom in order to achieve
progress together. In addition to Sartre’s commitments to integral needs and human
freedom, we can rely on the principles for healthcare ethics and established goals of
medicine. These principles and goals are not in conflict with Sartre’s commitments to
integral humanity and the mutual recognition of freedom. They are specifically tailored
to the values and issues that are most important in the context of healthcare.
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4.2 Ethical Orientation: Reflection, Empathy, and Invention

In the previous Chapter, I argued that Sartrean ethical subjectivity requires an
ethical orientation of reflection, empathy, and invention. In this section, I show what
this orientation demands of HCPs in reference to CBRs in healthcare. The ethical
orientation necessary for Sartrean subjectivity has implications for how HCPs should
conceive of their professional roles and the importance of acting in accordance with their
conscience. Ethical subjectivity requires the role of providers be understood as part of a
communal, group praxis and that conscience align with the goals of patient care, integral
humanity, and mutual freedom, rather than with practico-inert moral norms or each
individual’s subjective beliefs.
First, the Sartrean ethical orientation demands that HCPs should critically reflect
on their own moral beliefs and where they come from. When serving in the role as
gatekeepers to many medical services, HCPs should critically reflect on whether the
core moral beliefs they apply at their jobs are grounded in the best medical care for
patients. They should consider whether the moral beliefs that they hold are in line with
the chosen goals for healthcare as group praxis. Identification with role, often considered
a tenet of bad faith, is morally appropriate when one identifies one’s role with
communal group praxis aligned with the important ethical commitments. Thus, I am not
advocating for a strict professionalism in which professional obligations take precedence
over individual moral beliefs in all circumstances. Rather, identification with role is
appropriate when one serves as a member of a pledged group with properly aligned
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praxis dedicated to commitments to integral humanity and mutual freedom. This is true
of the profession of healthcare.
In A Plea to Intellectuals, Sartre explicitly argued that professionals have the
obligation to critically examine the ideologies behind their education and training. They
must uncover, in his words, their own “constituent contradictions.”525 In this context,
HCPs should, individually and with other providers, reflect on their own beliefs and
their origins. They should reflect on the healthcare goals such as the preservation of life
in order to see if these principles have become practico-inert in their application.526
Beliefs or principles become practico-inert if the professed principles are no longer
serving their originally intended purposes or are becoming counterproductive to these
purposes. Recall that Sartre considers “antipraxis” the inertia embedded in the practicoinert that “replies” to praxis. Because human praxis is projected onto the practico-inert,
the results of human action can become alienated from their original intentions.
“Counterfinalities” occur when the antipraxis results in the direct opposite of the agent’s
conscious intentions.527 Critical historical reflection must include identifying potential
counterfinalities in the way the principles of medicine are being applied.
For example, modern medical technology can keep people alive long after their
quality of life has deteriorated. Consequently, the “preservation of life” is no longer
always in the best interest of the patient. Another example is the principle of nonmaleficence (“do no harm”). As the definition of “harm” may vary from patient to
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patient, there must be some flexibility in the application of this principle to avoid
harming him or her. A HCP refusing to provide palliative sedation, in which a patient is
put into an unconscious pain-free state until death, because the provider believes that it
will violate the principle of non-maleficence, is an example of a principle no longer
serving its intended purpose. In this case, a desire to do no harm actually results in the
direct opposite of the acting agent’s intentions, with the outcome that the patient is put
through unnecessary pain. Both critical examination of one’s own personal principles
and collective reflection on the principles that have traditionally governed the practice of
medicine are necessary for ethical subjectivity.
The critical reflection should be a collaborative process between HCPs and not
simply the responsibility of one individual on his or her own. Even reflecting on one’s
personal ideals can be helped by the insight of peers who work in the same profession
but may have different viewpoints. Thus, the personal critical reflection should take
place with the help of one’s colleagues and through rigorous discussion of competing
points of view. It is important that these peers also work as HCPs so that individual
providers’ beliefs can be discussed in the context of the ends and goals of medicine and
healthcare as group praxis. The critical reflection can also include uncovering one’s
implicit biases. Studies have shown that despite openly confessed beliefs to racial and
gender equality, HCPs have shown tendencies to discriminate against African American
patients or be less likely to take female patients’ pain seriously.528 Engaging in honest
critical reflection with other HCPs can help individuals identify biases that they may not
be able to recognize on their own.
528
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Critical reflection also should take place at the institutional level and the
principles that have traditionally grounded healthcare ethics. It should be asked if the
procedures in question are based on the goals and ends of the healthcare practice or on
practico-inert beliefs and moralities. Practico-inert moralities are those that are
dependent upon culture, institution, or religion rather than on the “true ethic” grounded
in integral humanity. For example, principles such as non-maleficence and the goal of
the preservation or prolongation of life should be collectively reflected upon in relation
to new laws and procedures. This prevents the principles from becoming practico-inert
and having effects that are not in line with their original intentions. Codes of ethics
should be reworked to reflect new technologies, new legally available procedures, and
changing societal attitudes about practices such as PAD or artificial contraception. This
way, HCPs in training will be educated in objectives that reflect group consensus, or
pledged group praxis, and this education will lead to achieving shared goals.
Part of the uncovering of the conditions that have led to HCPs’ own beliefs,
including potential contradictions, includes active empathy with the vulnerable. As
patients come to them for treatment, healing, and comfort, they are vulnerable in relation
to providers. Some patients are even more vulnerable: those who are economically
disadvantaged, those who do not have health insurance, those who are terminal or
seriously ill, or those facing a challenging health situation such as an unintended
pregnancy. While the constraints of the field do not always allow it, HCPs should make
active efforts to spend time with these patients if possible, and to attempt to see things
from their point of view. They should also acknowledge that they cannot truly know
what it is like to be in these patients’ positions or to have their experiences. Active
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empathy with patients can help HCPs with critical reflection on their own beliefs. It may
lead to changes in the way HCPs view the acceptability of certain procedures, such as
PAD. Attempting to empathize with vulnerable patients will also help develop the
provider’s conscience in ways that make caring for the vulnerable an integral part of the
HCP’s project. This will prevent feelings of moral apathy or moral injury when
performing services they may have qualms about.
The last characteristic of the Sartrean ethical subjectivity is a willingness to
invent. In Morality and History, Sartre talks specifically about the difficult task of
invention, the task of ethics: the willingness to be different and to potentially break with
one’s personal past, at the level of individual praxis, or collective history, at the level of
group praxis. While moral integrity and consistency are necessary qualities for HCPs
given the demanding nature of their jobs, ethical subjectivity demands a willingness to
restructure one’s beliefs if the critical, intersubjective reflection reveals inconsistencies
or new knowledge. Invention also requires recognizing one’s freedom to pursue new
ends and to restructure one’s praxis accordingly. Simultaneously, it is important that
moral invention be accompanied by a moral compass and steady conscience. While
conscience can reflect practico-inert beliefs, conscience plays an important role in moral
life, especially in the context of healthcare. Thus, the willingness to invent must also
include conscientious adherence to some ethical commitments, rather than simply being
willing to change on a whim.
Moral invention that is properly guided by conscience in a Sartrean framework
requires that HCPs restructure their praxis around the ethical commitments to mutual
freedom and integral human needs. These Sartrean commitments are compatible with
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the traditionally held goals of healthcare and the principles of healthcare ethics. In the
next section, I will show that the Sartrean ethical commitments would require in most
cases that HCPs be willing to perform procedures for patients that are collectively
agreed to be rooted in the goals of medicine and principles of healthcare ethics.

4.3 Ethical Commitments: Mutual Freedom and Integral Human Needs

In this section I argue that the commitments to mutual freedom and integral
human needs imply that HCPs should perform legal, safe, medically-accepted
procedures as part of the professional roles they freely assume. First, I argue that mutual
freedom requires that patient autonomy be placed above providers’ right to freedom of
conscience because patients and providers do not occupy equal roles of power, and
vulnerability must be considered. Second, building on the discussion of group praxis in
Chapter Three, I show that integral human needs are best able to be met through
communal, goal-oriented praxis, rather than seriality. Thus, HCPs should see their
actions in their broader context, as they relate to the overall goals of healthcare as a form
of group praxis. Throughout this discussion, it is important to remember that integral
humanity and mutual freedom must be pursued contextually within the given historical,
social, and material field of possibilities.
The ideal of the mutual recognition of freedom is based on the idea that, as
human being with free praxis, we simultaneously recognize others are free beings who
interpret our projects. Thus, our freedoms are intertwined with the freedom of others
and all should be respected and promoted. We should acknowledge the meaning others
want to give to their projects as we want the same for ourselves. Making room for the
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freedom of others increases everyone’s freedom. Initially, it may appear that the
commitment to the mutual recognition of freedom entails that HCPs and patients should
respect each other’s decisions in the patient/provider relationship equally. According to
this line of argumentation, patients should respect HCPs’ right to refuse just as HCPs
should respect the patient’s decisions about treatment. However, positions of
vulnerability are important to recognize when pursuing the mutual freedom ideal.
Patients are in a position of vulnerability and HCPs freely take on roles as gatekeepers to
healthcare services for vulnerable people. Part of recognizing one’s own freedom as a
member of the healthcare profession is realizing that constraints and responsibilities
come alongside serving in a specific role and upholding group praxis. Thus, HCPs agree
to limits on their own freedom when they take on the roles that they do. This position
flows from Sartre’s discussion in A Plea of the increased responsibility that comes with
having access to higher levels of education and experiences that build awareness.
The second moral ideal is integral humanity. This should be used as the general
standard for shaping the group praxis of healthcare. I suggest that group praxis for a
pledged group of healthcare can be further evaluated according to the generally accepted
goals of healthcare, as well as commonly accepted principles for healthcare ethics.
These goals and principles are consistent with Sartre’s vision of integral humanity and
will both introduce a framework for evaluating human needs and exclude abhorrent
medical practices from becoming acceptable group praxis. As mentioned, commonly
accepted goals of healthcare endorsed by contemporary ethicists and members of the
medical community include the alleviation of suffering, the prolongation of life, the
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promotion of well-being and the prevention of disease.529 All of these goals are
consistent with Sartre’s vision for human fulfillment and freedom. Praxis can be further
evaluated in terms of its conformity with heavily supported principles for healthcare
ethics, the principle of non-maleficence (do no harm), the principle of beneficence
(patients should be benefitted and healed), the principle of autonomy (patients’ selfdetermination should be respected) and principle of justice (no patient is given unfair
preference over another).530 These principles are compatible with achieving integral
human needs through healthcare as group praxis. If any of these principles are being
violated, it is likely that the goals of healthcare are not being met, so that praxis is not in
line with the fulfillment of integral human needs. An identification of needs that are
foundational (needs which constitute our integral humanity) include access to sufficient
food, clean water, shelter, and general physical well-being; but also love, social worth,
and emotional fulfillment.
Evaluating group praxis in light of these healthcare goals and principles clearly
excludes practices such as participating in drafting guidelines for torture, for example,
which is not in conformity with any of the accepted goals of healthcare. It is also an
evident violation of the principle of non-maleficence. If practices that violate these
norms or commitments become legal, such as the US torture program, it is important
that HCPs have the moral right to refuse. This would give a healthcare provider
sufficient ground to refuse to participate in such a practice, in spite of some cultural or
institutional pressure. In such situations, it is important for the provider to have a wellfunctioning conscience. I am not suggesting that the goals of medicine and healthcare
529
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principles serve as a substitute for individual responsibility or provide some type of rulebook for properly aligned praxis. I am rather arguing that these principles are compatible
with Sartre’s vision of fulfilling integral humanity, so that they can serve as a foundation
for evaluating the overall praxis of healthcare as a communal, pledged group. It is
important, as already emphasized, that the principles themselves and their application to
newly available procedures and laws be continuously discussed and reflected upon in
order to avoid becoming practico-inert.
In addition to pursuing human fulfillment through healthcare goals and
principles, praxis can further be evaluated by whether or not it gives rise to reciprocal
interactions of trust and respect. The relationship between one’s conscience and this
particular version of fulfilling human needs requires that HCPs should evaluate the goals
of group praxis in relation to this framework. This should also be implicit in HCPs’
collective processes of reflection. Healthcare as a form of group praxis is best achieved
when there is cooperation and agreement among providers. The very real effects of
seriality have the potential to do great harm in a healthcare setting where life and death
are constantly at stake. It is unrealistic to consider that professionals will see eye to eye
on every issue. But the importance of critical reflection, discourse, and shared goals will
deliver the best patient care. This process can help providers develop their conscience
so that they will not feel moral apathy or the isolation and interchangeability that comes
with seriality.
As demonstrated through my discussion of Sartre’s view of freedom in Chapter
One, exercising freedom as a HCP means navigating within a set of constraints. These
constraints come from the practico-inert healthcare system itself, pressure from other
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HCPs, the necessities of respecting patient autonomy, and responsibilities for upholding
communal praxis as a member of the pledged group of healthcare. Engaging in critical
reflection on one’s own core beliefs, making deliberate attempts to empathize with
patients, and working cooperatively alongside other HCPs to properly align group praxis
and deliver the best patient care are all practices of freedom within the constraints. The
constraints simultaneously limit and enable freedom. Thus, while being coerced to act
against one’s conscience can lead to feelings of determinism or impotency, developing
one’s conscience alongside other providers and in relation to delivering patient care
allow HCPs to direct their praxis toward freely chosen communal goals.

5

Implications for Public Policy

The previous discussion elucidated the conceptual issues at stake, how CBRs
affect patients’ and HCPs’ possibilities, and what ethical subjectivity requires of HCPs
who freely choose to practice medicine. To conclude, I will make suggestions for public
policy based on this analysis. I focus on the important role that conscience plays in
subjectivity and in medical practice, in addition to demonstrated harms that come with
being forced to act against one’s conscience. I make suggestions for policy regarding
education, communication and discourse between providers, and best patient care. I
suggest that part of medical education should be helping students develop a sense of
moral conscience and how to apply it throughout their careers. I recommend that there
be consequences for experienced HCPs who refuse patients legal and medicallyaccepted procedures based on personal moral beliefs that are not grounded in medicine
as group praxis.
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First, medical training and education should include the development of
conscience and honest discussion of scenarios that HCPs will face when they choose to
pursue the practice of medicine. This training often takes place for physicians or other
long-term professionals who study for many years. Nurses, especially LPNs and RNs
who only take on one or two years of professional training before licensure,
respectively, are often not fully prepared for the scope of job tasks they will encounter.
They also have not had many experiences to develop their conscience in relation to
situations and ethical dilemmas that may arise on the job. The studies in which HCPs
have reported the greatest level of frustration regarding being forced to act against
conscience are studies of nurses.531 As providers who generally must “take orders” from
superiors in order for care to be efficiently delivered, nurses are at the highest risk of
moral stress. More focus on ethics and conscience in education, and regular
communication between nurses and physicians can help remedy this.
Second, there should be a requirement for a consistent reflection on and revision
of the ends and goals of healthcare by leadership of the American Medical Association
and other government bodies that are essentially responsible for determining the
collective goals of the profession. This should include discussion and discourse about
how values such as “do no harm,” “preserve life,” etc. should be practiced in relation to
changing societal norms and the ongoing legalization of controversial procedures, such
as PAD and emergency contraceptives. The reflection process should recognize that
concepts such as harm have a normative dimension and that perceptions of harm change.
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At the same time, the changes will have on patients’ and providers’ possibilities also
have to be recognized.
Third, it is outside the scope of this discussion to present an argument about
whether or not highly contentious procedures, such as abortion and PAD, are acceptable
praxis for healthcare as a pledged group. Abortion is one of the most divisive issues in
US society, and purely elective abortion is divisive among HCPs of all different roles.
PAD is legal in six states, but still illegal in 44, and there are still many HCPs who argue
that this practice violates the principles of non-maleficence. For these procedures in
which there is not yet consensus among HCPs or medical personnel of all levels, there
should be some tolerance for CBRs if they can be done without harming patients or
placing limits on their possibilities. Communal group praxis should take generally
precedence over individual beliefs. However in difficult cases when there is still debate
among medical professionals whether a procedure should be part of group praxis, some
accommodations for providers should be made at the institutional level. If these
procedures are collectively determined to be within the scope of the ends and goals of
healthcare, providers should recognize that upholding these commitments overall are
most important for group praxis. However, the importance of communicating this
information among HCPs cannot be overstated. The communication makes the
differences between HCPs feeling moral anguish and lack of freedom, isolation and
seriality, and feeling that they are participating in intentional, freely chosen, communal
praxis.
Lastly, in order to enforce the pledged group praxis, there need to be
consequences enforced for HCPs who fail to uphold the collective praxis, considering
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the ways in which HCP refusals can potentially alter patients’ possibilities and lead to
patient harm. Importantly, employer sanctions or consequences are only justifiable if the
previous three recommendations are met. These consequences should not immediately
include termination, but should instead be directed first of all at education and reform,
with emphasis on the importance of upholding patient autonomy and the communally
decided praxis. In line with Sartrean ethical subjectivity, these policies must recognize
that changing procedural norms will affect patients’ and providers’ possibilities. Thus,
opportunities for training, discussion, and education should be implemented in order to
help facilitate the concerns of providers. Strategies employed should reflect that moral
invention may require creative processes in order to instill a healthily functioning
conscience while simultaneously upholding group ends. Consideration of how individual
job tasks are part of broader pledged group ends—rooted in mutual freedom and integral
humanity——must be front and center in all of HCPs’ moral deliberation.

Conclusion

In this Chapter I have shown how a Sartrean analysis provides a fruitful
alternative to approaches that discuss healthcare ethics issues in the context of
competing rights or duties. Through the example of CBRs, I have shown that decisionmaking in a healthcare context is subject-forming and contributes to the existential
projects of both patients and providers. I have shown that refusing to perform a
procedure and being coerced to act against conscience both have effects on HCPs’ and
patients’ possibilities. Therefore, the moral depth of the issue goes beyond protecting
the rights of the liberal subject or simply maximizing utility, as we saw in accounts that
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were rooted in the traditions of Kant or Mill. Additionally, I have suggested evaluating
the practices in question on the basis of Sartre’s ethical commitments as well as the ends
of medicine and principles of healthcare, rather than arguing that each individual’s
personal moral view holds equal weight, regardless of its rational justification.
More than any other line of employment, healthcare is vital to societal
actualization of integral human needs. From ensuring basic nutrition, vaccines and
routine check-ups and screenings, alleviating pain and suffering of illness and injuries,
curing when possible or healing when there is no cure—all of these practices contribute
to the pursuit of integral humanity and mutual recognition of freedom. Advancing these
goals requires cooperation and collective group praxis between providers. The Sartrean
analysis shows that there is more at stake in CBRs than just competing claims to the
right to liberty. A robust ethical analysis must take into consideration how these
practices are creating possibilities for being subjects. Actions or policies rooted in
Sartrean ethical commitments will put mutual freedom and integral human needs as the
primary moral goals.
In the final Chapter, I will show how the Foucauldian model of ethical
subjectivity that I developed in Chapter Three can be applied to an issue in healthcare
ethics. I will present an analysis that considers a contemporary medical practice—
mandatory HPV vaccination—as a strategy of biopower. I will show how the practice is
shaping the field of possibilities for being subjects and what Foucauldian ethical
subjectivity involves in terms of mandating the vaccine. I will illustrate how the
Foucauldian analysis is unique from traditional deontological and utilitarian approaches.
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I will then conclude by making suggestions for how Sartrean and Foucauldian views can
continue to contribute to discussions in healthcare ethics.
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Chapter Five: Foucauldian Ethical Subjectivity and the HPV Vaccine Controversy

Introduction

In Chapter Two, I presented Foucault’s argument that subjectivity is constituted
by discursive practices, strategies of power, and practices of the self. I showed that
biopower and mechanisms of security are power strategies that operate in our present
epoch and affect our modern framework for truth. In Chapter Three, I suggested a model
of Foucauldian ethical subjectivity based on an ethical orientation of refusal, curiosity,
and innovation, coupled with ethical commitments to care of self and the philosophical
way of life. In this Chapter, I will show how a Foucauldian investigation can be applied
to an issue in contemporary healthcare ethics, and how the analysis that it offers is
different from traditional deontological or utilitarian approaches in mainstream applied
ethics literature.
For this task, I will examine the administration and controversial mandate of the
human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine in the United States, in order to show how a
Foucauldian analysis provides insights beyond those of a traditional deontological or
utilitarian analysis. HPV is the most common sexually transmitted infection in the
United States and worldwide. Approximately 79 million U.S. residents are currently
infected with HPV and about 14 million people become newly infected each year.
Approximately 4,000 women die each year from cervical cancer caused by HPV.532
Since 2006, a vaccine has been available and recommended for young females and since
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2009 for young males.533 There has been proposed legislation in several states to
mandate the vaccine for girls entering middle school.
Despite the potential benefit of preventing several different cancers, the push for
mandatory vaccination for HPV is met with some opposition. Some are concerned that
because the HPV vaccine is fairly new, the long term side effects of the vaccine are
unknown, and that the public benefit of the vaccine is exaggerated. Additionally, some
see the vaccine as an intrusion by the state into the decision-making process of
teenagers, who could abstain from sexual activity, and an intrusion on parental
autonomy regarding healthcare decisions for their children.534 Some stronger opponents
argue that vaccines for sexually transmitted infections (STIs) condone or even
encourage teenage sex, and give a false sense of security against other STIs. Proponents
of the vaccine argue that a mandate is the only way to achieve herd immunity, which is
the idea that if the majority of the population is vaccinated for a disease, those who
cannot be vaccinated due to age or weakened immune systems are still protected because
the spread of the disease is contained. Proponents argue that the benefits of the vaccine
outweigh potential side effects or concerns about teenage sexual behavior.535 Thus,
there is currently a public debate about whether the vaccine should be mandatory, if it
should also be mandatory for males, when it should be administered, and who should be
targeted to receive it.
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Literature on mandatory vaccination generally frames the conversation as a
conflict between an individual or parental right to liberty and utilitarian concerns about
what is best for the population as a whole. Those who argue in favor of vaccine
mandates claim that the benefits that come with establishing herd immunity against a
disease outweigh a parent’s right to refuse to have their children vaccinated as part of a
general right to liberty. Those who oppose vaccine mandates appeal to the importance
of parents’ rights to choose and refuse medical treatment for their children, and point out
that all vaccines come with associated risks. The conversation about HPV vaccination
in philosophical literature is framed in terms of whether HPV is harmful and contagious
enough to warrant overriding the parental right to liberty for utilitarian reasons.
In this Chapter I show how Foucault’s views on subjectivity as well as the model
for ethical subjectivity I constructed in Chapter Three can be used to contribute to the
conversation about this issue of public concern. I show why none of the current
approaches are properly accounting for the subject-forming dimension of HPV
vaccination and how taking this into account can be beneficial for formulating our
response. I show that this practice shapes the possibilities for youth who are targeted to
receive the vaccine and for their parents who must make the decision whether or not to
vaccinate. I argue that the issue of mandatory HPV vaccination is not only a debate
between parental autonomy weighed against the benefits to the population as a whole.
Possibilities for subjectivity, new strategies of power, and new categories for normality
and abnormality emerge alongside this new medical procedure and mechanisms for
implementing it.
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For this task, I use two concepts introduced by Foucault. I examine the HPV
vaccine as a strategy of “biopower” and the potential mandate as an accompanying
“mechanism of security.” The analysis will show that mandating the vaccine has the
potential to change the possibilities for adolescent subjects and the relationships they
have with their family members and peers. Those who support mandating the vaccine
must take these issues into consideration in order to understand the motivations and
concerns of opponents so that we have an inclusive debate about the issue. I make
recommendations for providers, public health officials, and public policy, suggesting
that the HPV vaccine can be implemented routinely side by side with other sexual health
practices in order to benefit the health of both adolescents and adults, while taking into
consideration how such practices will affect their field of possibilities.
I begin by showing how the Foucauldian model that I introduced in Chapter
Three is different from traditional utilitarian or deontological approaches which rely on
the vision of the liberal subject. I then introduce the HPV vaccine and the controversy
surrounding it, as well as how mandatory vaccination is typically approached in applied
ethics literature. I show why framing the debate as a conflict between individual liberty
and social welfare does not sufficiently capture all that is at stake in vaccination
practices and HPV vaccination in particular, which is spread through behavior rather
than casually. I then proceed with the Foucauldian analysis, interpreting the HPV
vaccine as a mechanism of biopower that is shaping the possibilities for human subjects.
To do so, I appeal to Foucault’s analysis of the smallpox vaccine in 19th century Europe
and the discourses and concepts that emerged alongside it. By applying his analysis of
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the smallpox vaccine, I show how similar concepts are operative today in the debate
about the HPV vaccine.
I then proceed to the normative analysis. In Chapter Three, I argued that refusal
refers to an attitude of rejection of inevitabilities, both in our social landscape and our
own possibilities. I argued that curiosity refers to framing our ethical deliberation in
terms of certain background questions, primarily asking how we are constituted as
subjects of power, knowledge, and our own actions. I argued that innovation refers to an
ongoing willingness to change and transformation. In terms of commitments, I argued
that care of self requires recognizing the link between ethics and truth, caring for others
alongside ourselves, and helping others have the relevant information or thought
processes to decide for themselves. I argued that the philosophical way of life requires
retaining reflective awareness of how we become subjects through biopower and
mechanisms of security. I also argued for a commitment to exposing ways of thinking,
speaking or acting that were previously closed off or unexplored. To conclude the
Chapter, I elucidate what this orientation and commitments imply for providers, public
health officials, and policy makers. I show that Foucauldian ethical subjectivity
requires recognizing how HPV vaccination is affecting categories for normality and
abnormality and potentially changing relationships. I make suggestions for policy,
including outreach strategies, which both recognize these concerns and meet parents and
adolescents on their own terms.
Thus, the objectives of this Chapter are as follows: 1) to differentiate Foucault’s
ethical subjectivity model from traditional ethical models rooted in the thought of Kant
and Mill, 2) to show the current controversy surrounding the HPV vaccine as well as
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how mandatory vaccination is approached in the philosophical literature, 3) to use
Foucault’s concepts of biopower and mechanisms of security to help elucidate how the
HPV vaccine influences subjectivity, using his discussion of historical smallpox
vaccination as a contrast model, 4) to use the Foucauldian model of ethical subjectivity
to argue how public health officials and providers should approach HPV vaccination,
and 5) to make recommendations for public policy and refocusing the debate based on
this analysis.

1

Foucauldian Ethical Subjectivity versus Deontology and Utilitarianism

In Chapter Four, I discussed two different ethical frameworks based on the
thought of Kant and Mill. I also showed how Kantian and Millian thought are used to
justify moral or political rights. The first, based on Kant, is a deontological approach in
which rights are introduced to protect the inherent dignity of each human being. Kant
argues that human beings have universal faculties of reason, and thus are capable of both
legislating and following the moral law. Most important for contemporary moral thought
is his argument that each person should treat other human beings as an ends in
themselves, and never as only a means to an end. As autonomous decision-making
agents, human beings should be treated as fellow decision makers, not as things or
tools.536 As mentioned, this is often extrapolated into a rights-based framework in
which human beings, as possessors of universal powers of reason and choice, are
entitled to certain protections. Rights involve placing limits on the behavior of everyone
in order to protect the interests of the rights-holder. One of the most important rights
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supported by a deontological framework with respect to healthcare ethics is the right to
bodily autonomy and the right to choose or refuse treatment.537
The second approach, based on Mill, is utilitarian insofar as rights serve an
instrumental purpose and are introduced in order to produce utility. Mill’s ethical
thought, rather than being based on universal moral laws derivable solely from reason, is
instead based on consequences that lead to the best results for the most people. Actions
are morally good when they lead to consequences that make the most people happy or
lead to their well-being.538 This argument is now referred to as rule-utilitarianism and
introduces rules for society that, if followed by everyone, lead to the greatest good for
the greatest number. As we saw in Chapter Two, Mill believes that human beings are
most happy when they are generally left alone. Thus, he argues for a vision of justice
based on negative liberty and the no-harm-to-others principle. As we saw in Chapter
Four, Mill’s thought can also be extrapolated into defense of a system of moral rights.539
In this view, rights are not defended as ends in themselves, but because they are
instrumental in realizing certain desirable ends.540 These rights are grounded in general
utility, that is to say, the happiness they create for society as a whole. When two rights
appear to be in conflict, we must weigh which right produces more utility for everyone.
In a utilitarian approach to rights, the right to bodily autonomy of the individual can be
overridden by broader concerns for the health of the population. I discuss Foucault’s key
differences with deontological or utilitarian rights theories because these theories
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currently dominate the mainstream conversation in healthcare ethics. In the case of
mandatory vaccination in healthcare, the debate is framed as a conflict between a
parental right to liberty versus utilitarian concerns regarding societal welfare and disease
control.
An approach based on Foucauldian ethical subjectivity is significantly different.
First, Foucault does not argue that rights-based approaches to ethics are necessarily bad,
but that they have the potential to be dangerous when assumed to be self-evident,
timeless, or immune from questioning. Foucault would emphasize that rights introduced
will present certain behavior or characteristics as desirable and will produce subjects in
the sense of modifying the ways that subjects think of themselves and others. The right
to bodily autonomy or the overriding of rights in the interest of societal welfare will
produce or emphasize certain categories for normality. Practices that exercise control
over bodies and behavior will establish a norm and categorize subjects accordingly.
Second, rights-based theories are focused on the appropriate treatment of moral patients,
or morally considerable human beings. Foucauldian ethical subjectivity is primarily
concerned with the development of the individual self. Refusal, curiosity, and
innovation are orientations in which one refuses to accept many characteristics of
oneself as inevitable, one attempts to understand oneself in one’s unique historical
moment, and one is generally willing to change and think something different than one
thought before. Third, both deontological and utilitarian rights-based approaches to
ethics are interested in protecting or legislating the liberal subject and introducing
constraints on behavior as a means of doing so. Foucauldian ethical subjectivity, by
contrast, recognizes that we become subjects with possibilities through the discursive
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frameworks and strategies of power present in our epoch. Thus, ethics is a process of
building oneself in reference to an orientation and recognizing that our practices affect
the possibilities of others, rather than protecting an existing self.
At the level of commitments, the commitments with Foucauldian roots that I
introduced include care of self and the philosophical way of life. The most explicit
difference between Foucauldian ethical subjectivity and deontological or rights-based
approaches is that Foucault is more interested in uncovering than legislating—he does
not believe there are ethical maxims that transcend historical epoch or that it is the
philosopher’s job to tell others what kind of political system or laws they should have.
Rather, a commitment to care of self and the philosophical way of life includes helping
others have the relevant knowledge to decide for themselves. It also includes
illuminating ways of thinking and doing that may have been previously unexplored in
order to create new possibilities for ourselves and others.
In a recent work on Foucault and his position regarding rights, Ben Golder541
argues that for Foucault, there is an ambivalence to rights. Golder’s analysis is very
useful in terms of elucidating Foucault’s views on rights, which occasionally seem
indecisive. A brief discussion of his study will make Foucault’s views more clear and
lend support for an ethical approach that goes beyond moral rights. As discussed in
Chapter Three, Foucault argues in Society Must Be Defended that rights-discourse
“serves as a vehicle for and implements relations that are not only relations of
sovereignty, but relations of domination.”542 However, there are also times when
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Foucault talks about the importance of rights, specifically in his advocacy for gay rights
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In Golder’s interpretation, Foucault sees rights as at
the same time emancipatory and regulatory, liberating and constraining. This is because
rights can serve as tools to enlarge, expand, or protect the sphere of possible actions for
subjects. At the same time they can also serve as vehicles for strategies of power that
establish those subjects in communities in particular ways and regulate them within
existing forms of power.543 Golder characterizes Foucault’s view as follows: “[I]f
…[rights] are sometimes effective in redirecting and remaking power relations, they
nevertheless do so by fabricating and then regulating the very subjects who claim to rely
upon them.”544 Golder convincingly appeals to several of Foucault’s interviews during
his activism on behalf of gay rights to support this view. For example, in a 1982
interview, Foucault said:
I think we should consider the battle for gay rights as an episode that cannot be
the final stage…because a right, in its real effects, is much more linked to
attitudes and patterns of behavior than to legal formulations…That in the name
of respect of individual rights someone is allowed to do as he wants, great! But if
what we want to do is to create a new way of life, then the question of individual
rights is not pertinent… [the notion of gay rights] has been very useful, but it
limits us.545
Foucault’s critique of the movement on behalf of gay rights was a critique of a
tendency to identify or isolate a “gay identity” which would then be protected with
similar rights as those protecting heterosexual relationships. While this may enhance the
sphere of practical actions for gay individuals, Foucault was wary that it also introduced
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a constrained view of what homosexual relationships were supposed to be. Foucault
was interested in creating new types of relationships that are open to change and
innovation rather than being constrained by existing sexual norms. He says:
Rather than arguing that rights are fundamental and natural to the individual, we
should try to imagine and create a new relational right that permits all possible
types of relations to exist and not to be prevented, blocked, or annulled by
impoverished relational institutions.546
With this statement, Foucault suggests the possibility of “relational rights” or rights
which allow for different types of relationships to exist rather than rights that control or
regulate conduct to such an extent that it constrains the relationships we can have with
each other. Golder argues that Foucault sees rights as an available political means to
contest dominating power relations and open up spaces for resistance and freedom. At
the same time, rights “reveal their contingency and availability for political
resignification, they will not for this reason alone always and necessarily present the best
possible means for the contestation of power relations.”547
From this discussion it is clear that Foucault considers rights as political tools that
exist in a web of power relations. While they can serve as useful tools for opening a field
of action in which subjects will have more room to creatively construct their own
identities and relationships, they can equally often constrain or regulate behavior in such
a way that only limited or specific identities and relationships are allowed to develop.
As Golder comments, “Rights are political mechanisms that both produce and threaten
the space of freedom.”548 The implications that this has for discussions of ethics is that
while rights may serve as useful tools for legislating society and moral rights can serve
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as useful tools for ethical discourse, rights are only useful if they are not overly
constraining or stifling of freedom or of our relationships with each other. Rights may
serve the useful function of promoting the individual’s freedom, but they have the
potential to be dangerous if they are assumed to be inherent and the “be-all and end-all”
of political or moral discourse. Foucault’s example with the gay rights movement
elucidates this point quite well: while a right to sexual freedom enabled new types of
relationships and new possibilities for gay people, fighting for gay rights also introduced
the danger of forcing gay relationships to conform to existing categories for “normal”
relationships. The implications of this view for my project is that when we employ
moral rights language, this should not be the sole discourse used. Rather, our analysis
must go deeper and examine whether relying on rights is not also limiting possibilities
for who we become and what type of relationships we establish with one another.
In terms of mandatory vaccination, this discussion does not entail that we should
do away with rights talk or dismiss the debate regarding the proper balance of individual
liberty weighed against the health of populations. We must work within the conceptual
frameworks and rational justifications that operate in our epoch. Rather, a Foucauldian
analysis should add to the conversation rather than replacing the current discussion, and
bring lucidity so that we are aware of what new practices, new laws, or new “rights”
entail. A Foucauldian analysis will draw attention to the ways that medical practices are
affecting the possibilities for subjectivity, affecting frameworks for truth, and affecting
our relationships with each other. This analysis will identify spaces of freedom in these
possibilities and relationships. This will allow us to see the full scope of what is at stake
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and provide a more robust foundation for approaching issues in healthcare. It will also
show the shortcomings of relying only on utilitarian or deontological approaches.

2

HPV Vaccination: Overview and Current Approaches

2.1 HPV: Overview and Current Debate

HPV is a serious medical concern both in the United States and worldwide. It is
so common that nearly all sexually active men and women will get at least one type of
HPV at some point in their lives. There are over 100 strains of the virus, two of which
have been linked to 70% of cervical cancer in females. HPV can be transmitted through
sexual intercourse or sexual activity, and occasionally can be transmitted from a mother
to a baby during delivery. Each year about 360,000 men and women develop genital
warts resulting from HPV, 12,000 women develop cervical cancer, and 4000 of them
die.549 High risk HPV types are found in about 3.4% of women tested and detected in
virtually all cervical, vaginal, and vulvar cancers.550 Women who do not die from
cervical cancer often must still go through painful surgeries to remove portions of their
cervix. Genital warts caused by HPV are often difficult and painful to treat.551 In
addition to causing uncomfortable warts and cancer, there is a financial cost of treating
HPV: roughly 16 billion dollars each year.552
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The development and approval of the HPV vaccine in 2006 was seen as an
opportunity to significantly decrease the rate of infection. Since rates of HPV are higher
in the age group of 14 through 24, the recommendation is to vaccinate females before
the onset of sexual activity, when it is unlikely that they have been previously exposed
to the virus.553 The Center for Disease Control and Prevention recommends that, in order
to be maximally effective, the series of vaccination should be given to adolescents at
around 11 to 12 years of age. In 2009 the vaccine was also approved and recommended
for adolescent males, recommended for 11 and 12-year-old boys.554 In addition to
protecting males against genital warts and cancers, vaccinating males reduces the spread
of the disease to females.
Late in 2006, states began considering legislation that would mandate
vaccination for girls entering middle school. Although the initial development of
legislation saw little controversy, this changed when Texas governor Rick Perry signed
an executive order in 2007 requiring the HPV vaccine for girls entering middle school.
This order was later revoked by the Texas state legislature. Since then, 24 states have
considered legislation that would mandate the vaccine, although those measures have
only passed in Virginia and the District of Columbia.555
Four common concerns have been raised about the mandated administration of
the HPV vaccine. The first is that the potential health benefit for the public that would
come from mandating the vaccine is not sufficient to warrant an intrusion on parents’
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and adolescents’ right to liberty, including the right to refuse treatment. Second, there is
the concern that because the vaccine is fairly new, there are not enough data to ensure its
safety. Initial studies suggest the vaccine is safe. The Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting
System has found no serious systemic reactions apart from those that are common to
almost every other vaccine.556 However opponents are concerned that the long term
effects of the vaccine, if there are any, are not yet known. Since HPV is not casually
transmitted like other diseases for which children are traditionally vaccinated, many
parents believe that an equally effective alternative to a vaccine that has potential side
effects is to practice abstinence.557 There is a significant gap between parents who are in
favor of mandatory TDAP (tetanus, diphtheria, and pertussis) vaccine and those in favor
of mandatory HPV vaccine,558 suggesting that many hold the view that HPV can be
avoided through methods other than vaccination. It can also indicate that many do not
understand that HPV is a serious threat. The third concern is that the vaccine gives
adolescents a false sense of security in terms of avoiding other STIs. In other words, the
knowledge that they are protected from one sexually transmitted disease may lead some
adolescents to erroneously believe they are protected from other STIs like HIV. Fourth,
the strongest opponents are concerned that mandating a vaccine for an STI condones or
even encourages sexual behavior in adolescents.559
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Those who argue in favor of making the vaccine mandatory assert that disease
rates do not fall unless vaccines are made mandatory. They also argue that routine
administration is necessary for establishing herd immunity, and this is only achieved
through vaccine mandates. This is an argument supported by historical and modern
evidence of disease control through vaccination, including smallpox elimination. A
number of child vaccines have been mandatory in schools for a long time, and such
requirements have been successful in preventing infectious diseases. Even those who are
not eligible for the vaccine get protection through herd immunity because the spread of
the disease is contained.560 Proponents assert that any misguided perceptions that
individuals are also protected against other STIs can be avoided by proper education
about the vaccine. In general, they argue that the potential public health benefits
outweigh potential concerns about teenage sex.561

2.2 Vaccination: Philosophical Literature

In philosophical literature, the debate about mandatory vaccination is usually
framed as a conflict between a right to liberty and utilitarian concerns regarding the
well-being of the overall population, or as a conflict between individuals’ competing
right to life. Heta Hayry and Matt Hayry,562 for example, argue that there are conflicting
rights claims on both sides of the debate. They use the example of the New York 1947
smallpox vaccine program in which eight million people were successfully protected
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against the disease, but four people died as a result of receiving the vaccine. Hayry and
Hayry argue that the four people who died had a prima facie right to life that was
arguably violated when they were coerced to receive the vaccine that caused their
deaths. At the same time, they argue that the eight million people who were successfully
inoculated had an equally valid claim to a right to life and without the vaccination
program many more would have died.563 Thus, they argue, the problem cannot be solved
solely by appealing to rights. Our decision must include a “rough and ready utilitarian
calculus.”564 Because far more people would have died if the mandatory vaccination
program had not been implemented, Hayry and Hayry argue that we must resort to a
utilitarian calculus, which is clearly in favor of the vaccination program.565
Mark Navin also makes an argument in favor of mandatory vaccination that he
argues goes beyond the traditional debate weighing claims to liberty and public health.
He introduces two additional moral reasons mandatory vaccination is justified: the
principle of fairness and concern for vulnerable persons.566 Navin argues that refusing
to vaccinate one’s children amounts to free-riding upon a public good that others have
created. Herd immunity, he argues, is a public good comparable to clean air or national
security. Like in the case of clean air or national security, you cannot prevent people
who do not pay their fair share from benefitting from herd immunity. Thus, a fair
scheme for contributing to the public good is needed, and the only fair scheme for
paying the cost of herd immunity is for everyone who can receive a vaccine to do so. If
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one refuses to participate in fairly sharing the costs, Navin argues that he or she is a freerider, or one who treats others with insufficient impartiality in pursuit of one’s own
interest.567 The second reason that refusing vaccination is immoral, in Navin’s view, is
that it fails to show concern for the vulnerable. Vulnerable people, in Navin’s definition,
are those who lack reasonable means to avoid becoming infected. This includes infants
who are not old enough to be vaccinated for infectious diseases, as well as those with
weakened immune systems who cannot handle receiving a vaccine. Navin concludes
that refusing to have oneself or one’s child vaccinated constitutes negligence or
insufficient effort to prevent oneself from harming others.568
A similar argument is made by Angus Dawson,569 who looks to solve what he
calls the “Prevention Problem.” The Prevention Problem, as presented by Dawson, is
the tension that arises because the risks of mandatory vaccination are carried by the
individual, but the benefits of mandatory vaccination come at the level of populations.
Thus, the argument goes, given the unequal distribution of the risks and benefits,
mandatory vaccination is unethical because it unfairly coerces individuals to put
themselves at risk of harm for no individual benefit.570 Dawson argues that the
“Prevention Problem” can be solved because herd immunity benefits each person
individually. This is because no vaccine is 100% effective, so that people who are
vaccinated can still be infected with the disease. However, the establishment of herd
immunity means that the spread of the disease is contained. The relief from worrying
about being infected by a serious contagious disease because of herd immunity is a
567
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significant benefit to each individual. Thus, Dawson argues, there is no conflict between
the risk of harm being undertaken by the individual and the benefits reaped at the level
of populations.571
Robert Field and Arthur Caplan572 offer an ethical framework for balancing
competing values and determining when vaccine mandates are acceptable. Those who
oppose mandates, they say, appeal primarily to the value of individual autonomy.
Proponents of mandates rely on the values of beneficence, utilitarianism, justice, and
non-maleficence.573 Field and Caplan offer a framework for balancing these values,
which is the interest of public policy. The interest in autonomy, they argue, is most
compelling when the objector would pose no harm to others. But the respect for
autonomy declines as the risk of potential harm grows. This means that when the
disease becomes more dangerous and deadly, utilitarian concerns begin to hold more
weight than autonomy. Thus, if the disease is mild, autonomy should reign supreme, but
the more dangerous the disease, the more utilitarian concerns should take precedence.
Field and Caplan specifically address the HPV vaccine under this framework. They
argue that because the harm HPV poses can be prevented through means other than
vaccination (safe sex or abstaining from sex), and because the disease is not spread
casually, HPV does not meet a high enough threshold of harm to override respect for
autonomy.574
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Heidi Malm575 discusses mandatory HPV vaccination specifically within the
context of immigration justice. Recently the HPV vaccination was added to a required
list of vaccines that immigrants must receive before they are allowed to enter the United
States on certain VISAs. Malm accepts Navin’s justifications for supporting vaccine
mandates, which were the principle of fairness and concern for the vulnerable. Malm
argues that because HPV is not spread casually, neither of these two principles justify
mandatory HPV vaccination. First, she argues that there are other ways for people to pay
their “fair share” in order to benefit from the public good. For example, abstinence and
safe-sex practices would be equal ways of paying one’s fair share for preventing the
spread of HPV. Malm argues that the same goes for concern for the vulnerable: someone
who is concerned about vulnerable people who cannot be vaccinated for HPV can use
behavioral control in order to prevent oneself from spreading the virus to vulnerable
people.576 Thus, while she accepts Navin’s basic principles for justifying mandatory
vaccination, Malm argues that the fact that HPV is not spread through casual contact
means that it does not meet the thresholds introduced by Navin.
The discussion in the philosophical literature provides an important conversation
about the balance of claims to liberty and autonomy weighed against public health and
overall social welfare. Because the right to liberty plays a key role in political life in the
United States, an ethical analysis of mandatory vaccination must include discussion of
the nature and scope of the right to liberty and when it can be overridden in the interest
of public health. The Foucauldian analysis I present below is not meant to serve as a
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replacement for this philosophical discussion, but as a supplement to it. What becomes
clear in the following discussion is that vaccination and disease control in general are
subject-forming experiences. As the HPV vaccine is linked to sexuality, administered in
adolescence rather than infancy, and for a disease that is not easily contagious or
casually transmitted, it has subject-forming implications that go beyond normal
childhood vaccinations. Because HPV does not meet a high enough threshold of
possible harm for traditional justifications for vaccine mandates, providers and public
health officials must include new strategies for implementation and new lines of
argumentation in order to reach consensus.
The analysis that I develop below will be different from the traditional discussion
in several ways: First, approaches discussed above rely on the viewpoint of protecting
the moral rights of the liberal subject, without recognizing that subjectivity is being
formed through the practice of vaccination. I demonstrate how we can take a new
starting point of analysis when we do an evaluation through Foucault’s vision of
subjectivity, especially as it relates to bipower and mechanisms of security. Second, I
make a case for an approach to HPV vaccination that is not based on straightforward
deontological or utilitarian reasoning, but emphasizes the importance of ethical,
inventive subjectivity. Third, I introduce recommendations for how providers and
public health officials should approach the administration of the HPV vaccine that
acknowledges how medical practices are formative of subjectivity. Fourth, I make
recommendations for public policy based on commitments to care of self and the
philosophical way of life, but situate them in the specific context of liberal society in
which this problem occurs. I emphasize that conversations about HPV vaccination and
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strategies for its implementation do not have to result in antagonistic competing rights
claims.
3

Vaccination and Subjectivity: The Case of Smallpox

As I have previously shown, Foucault argues that the possibilities for becoming
subjects are shaped by discursive practices, strategies of power, and practices of the self.
One of the most important strategies of power that characterizes our contemporary
epoch is biopower. Recall that biopower is a specific strategy that solidified its
foundation when Western societies discovered the fundamental biological fact that
human beings are a species. Biopower can be viewed as a tool to explore the
mechanisms through which some basic biological features of humans as a species were
discovered as susceptible to mastery and manipulation. Foucault describes biopower as
the “numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the
control of populations”577 and “the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological
features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general
strategy of power.”578 Mechanisms of security, which are disciplinary mechanisms
aimed at the level of populations, included vaccine mandates and enforced quarantine,
among others.579
Another Foucauldian concept at play in mandatory vaccination initiatives is
“normalization.” Recall that normalization is the positing of an optimal model to which
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people in their movements and actions are required to conform. Normalization is
present in disciplinary, medical, and other social practices that intend to alter subjects in
order to bring them in line with a specific standard. It is a prescriptive norm that
determines that which is normal and consequently also that which is abnormal.580
Normalization acts through imposing homogeneity on subjects, while at the same time
individualizing them. This takes place through measuring differences between subjects
and then determining levels of normality.581 Because mandatory vaccinations are
intended to create a norm of immune bodies that stop the spread of disease, they involve
the establishment of a norm and a subsequent attempt to bring the population in line
with this norm.
Many of the new mechanisms of security introduced alongside biopower relied
on the new idea of preventative medicine, including herd immunity. Herd immunity, the
crux of mandatory vaccine arguments, is a clear example of a mechanism of biopower.
Individual human subjects are vaccinated in order to prevent the spread of disease to the
overall human population. Herd immunity then allows a proliferation of life through
protection of individual subjects by prescribing a norm for these same individuals in
order to benefit the species. In his lecture series Security, Territory, and Population
(STP), Foucault specifically discusses the smallpox vaccine in 18th and 19th century
Europe and how this vaccine introduced a new framework for thinking and speaking
about disease and disease control. This included new categories of normality, new ways
that subjects thought about themselves and others, and new ways that behavior was
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controlled. Thus, the introduction of the smallpox vaccine created a new framework for
thinking, speaking, and doing.
In Foucault’s interpretation, smallpox vaccination is particularly interesting
because, for the first time, statistical instruments made it possible to think of the
phenomena of smallpox purely in terms of calculated probabilities. These calculations
led to vaccination being integrated into mechanisms of security. In addition to
Foucault’s analysis, I will appeal to a comprehensive study on smallpox eradication in
18th and 19th century London by Anne Hardy, whose findings support and supplement
Foucault’s analysis.582 Foucault argues that when it became possible to think about
smallpox through calculable probabilities, smallpox was no longer apprehended as a
“prevailing disease” in the sense of a disease that is associated with a particular place
and a particular group of people.583 Previously, smallpox was identified with the poor,
the unclean, or those inhabiting a certain area. Quantitative analysis enabled the
possibility to predict rates of smallpox. It became possible to calculate the likelihood of
smallpox cases arising. Smallpox was then considered a “distribution of cases in a
population circumscribed in time or space.”584 Foucault argues that four new concepts
came into play with methods of smallpox vaccination: case, risk, danger, and crisis.
Cases of smallpox did not refer to a specific individual case, but rather to the
result of an ability to measure when smallpox may breakout within a short time period
or in a specific portion of the population. As studies of smallpox showed, the disease
was likely to arise among specific individuals at a specific time.585 Data revealed that
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areas where many people lived in small houses were ripe for smallpox outbreaks.586
Contemporary scientific knowledge about smallpox suggests that cases of smallpox
were easily detected because the presence of the disease was obvious. Symptoms for
smallpox began approximately 12 to14 days after exposure to the virus. The symptoms
began with fever or vomiting, followed by a development of a rash two to three days
later.587 It would then be apparent that a certain group of individuals who had occupied
the same space were likely infected with smallpox. A case of smallpox was clearly
visible and identified through the lesions which were publicly understood to be a symbol
of disease and death.588
The second concept that arose from the mathematization and study of smallpox,
according to Foucault, is risk. Through the analysis of the distribution of cases of
smallpox came the possibility of identifying the extent to which specific groups or
individuals were at risk of dying from smallpox or susceptible to being cured. For the
first time, it was possible to calculate the risk of death specific to an age group, a
profession, or a particular milieu. For example, it was shown that individuals who lived
in towns rather than in the country were more at risk for contracting smallpox.
Additionally, infants, the weak, and the elderly were more likely to die from the
disease.589 The poor shared a disproportionate risk as they often lacked the same hygiene
standards as the wealthy, were more likely to live in close quarters, and were generally
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less educated about proper practices for prevention, such as vaccination, hygiene, and
handling of the disease.590
Third, Foucault argues that the new methods of calculation allowed the
determination that risk is not the same for all individual ages, conditions, or places, so
that zones of higher or lower risk could be established. This led to an ability to identify
what can be considered dangerous. For example, an analysis of risk showed that it was
dangerous to be less than three years old, more dangerous to live in a town than the
country, and dangerous to live in close quarters where there was sharing of clothing,
space, and living items.591
Fourth, Foucault shows that the ability to calculate cases, risks, and dangers
involved with smallpox gave rise to the notion of crisis. The term refers to the sudden
worsening, acceleration or spread of the disease that could be associated with a specific
time and place. A crisis would not fall within the category of epidemic, but would refer
to increasing disease rates that were considered unstoppable unless “effectively checked
by either an artificial or an enigmatic natural mechanism.”592 A crisis was a case of
smallpox that worsened or began to spread.
These four new notions of case, risk, danger, and crisis gave rise to a new field
of application and techniques of power, including a series of interventions from the state
which differed significantly from previous methods of dealing with a disease. Previous
interventions sought only to nullify the disease in every subject and then to prevent
contact between those infected and those who were not. In contrast, interventions
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utilizing vaccination considered the sick and healthy as a whole, and then identified a
probable morbidity given the demographic to which they belonged. These mechanisms
established a normal expectation of the population being affected and how many could
die from the disease. Thus, there arose in the 18th century, as a result from gathering
statistics, the idea of a “normal” morbidity from smallpox.593 The technique then applied
was an attempt to reduce excessive rates, such as in those regions or groups that fell
above the normal rate of smallpox for that demographic, and bring these regions or
groups in line with the normal rate.594 The intention of establishing a norm led to the
passage of laws which mandated vaccination, and, in England, to the establishment of
medical stations where appointed medical officers enforced vaccination laws.595
Along with a new mechanism of normalization, the introduction of case, risk,
danger, and crisis led to the development of a new discursive framework that affected
human subjects. Because of the new methods used to deal with the disease, for the first
time, subjects understood themselves as being vulnerable to a “case” of smallpox, as
being at a higher “risk” in terms of the demographic or categories to which they
belonged, as being in “danger” of dying from the disease, and as susceptible to being
swept away by a “crisis” of the disease. It created a framework for understanding
whether one fell in line with a normal rate of smallpox. These changes were part of a
broader power strategy that eliminated the disease, but also had effects on the way
subjects understood the disease and their relation to it.
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Foucault’s detailed discussion of smallpox vaccination provides a convincing
example to support his views about the relation between medical practices,
normalization, and the possibilities for subjectivity. New concepts emerged for
understanding disease control. Consequently, there was a rearrangement of different
variables in the environment and in the human body. Human subjects’ bodies and
behavior as well as the physical environment were regulated and controlled based on
this new knowledge and these new concepts. New categories for normality and
abnormality were introduced. A new conceptual framework for understanding one’s
health and the health of others emerged. Public health officials were able to think about
smallpox and disease control in terms of the wellbeing of an overall population.
This discussion of how smallpox created a new framework for thinking,
speaking, and acting with respect to smallpox can now shed light on how the HPV
vaccine may be affecting possibilities for thinking, speaking, and acting in the present.
To do so we must first identify several key differences between HPV and smallpox.
First, HPV is hidden. While smallpox vesicles were visible, immediately identifying a
subject infected with the disease, HPV may go unnoticed or undetected even by the
subject who is infected. Second, HPV is spread through sexual intercourse, while
smallpox was spread through casual contact in shared space. Third, HPV is more
harmful and deadly to one gender, while smallpox was equally deadly to both. Females
are at more risk for complications resulting from HPV. Consequently, the vaccine offers
more protection to females. The reason why males are vaccinated is to contain the
spread of the disease to females. With these differences in mind, let us now use the
model of Foucauldian ethical subjectivity to analyze HPV vaccination.
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4

Ethical Subjectivity and HPV Vaccination

4.1 Ethical Orientation: Refusal, Curiosity, Innovation

In Chapter Three, I argued that a Foucauldian ethical orientation is characterized
by refusal, curiosity, and innovation. I argued that refusal refers to an attitude of
rejection of inevitabilities, both in our social landscape and our own possibilities. I
argued that curiosity refers to framing ethical deliberation in terms of certain
background questions, primarily asking how we are constituted as subjects of power,
knowledge, and our own actions. I argued that innovation refers to a disposition of
ongoing willingness to change and transformation. Now that we have discussed how the
control of disease through vaccination can affect possibilities for subjectivity, let us use
this ethical orientation to discuss the HPV vaccine.
With regard to refusal, I argued that the ethical orientation mandates that we not
accept our social and political landscape as innate, and acknowledge the contingency
and lack of necessity in our practices. Refusal requires a willingness to challenge our
assumptions, while simultaneously realizing that we cannot instantly reverse them.
Refusal with respect to HPV vaccination requires that we acknowledge that there is
more at stake in the debate than an abstract conversation about individual liberty and
social utility. We should accept the possibility that there are other ways of approaching
vaccination that go beyond traditional mandates for school, employment, or
immigration. At the same time, we must acknowledge that the debate between
competing values of parental autonomy and public health cannot be easily dismissed,
because these competing values are part of the framework for our moral and political
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discourse. Thus, we must accept that our current way of thinking about vaccination is
only one of several possibilities, while simultaneously acknowledging that we cannot
simply transcend or think outside of the current framework.
Curiosity, as we recall, refers to framing ethical deliberation in terms of certain
background questions, primarily asking how we are constituted as subjects of power,
knowledge, and our own actions. In “What is Enlightenment?” Foucault suggests that
we make critical inquiries into the following questions: “How are we constituted as
subjects of our own knowledge? How are we constituted as subjects who exercise or
submit to power relations? How are we constituted as moral subjects of our own
actions?”596 Foucault shows that, by posing these questions for different historical
epochs, we can reveal the contingency of how we currently think, speak, and act. To
elucidate how we can do this with respect to HPV, let us recall the concepts of case,
risk, danger, and crisis in Foucault’s discussion of the smallpox vaccine. For each
concept, we will ask the question of whether we can speak of case, risk, danger and
crisis in terms of HPV. Showing how these categories may or may not apply in the case
of HPV will help illuminate what is uniquely at stake with HPV in contrast to other
diseases which have been controlled through vaccination.
First, can we speak of “cases” HPV? It is debatable whether or not HPV can be
considered a case analogous to that which Foucault identifies as a case of smallpox.
Cases of smallpox were easily detected because the presence of the disease was starkly
visible. Many people who have or are exposed to HPV never know it, because
symptoms are not always present. They may be infected with the virus while never
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manifesting the traditional symptoms. An HPV infection may take years to form genital
warts or decades to develop into cancer. It is not always possible to isolate a case and
thus accurately predict those who will manifest symptoms. Another reason why cases of
HPV are more difficult to identify than cases of smallpox is that HPV is more prevalent
among persons who engage in unprotected sexual activity or sex with multiple partners.
It is thus not limited to people who occupy a certain environment, as smallpox was often
transmitted to those who occupied the same space. Since sexual contact is a condition
for the virus to spread, it is not clear when cases will arise, who has HPV and, due to the
intimate nature of its transmission, who is transmitting it to others.
Second, can we speak of HPV “risks”? Research about HPV has led to the ability
to calculate who is at higher risk of contracting HPV and at a greater risk of dying from
diseases caused by HPV. Government agencies are able to conduct studies that examine
the prevalence of HPV and its likelihood to lead to cancer. These calculation processes
allow us to predict how drastically cases of cervical cancer will decrease if the vaccine is
made mandatory. For example, it has been shown that women with lower education and
higher poverty experience a higher rate of HPV-associated cancer, most likely due to
lack of proper sexual education and accessibility to regular pap smears and screening. 597
Identification of at-risk populations lead public health providers to associate certain
subjects with the disease. In turn, adolescent subjects may also conceive of themselves
as being “at risk” or associate risk with sexual behavior. It also leads adolescent subjects
to perceive the risks to their well-being associated with behavior.
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Third, can we speak of “danger” of HPV? The ability to identify the risk of
contracting HPV allows us to calculate the danger of the disease. In many states that do
not require the vaccine, there are educational materials in both schools and healthcare
centers that discuss the risk of HPV, which can lead subjects to understand that it can be
dangerous to have unprotected sex. While for the smallpox vaccine danger was
associated with a specific location or age demographic (being under three years old or
living in a town), in the case of HPV the danger is linked to gender, as the virus is more
deadly to females. In addition, females may also perceive HPV as a potential danger
associated with sexual assault. However, the hiddenness of HPV and the perception that
it is possible to avoid the disease through practicing safe sex or abstinence makes the
sense of danger less immediate than the sense of danger that accompanied smallpox.
There is also no exposed graphic sign analogous to smallpox vesicles to accompany
HPV which would cause individual subjects to feel the same public sense of danger or
fear.
Last, can we speak of a “crisis” of HPV? The notion of crisis that accompanied
the mathematical calculation of smallpox is harder to detect with HPV. The sense of
crisis could possibly refer to an increase of cases of HPV in a shared social setting, such
as college campuses or in low-income communities where women do not have access to
regular cervical screening. However, much like cases of HPV, crises are much harder or
even impossible to identify. Due to its hidden nature and the process by which it is
transmitted, identifying a crisis requires an intrusive investigation of very private and
personal behavior. Additionally, because HPV is not a disease that is spread by people
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simply occupying the same space, it is more difficult to establish if a rate of HPV is
accelerating or spreading at an unusual pace.
Identifying how we might speak of case, risk, danger, and crisis in relation to
HPV is a way of using concepts related to disease control that emerged in the past and
understanding how the concepts operating today are similar or different. This is an
important part of framing our ethical reflection in the orientation of curiosity. Another
way of analyzing how we are constituted as subjects of power relations is to identify
forms of normalization and their potential effects. There are at least three different forms
of normalization present in the push for mandating the HPV vaccine. First, the support
for mandatory vaccination seeks to establish as a norm both elimination of individual
cases and prevention for the sake of the population at large through herd immunity. The
practice of herd immunity reaffirms the medical norm of individuals being vaccinated
for a disease that might represent a greater risk or harm to other members of the
population than to those receiving the vaccine. This is the case when males are
vaccinated, even though the disease is more deadly and harmful to females. There is
resistance from some people who argue against the principle of herd immunity, asserting
that they or their children should not be required to receive medical procedures for the
sake of others. This resistance is even stronger if they feel that their children are being
required to get the vaccine in order to prevent the spread of the disease among those who
engage in promiscuous or unsafe sex.
The second form of normalization concerns the individual. Regular childhood
vaccines have become a standard for children’s health. They are viewed and understood
as a requirement for health. It is part of a normalization process that attending school
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where a large number of children easily spread illnesses to one another is a place where
mandatory vaccines are required. A mandate for HPV vaccination, however, establishes
the principle that one should be vaccinated for a disease that is not spread casually.
Normalization then distinguishes individuals by the extent to which they follow the
overall rule of being vaccinated for a non-casually transmitted disease. A boundary is
established between normal or abnormal bodies: normal bodies conform to vaccination
against non-casually spread diseases, abnormal bodies are not vaccinated and must rely
on behavioral strategies alone (such as abstinence or safe sex practices) to protect
themselves from the disease or to avoid communicating it.
A third form of normalization consists in the fact that mandating the HPV
vaccine can also potentially affect behavioral norms. A worry or concern from those
who oppose mandatory or routine vaccination is that it establishes adolescent sexual
activity as a norm to the extent that individual behavior is evaluated by a whole group,
and such an evaluation tends to rely on an implicit rule to be followed. Thus, the worry
of some who oppose the vaccine is that by establishing an assumption of sexual activity
and thus setting a norm, mandatory or routine vaccination transforms the “normal” body
that could instead be protected through other traditional strategies of STI prevention.
The last component of Foucauldian ethical orientation is the attitude of
innovation, that is to say, an ongoing willingness to change and self-transformation. In
Chapter Three I argued that the attitude of innovation should look to recover the
sentiment of philosophy as a practice and work on ourselves. This includes being willing
to challenge one’s assumptions and experiment by looking beyond them. In his analysis
of Foucauldian ethical subjectivity, Koopman argued that there are two different forms

286

of transformation in Foucault’s portrayal of historical parrhesia: a social transformation
and an individual transformation. On the social level, parrhesia is portrayed as
transforming our societal conceptions of justice so that we may come to recognize
certain practices as unjust.598 On the level of individual transformation, Koopman
argues that parrhesia functions to effect transformations in ourselves and our own
conception of truth.599 Through critical examination of our assumptions about what is
true, we exhibit a willingness to become different if this is where our investigation leads
us.
This general attitude of innovation and disposition toward transformation can
aid in our approach to HPV vaccination. The attitude of innovation is relevant in terms
of HPV vaccination because, as I have shown, HPV does not meet the threshold for
traditional justification of compulsory vaccination. Additionally, the age at which the
vaccine is administered and its link to sexual behavior means that it brings with it a
different set of concerns. This means that providers and public health officials must be
aware of the new potential concerns and must be willing to meet people on their own
terms in order to avoid those concerns. For example, initial studies show that the
concern that the HPV vaccine leads to an increase in sexual behavior in adolescents is
unfounded. But this does not mean that parents’ concerns regarding teenage sexuality in
relation to the vaccine should be dismissed or criticized. Rather, these concerns must be
responded to in a way that meets parents on their own terms in relation to their own
beliefs. Innovation also requires bringing new ways of talking about vaccination and
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strategies for bringing adolescents and their parents to the table. Innovation requires
recognizing that some of the traditional moral justifications for mandatory vaccination
will not hold the same weight in the discussion of HPV. I will provide an example of
these strategies throughout my discussion of the ethical commitments to care of self and
the philosophical way of life below.
The ethical orientation of refusal, curiosity, and orientation, then, enables a more
holistic approach to looking at the issue of HPV vaccination. It acknowledges the
current frameworks we use for thinking about vaccination and also shows the
shortcomings of relying only on such analyses. It appeals to a critical historical ontology
of our vaccination practices in order to understand how vaccination shapes our field of
possibilities in the present. Last, it is open to the possibility of creating new strategies
for targeting recipients of the vaccine and for talking about the vaccine to adolescents
and their parents.

4.2: Ethical Commitments: Care of Self and Philosophical Way of Life

In Chapter Three, I argued for a commitment to care of self in our epoch which
focuses on how practices of biopower and mechanisms of security affect our
possibilities. I argued that we should strive to understand the categories of normality and
abnormality through which we form beliefs about ourselves and others. We should
acknowledge how new practices of biopower or discipline create categories for
understanding ourselves, and how this will affect others. This does not mean telling
others what they should do, but helping people reach the relevant knowledge to decide
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for themselves. Care of self also involves establishing appropriate relationships with
others and considering caring for others as a component of caring for oneself.
First, care of self with regard to vaccination requires taking seriously the ways
that disease control takes place within a web of human relationships. In the case of
smallpox, mass vaccination and elimination of disease could not be achieved without the
cooperation of families to vaccinate their children. In 19th century London vaccination
programs, parents had to be educated and convinced to make the journey to the
vaccination stations to get their infants vaccinated and had to be informed of the
importance of revaccinating in three years.600 Without the vital communication to
parents and family members about the benefits and necessity of the smallpox vaccine,
herd immunity could not be established and the vaccine could not be successful in
containing the disease.601
Controlling the spread of HPV also necessitates cooperation between family
members. This means that parents must be properly educated about the vaccine and the
proper method for receiving it if they so choose. It has been shown that physician
recommendation is vital to parents choosing to vaccinate.602 Familial relationships
between parents and children as well as relationships between parents and medical
providers are an integral part of the administration of the vaccine. However, the process
can also bring about changes in those relationships. Adolescents may view themselves
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and understand themselves differently as subjects and as sexual beings. This can lead to
changes in family relationships, relationships with peers, and romantic or sexual
relationships. As Foucault argues, relationships exist only through various power
mechanisms and strategies of biopower are necessarily intertwined within familial
relationships. He writes:
There are not family type relationships, and then over and above them,
mechanisms of power; there are not sexual relationships with, in addition,
mechanisms of power alongside or above them. Mechanisms of power are an
intrinsic part of all these relations, and in a circular way, both their effect and
cause.603
In this passage we see that exploring how new power strategies affect our possibilities
means exploring how they will affect our possibilities in our relationships with others.
A key relationship that is affected is between parent and child. The importance of
parental approval and recommendation for the vaccine has been proven by several
studies, especially recommendations and approvals from mothers, even when women
were old enough to choose to be vaccinated without their mother’s consent.604 This
shows the extent to which adolescents associate the control or alteration of their body
with familial approval and relationships. Because of laws mandating the vaccine or
requiring discussion of the vaccine with parents, parents of adolescents may consider
risks to their child’s health that they did not previously anticipate or even consider.
They may also consider their children as potentially sexually active for the first time.
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Studies in general have shown that in 50% of cases, mothers who reported that they do
not believe their teenage daughters have had sex were incorrect, as their daughters
privately admitted to having sex.605 This gap may be linked to the 45% of mothers who
do not think their daughters are at risk for HPV.606 This statistic suggests that many
parents do not fully understand how common HPV is in the overall population. It also
suggests that many parents fail to see the “big picture,” to the extent that even if their
teenage daughters are not currently sexually active, the vaccine will protect their
children later in life. Current studies show that there is no evidence that the vaccine
leads to an increase in sexual behavior.607 However it is important that the results of
these studies are properly communicated to parents by their medical providers. Roughly
half of mothers reported that they were likely to use the topic of HPV vaccination as a
potential opportunity to talk with their daughters about sex. This indicates there is a need
for more communication.608
Familial relationships are not the only relationships that are shaped and formed
by mechanisms of biopower or normalization. Surveys of both male and female
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adolescents show that there is a link between vaccine uptake and peer acceptance.609
Knowing that many of their peers have received the shot shapes their perspective of how
normative the vaccine is. In other words, if a teenager recognizes that many of his or her
peers have received the shot, he or she will perceive it as an implicit rule to be followed.
This could potentially lead to categorizing oneself or one’s peers as normal or abnormal.
This is not bad in and of itself, but must be recognized in the conversation.
Second, care of self as an ethical commitment also means emphasizing the
importance of caring for others alongside caring for oneself. Currently, vaccine
outreach strategies emphasize to parents the importance of vaccines for prevention of
disease to their own child. The effects that vaccinating have on others should also be an
important part of the conversation. Vaccine outreach approaches in general should
emphasize to parents the importance of establishing herd immunity for vulnerable
members of the population. Parents, understandably, think primarily about the health
and well-being of their own children before others. Providers and vaccine advocates
should help parents understand the broader social implications of not vaccinating and
understand the importance of assuming a small risk in order to protect others. If parents
or adolescents perceive themselves as taking steps to care for others through
vaccination, this can add an important dimension to their choice. Public health and
outreach initiatives could focus on the important social function of herd immunity and
how our possibilities for our own health are intertwined with the health of others.
These outreach measures are important for the HPV vaccine in particular, because the
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most dangerous health threat is to only one half of the population—women—and the
other half may not see a need for it.
Outreach methods could emphasize that even though boys are at a lower risk of
developing severe complications from HPV, they can choose to receive the vaccine as a
way of caring for others alongside oneself. Male uptake for the vaccine is still very low,
as studies indicate that only approximately 2% of males eligible are vaccinated. This is
due primarily to lack of education about the vaccine or because parents fail to realize
that their sons are now eligible for it.610 Given the hidden nature of HPV, many
adolescent males are not even aware that they could contract the virus. Similarly to
female adolescents, adolescent male willingness to get the vaccine was often closely
linked to parental approval. In addition to emphasizing the important benefits it can have
to their own health, outreach methods directed at male adolescents can emphasize the
importance of establishing herd immunity to protect both themselves and females who
are at higher risk of serious complications.
Framing the conversation about HPV vaccination this way could help parents
and adolescents come to a decision on their own rather than the conversation being
presented as an antagonistic conflict between parental/individual autonomy and
government coercion. Presenting vaccination as a tool for caring for others could affect
attitudes and encourage parents and adolescents to look at the way their possibilities are
intertwined with others without being perceived as an intrusion. The commitment to
care of self, then, requires helping others have the relevant knowledge to decide for
themselves. This means respecting that the introduction of a new norm will lead to new
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categories of normality and abnormality. It also requires properly acknowledging the
web of relationships that are affected by HPV vaccination, and emphasizing how
vaccination can be a form of caring for others alongside oneself.
As we recall, philosophical parrhesia does not consist in demonstrating that
something is morally right or wrong or true or false, but instead in influencing social and
cultural attitudes and behaviors through the practice of truth-telling. The philosophical
way of life includes recovering philosophy as a process of work performed on the self.
In our epoch of biopower and mechanisms of security, this would mean bearing the truth
of our possibilities, maintaining a reflective awareness of how we become subjects
through these practices, and a willing acceptance that we may become different through
changing these practices. Additionally, the courage to tell the truth requires the courage
to speak up and speak out appropriately when a practice is changing categories for
normality. For us, this means bearing witness to the truth of how medical and
disciplinary practices are operating in our epoch and being willing to illuminate new
models of thinking, speaking, and acting.
The philosophical way of life in relation to the potential mandate of the HPV
vaccine requires recognition that a medical norm introduces new categories of normality
and abnormality, and that these new categories inevitably affect subjects’ perception of
self and relationships with others. It also requires helping reveal how and why this
vaccine introduces a new strategy of power and, more than other vaccines, has a
possibility to affect our perception of the truth about ourselves and others. For
example, while smallpox vaccination necessitated control over bodies, the vaccine had
no intimate link to sexuality like the HPV vaccine. The very fact that there is a
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disagreement on whether adolescents should rely on safe sex methods rather than a
vaccine in order to control the disease indicates that the conflict is about the behavior
and alteration of the body. This is not only true from the perspective of parents, but also
from the perspective of children, as they may see parental insistence that they must get
the vaccine as an attempt to control their own body and their behavior. Additionally they
may feel that their parents assume or expect them to have sex even if they do not
encourage it. The situation is different from vaccines that are targeted towards easily
communicable diseases, which are viewed by many parents and health providers as a
requirement or normal standard for health. By contrast, the HPV vaccine is viewed in
connection with intimate behavior—engaging in sexual activity or abstinence—that
adolescents do not see in a uniform way.
Because the vaccine is not spread casually and because the disease it prevents is
not always harmful and does not always lead to cancer, the outreach methods used for
traditional vaccines such as MMR (measles, mumps, rubella) and TDAP (tetanus,
diphtheria, and pertussis) may not work for HPV. In the discussion of HPV in the
philosophical literature, we saw that the traditional model for justifying mandatory
vaccination weighs the parental right to liberty against utilitarian concerns. Both Field
and Caplan and Malm argued that HPV is not harmful enough to warrant overriding
patient or parent autonomy. This means that the approach taken by policy makers and
public health workers when talking about HPV vaccination must be different, and this is
where Foucauldian philosophical way of life can play a role.
For example, the Maine Public Health Department recently developed an
immunization outreach toolkit for normal childhood vaccines, as a response to an overall
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decline in vaccination rates. The health department study found that messages intended
to be scary or pushy were not effective at motivating parents to have their children
receive routine childhood vaccinations, nor were messages that framed parental
decisions as either “good” or “bad.” Instead, the messages that were most effective were
those which emphasized the importance of vaccination for overall health and wellbeing.
They also found that parents from different locations, communities, and education levels
made decisions about their children using different methods and put different levels of
trust in certain types of sources. In a multicultural democracy like the United States,
individuals from different backgrounds put trust in different sources that they believe are
reliable conveyors of truth. If ethics functions in relation to an operative framework of
truth, there are different sources and authorities that different groups rely on.
For example, the Maine initiative found that middle-age, college-educated, upper
middle-income parents with small families tended to make their decisions based on their
own analysis and interpretation of existing evidence. Young, high-school educated, lowincome parents with large families tended to trust advice of leaders in their family or
community with similar life experiences to their own.611 This meant that different
strategies could be used to target families depending on how they tended to make
decisions. For example, when targeting the first group, Maine public health officials
recommend an email series from an expert source with the opportunity for parents to
give their own feedback and ask their own questions. Additionally they found that
newspaper Op-Eds by healthcare experts had a positive effect. For the second group,
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they found “Good Neighbor” peer to peer campaigns sharing information to be helpful.
With this strategy, they enlisted the help of parents who supported vaccination to talk to
their neighbors about the benefits of immunization. As this group of parents were more
likely to trust the advice of people from their own communities who they perceived as
having similar experiences, they were more receptive to hearing information about
vaccination from their trusted neighbors.612 These creative outreach strategies helped
frame the benefits of vaccination in terms that parents would understand and from
sources that they trusted.
Outreach efforts in the spirit of the philosophical way of life should strive to
work within the sources that each group considers trustworthy. The Maine immunization
outreach initiative was for standard childhood vaccines such as TDAP and MMR that
are spread casually and not linked to sexuality. Thus, a similar targeted outreach
campaign for HPV must integrate the identified concerns when presenting the
information to parents and adolescents. A similar “Good Neighbor” campaign might not
work due to the link between HPV and sexuality. An alternative would be for public
health initiatives to recruit individuals who have had their children vaccinated to invite
their neighbors or community members to a group discussion about the vaccine where a
trained professional would lead the meeting but would have the “endorsement” of
trusted community members. This could include testament from neighbors or
community members as part of the discussion. A 2012 study showed that a determining
factor in mothers’ attitudes toward the HPV vaccine were the mothers’ own experiences.
If mothers had personal experience with HPV or other STIs or had a friend or family
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member who had HPV or cervical cancer, this influenced the favorable perception of the
vaccine.613 Thus, stories from neighbors that help mothers and adolescents realize that
HPV infection could affect them or someone they care about will likely correlate with a
willingness to have their children vaccinated.
In another example, Focus on the Family is a conservative Christian organization
that emphasizes family values rooted in abstinence until marriage and faithfulness after
marriage as the primary mechanism of HPV and general STI prevention. However,
Focus on the Family issued a statement publicly supporting universal access to the HPV
vaccine, but opposing a vaccine mandate. In their public statement, they suggest parents
and adolescents take into consideration the fact that one can become infected with HPV
through sexual assault and that even if their children remain abstinent until marriage,
they may marry someone who is already infected.614 Thus, while not wavering from
their message of promoting abstinence until marriage, Focus on the Family still
encourages parents and adolescents to be realistic in their decision and take all possible
variables into consideration. The organization recognizes the very real benefits that HPV
vaccination can have. This shows that the vaccine can be accepted even by parents with
strong feelings about teenage sexuality if presented in a way that acknowledges their
concerns but emphasizes real benefits for even those who do choose to abstain from
sexual activity. Commitment to the philosophical way of life means meeting people on
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their own terms in order to enable them to decide for themselves. It involves helping
people see what is at stake through their own lens before making a decision.
When parents and adolescents freely choose to participate in HPV vaccination
based on their own interpretation of the risks and benefits, the issue will no longer be
perceived as a conflict between public health and a right to individual liberty. All
vaccine programs work better when there is cooperation from parents and children, as
evidenced in the history of smallpox vaccination and in modern disease control. When
parents and children discuss the issue and come to a decision together on their own
terms, there is room for freedom which may have otherwise been stifled or denied.
Foucauldian freedom is an empirical practice. Medical practices, such as vaccination,
can be freedom enabling when approached in the spirit of the philosophical way of life.

5

Implications for Public Policy

As has been emphasized, a Foucauldian analysis is more about uncovering than
legislating. I will identify policy recommendations that I believe are in the spirit of a
Foucauldian critique. What is distinctly Foucauldian about the recommendations is that
policies reflect vaccination as a subject-forming issue that is shaping the field of
possibilities for thinking, speaking, and doing.
As a first recommendation, a Foucauldian analysis can help us refocus the
debate, which is not just a matter of whether to place greater weight on individual liberty
or societal welfare. First, discussion should recognize that the HPV vaccine is a form of
biopower and entails a form of normalization—establishing what is normal and
abnormal. It is not a neutral medical procedure. Second, while biopower introduces
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power over bodies, not all forms of biopower are detrimental, and some of them can lead
to the eradication of deadly diseases, such as smallpox, or the containment of diseases
like measles, mumps, rubella, tuberculosis, and diphtheria, which are all prevented
through usual child vaccines. In these cases, an alteration of bodies cannot to be equated
with harm. Third, when new forms of biopower and normalization occur, adolescents
should be part of the conversation so that they are included in the decision-making
process, instead of being subjected to it. Fourth, parents, who are legally and morally
responsible for adolescents have to be part of the conversation and the decision-making
process so that the biopower and the normalizing process are not external anonymous
forces, but are recognized and discussed.
As HPV is potentially added to regular vaccine schedules, a second
recommendation is that it is important to include options. In the 10 years that the HPV
vaccine has been available, rates of HPV in sexually active females age 14-24 decreased
from 11% to 4%.615 This rate could be brought down even lower if uptake for the
vaccine increases. Research of disease spread and control consistently shows that a 90%
vaccination rate is needed to achieve herd immunity. The only way to achieve a 90%
vaccination rate is to make a vaccine mandatory. If HPV is added to a regular vaccine
schedule, it is important that it include an option to opt-out, as the disease is controllable
through behavior. The vaccine must also be implemented only alongside other
mechanisms of prevention and control, and with a reflective awareness of how vaccines
can affect subjects.
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A third recommendation is to have a rigorous campaign to address parental
concerns in terms parents and adolescents are receptive to. I mentioned four main
concerns from those who oppose a mandate for the vaccine, and these concerns should
influence our discussion of public policy. The first one is that the overall benefit to the
public is not sufficient to intrude on parental autonomy in the decision making process.
This concern could potentially be countered if parents better understood the high risk of
HPV and that HPV can lead to cancer. There are still a large number of parents who do
not completely realize how common HPV is and how harmful it can potentially be, or
how costly it is. In terms of the public health benefit, there is an enormous benefit that
comes from establishing herd immunity against a disease which could eventually lead to
a severe reduction or complete eradication of it. This again emphasizes the need for
proper communication between providers, parents, and patients. The second concern
was that the vaccine is fairly new, so that the long term effects are still unknown.
However, now that the vaccine has been available for ten years, it can hardly be called a
new vaccine. If more adolescents receive the vaccine and its safety continues to be
demonstrated, this concern should subside. It should also be emphasized that the vaccine
is not intended to serve as an alternative to safe sex practices, but should be
implemented alongside them. The third concern was that the HPV vaccine gives
adolescents a false sense of security over STIs. This concern can be mitigated if it is
emphasized to adolescents that the vaccine does not protect against a large number of
other STIs, including other very serious ones such as HIV. Studies have shown that a

301

very small subset of girls perceived themselves as overall at less risk for STIs.616 Here
again, proper education of those receiving the vaccine (as was demonstrated with the
smallpox vaccine) is extremely important. The fourth concern was that the vaccine
condones or encourages sexual behavior in teenagers. Several studies suggest that this
concern has, so far, been unwarranted.617 However, it is important for providers to
communicate these data as well as for parents to share them with their children to ensure
that this does not become a cause for concern in the future.
In addition to potentially adding HPV vaccination to the regular vaccine
schedule, other public health initiatives should focus on giving parents and adolescents
the best, most accurate information possible in order to help them reach a decision on
their own. They should also frame the discussion in terms that parents are receptive to
and from sources that parents and adolescents trust. This could mean presenting the
information differently to parents of different regions or socioeconomic and educational
statuses, such as the outreach strategies used in Maine, in which parents were targeted
based on the sources of information they trusted to influence their decisions.

Conclusion

In this Chapter, I have shown how a Foucauldian analysis can be used to
contribute to a debate within healthcare ethics. Through the example of HPV
vaccination, I have shown that vaccination is a strategy of biopower that shapes the field
of possibilities for parents and their children. Thus, the moral depth of the issue is
616
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greater than a debate about whether we should place greater value on individual liberty
or utilitarian concerns. This does not mean that literature weighing the right to liberty
and utilitarian benefits are not useful, but that Foucauldian ethical subjectivity based on
an orientation of refusal, curiosity, and innovation, as well as commitments to care of
self and the philosophical way of life can add something unique to the discussion: a
focus on how subjects are produced through this strategy of power and how this vaccine
contributes to new conceptual frameworks, discourses, and ways of relating to others.
A Foucauldian analysis shows what is at stake in vaccination strategies in
general and in the case of the HPV vaccine in particular. The HPV vaccine and
mechanisms of enforcement are strategies of biopower that affect adolescents, parents,
and the human species as a whole. The traditional model of weighing the potential harm
of the disease against the right to liberty does not produce a satisfactory result because
the disease can be contained through behavior. Traditional arguments focusing on free
loading on the public good of herd immunity or protecting the vulnerable are
insufficient, not only because HPV is controllable through means other than vaccination,
but also because this framing of the debate focuses too narrowly on legislating existing
subjects and not on how subjects are being produced.
The commitments to care of self and the philosophical way of life illuminate
possible responses to this issue that take heed of the fact that identities and relationships
are constantly being shaped by power relations. This means that the strategies we
employ for targeting individuals to receive the HPV vaccine, for talking about HPV
vaccination with parents and adolescents, and for doing outreach about the vaccine must
take into consideration how these strategies are producing a field of possibilities for the
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development of relationships. The process of helping others decide for themselves
should also take into consideration the sources of information that different groups trust
and help frame the risks and benefits of the vaccine by appealing to what is important to
them. When this is the approach taken, HPV vaccination can serve as an affirmation of
life that enables and produces new possibilities and spaces of freedom, rather than a
regulating mechanism that constrains or causes conflict.
To conclude this dissertation, I will review what we have learned from Sartre’s
and Foucault’s views of subjectivity in previous Chapters regarding how social practices
shape our field of possibilities, and how our freedom acts as a negotiation with
constraints in this given field. I will make suggestions for how the ethical subjectivity
models can continue to make contributions to future discussions in ethics, especially
healthcare ethics.
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Conclusion:
I began with the task of illustrating Sartre’s and Foucault’s argument that human
subjectivity is constituted through history, sociality, and materiality. I then used their
later lectures on ethics to construct a model of ethical being in the world, or ethical
subjectivity, that is characterized by critical historical reflection and invention. Lastly, I
showed how their views provide a fruitful analysis of issues in healthcare ethics. I will
conclude by reviewing the key points of each Chapter and making suggestions for the
continued use of Sartrean and Foucauldian views in future conversations in healthcare
ethics and the related field of bioethics.
In Chapter One, I demonstrated the progression and improvement of Sartre’s
views on subjectivity and freedom from Being and Nothingness (BN) to The Critique of
Dialectical Reason, Volume 1 (CDR). I highlighted the key changes in his transition
from the nihilating subject that he portrays in BN to the dialectical, spiraling subject we
find in CDR. I showed that, in CDR, the spiraling subject includes a material bond of
praxis to matter, is mediated by its environment rather than being capable of
transcending it, has a passive dimension to the self, and is alienated from its freedom. I
illustrated the different “layers” of the social and historical conditions, or practico-inert,
that Sartre argues shape our field of possibilities: physical objects imprinted with human
meaning, language, deeply engrained ideas, social institutions, class-being, and
societally specific moral norms. I showed that our freedom operates in response to these
layers, so they both limit and enable our freedom. Contrasting Sartre’s spiraling subject
with Kant’s ahistorical “noumenal self” showed Sartre’s key points of divergence from
the Kantian subject: specifically, the subject in Kantian thought possesses a robust sense
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of autonomy and, for Kant, the key aspects of subjects’ identities are independent of
social, historical, and material influences.
In Chapter Two, I traced Foucault’s vision of subjectivity through his three axes:
the axis of things, the axis of behaviors, and the axis of practices of the self. In
Foucault’s axis of things, we saw that Foucault argues that there are changing historical
standards for truth, or, rules governing speaking and acting that determine what is
accepted as true. In his axis of behavior, I illustrated Foucault’s concept of power,
understood as a complex strategical situation in a society. I used his studies of
disciplinary power and biopower to elucidate how conduct is controlled, observed, and
classified in order to establish different categories of normality and abnormality. My
focus on biopower, or the set of controls that accompanied a new understanding of
human life processes, emphasized an important moment in our recent historical past that
Foucault believes is shaping our subjectivity today. For his third axis, I presented his
historical analysis of care of self and his exploration of the ways that subjects perform
practices on themselves in order to become a certain type of subject. I showed that
freedom in Foucault’s thought, like in Sartre’s, is limited and enabled by social and
historical conditions, and takes the form of resistance and critical reflection. Comparing
Foucault’s views on subjectivity to the views of John Stuart Mill articulated the
uniqueness of Foucault’s view from the classic liberal conception. The example of the
modern War on Drugs in the United States illustrated the key differences between
Foucault and Mill: Mill argues for an inherent human nature grounded on autonomy and
choice, which flourishes through lack of interference, while Foucault rejects a universal
human nature, arguing instead that human nature emerges through the discourses,
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practices, and power strategies of one’s time. Mill’s no-harm-to-others principle could
be a historically specific guideline, but Foucault would caution us to be aware of its
limits.
In Chapter Three, I showed the key differences between Sartre’s and Foucault’s
views on subjectivity: dialectic versus rupture, the degree of freedom granted to human
agency, and their different reasons for rejecting a theory of rights. Through examination
of each thinker’s later lectures on ethics, I developed a model of “ethical subjectivity” in
each thinker. For Sartre, this consists of an ethical orientation that is critically reflective,
actively empathetic, and inventive. This is accompanied by ethical commitments to
mutually recognizing each other’s freedom and to meeting integral human needs. For
Foucault, ethical subjectivity involves an orientation of refusal of inevitabilities, a
critical inquiry into ourselves in our historical moment, and a general orientation
towards transformation. I suggested what Foucauldian commitments of care of self and
the philosophical way of life could mean for us today in our epoch of biopower,
acknowledging that Foucault himself does not explicitly advocate for these
commitments. I argued that care of self requires recognizing the link between ethics and
truth, caring for others alongside ourselves, and helping others have the relevant
information or thought processes to decide for themselves. I argued that the
philosophical way of life requires retaining reflective awareness of how we become
subjects through biopower and mechanisms of security, and a commitment to exposing
new ways of thinking about or approaching the subject-forming practices of our time. I
illustrated that both thinkers advocate for an approach to ethics that includes critical
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historical reflection, the theme of ethics as an ongoing “task,” and a sense of creativity
or invention that requires exercising freedom.
In Chapter Four, I applied the Sartrean views to a current issue in healthcare
ethics: conscience-based refusals. I showed that in the philosophical literature,
conscience-based refusals are generally approached as a conflict between a provider’s
right of conscience and a patient’s right to choose treatment. I used the Sartrean model
to present an alternative analysis. Specifically, I showed that conscience-based refusals
are subject-forming and shape the praxis of patients and providers. I argued that
healthcare should be seen as a form of group praxis aligned with Sartre’s commitments
to mutual freedom and integral human needs. I suggested that Sartrean ethical
subjectivity demands that individual healthcare providers critically reflect on the beliefs
they individually hold. It also requires ongoing collective reflection on the goals of
medicine and the principles of healthcare ethics. I showed that ethical subjectivity
requires that providers attempt to actively empathize with their patients who are in
positions of vulnerability. I argued that they must be willing to potentially break with
their pasts if the critical reflection shows this to be needed. Most often, Sartrean ethical
subjectivity requires that providers perform tasks that are collectively agreed to be
within the bounds of the goals of medicine, the principles of healthcare ethics, and
Sartre’s ethical commitments to the mutual recognition of freedom and integral human
needs. I made recommendations for public policy that included education for providers
and regular reflection and revision on medical codes of ethics. I also recommended that
providers should generally be required to perform procedures that are collectively
determined to be within the bounds of the group praxis, although there should be some
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tolerance for conscience-based refusals regarding highly contentious procedures without
current collective consensus.
In Chapter Five, I analyzed mandatory HPV vaccination and the surrounding
controversy through the Foucauldian framework. I began by showing how mandatory
vaccination is generally approached in the healthcare ethics literature: a conflict between
the individual/parental right to autonomy versus utilitarian concerns for the welfare of
the population. I examined the HPV vaccine as a mechanism of biopower and showed
that its administration is particularly subject-forming because of the link to adolescent
sexuality. I used Foucault’s discussion of the smallpox vaccine to show how historical
disease control introduced a new framework for subjects to think about themselves and
others and affected relationships between various individuals. I demonstrated that the
HPV vaccine shapes the possibilities for youth who are targeted to receive the vaccine
and for their parents who must make the decision whether or not to vaccinate. I argued
that Foucauldian ethical subjectivity requires that we acknowledge how the vaccine has
the potential to shape the categories for normality and abnormality and affect
relationships. Additionally, it requires that providers and public health officials provide
parents and adolescents with the relevant knowledge to decide for themselves. I made
recommendations for public policy that included suggestions for refocusing the public
debate, the option to opt-out if HPV vaccine is added to regular vaccine schedules, and a
targeted outreach campaign that met concerned parents on their own terms.
There are many ways that Sartre’s views on subjectivity, freedom, and ethics can
continue to be developed in conversations in healthcare ethics and the related field of
bioethics. Sartre’s view of subjectivity focuses on how our praxis interacts with the

309

material world, leaves its traces, and comes back full circle to restrict our future
possibilities. His ethical views emphasize a critical historical reflection on ourselves,
active empathy with the vulnerable, the recognition of each other’s freedom, and the
meeting of human needs. Overall, he maintains a robust sense of agency that is always
unconditionally free, but also thoroughly conditioned. Our free praxis is always limited
and influenced by our environment and by others. These views have potential for
application and development in debates that focus on the actions and choices of
individual agents, such as healthcare providers and individual patients.
For example, one area in which Sartre’s views could be useful is in conversations
surrounding models for the patient/physician relationship. There are currently several
competing models in the healthcare ethics literature for a patient/physician relationship
that properly balances honoring patients’ choices with advocating for their well-being.
At stake in these discussions is how physicians should properly use their medical
expertise and knowledge while still respecting patients’ autonomy. Often, what a patient
values is not necessarily in line with living a healthy life. The most commonly
advocated model in the literature is known as the deliberative model. In this model, the
physician makes an attempt to understand patients’ values and what is important for
them, but will criticize those values if the physician thinks they are counterproductive to
leading a healthy life. The physician will use value-laden language to make
recommendations about what the patient should do in order to lead a healthy life.618 In
this model, the provider seeks to both understand the patient’s values and potentially
change those values if they are incompatible with their health. At the same time,
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patients are given full disclosure about all possible treatment options and make the
decision about their care. The deliberative model seeks to avoid paternalism, in which
physicians selectively present information to patients in order to guide them to what the
physician thinks they should do. The deliberative model is also intended to avoid the
other extreme in which physicians simply bend to the patient’s demands and reinforce
unhealthy lifestyle choices without giving advice based on their medical knowledge.
The aim of the deliberative model is not coercion, but for the physician and patient to
“deliberate” the options together and ideally come to a mutual conclusion that is in the
best interest of the patient.
Sartre’s view of a dialectical, spiraling subjectivity could help inform or modify
the deliberative model. Sartre argues that individuals form their identities through a
forward looking project. Considering patients as having “projects” that their healthcare
needs fit into can inform the deliberative model. A Sartrean analysis would explore how
different sources of conditioning influence patients’ values, how subjects perceive of
their own health, and how patients from different backgrounds view different types of
medical care. A Sartrean analysis of subjectivity would look to understand how
influences, such as cultural practices, class-being, seriality, and positions of
vulnerability, shape patients’ projects and influence how they interpret their possibilities
during the medical encounter. The results of such reflection could lead to better
communication and understanding between patient and provider. A physician
understanding the social, cultural, and material influences on a patient’s project could
greatly aid in both understanding that patient’s values and directing the patient down a
path to living a healthier life.
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Another related area in which Sartre’s views have implications is the issue of
informed consent. Obtaining consent from a patient prior to treatment or participation in
research is now considered one of the most important ethical concerns in the practice of
medicine and research. For genuine informed consent, the person must be provided with
all of the relevant information in the appropriate context.619 One of the most highly
debated areas with respect to consent has to do with individuals in positions of
vulnerability. The question at stake is whether vulnerable individuals are actually giving
their full consent for treatment or participation in a study. For example, researchers
have been known to recruit participants for research trials outside of homeless shelters,
where homeless individuals are offered money in exchange for their participation. There
is a debate as to whether the homeless individuals who agree to participate in the study
actually gave their consent or were coerced. In another example, there is controversy
surrounding wealthy couples who recruit surrogates from developing countries and pay
them sums of money to carry their children to term for them. Some ethicists question
whether these surrogates are actually giving consent or feel compelled to do so because
of a lack of other meaningful options.620 Other times, it is necessary to perform medical
research on vulnerable populations, such as those in developing countries, because a
particular disease or condition is isolated to that area. Determining if there has been true
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consent from these individuals can be difficult because of cultural differences, language
barriers, illiteracy, and poverty.621
Sartre’s spiraling subject in CDR, with its key focus on how material
circumstances limit the possibilities for the projects of vulnerable individuals, hold
significance for the debate surrounding consent. Sartre emphasizes how circumstances
such as material scarcity and seriality form a passive dimension of self and can make
choices or thoughts almost “ours” without them fully being ours. In Sartre’s view,
individuals whose possibilities are very limited by practico-inert structures interpret their
possibilities as restricted and determined. Consequently, exploitation and vulnerability
blur the lines of consent. Sartre’s example of the woman who works at the Dop
shampoo factory and the limited material and intellectual tools she had to construct her
project shows that behind many vulnerable people’s choices there is a set of practicoinert constraints. Sartre’s views have relevance for distinguishing between free,
intentional, praxis and those choices made as a result of seriality or alienation. We
could use Sartre’s views on subjectivity to analyze the various conditioning factors that
may go into participants’ decisions to “consent” to treatment or to participate in a study.
A Sartrean analysis would question whether these vulnerable individuals, such as the
homeless or women who agree to be surrogates, were participating in freely chosen
praxis or felt determined or forced by circumstances. A Sartrean ethical response would
attempt to create conditions where individuals could freely choose to participate in a
project as praxis, rather than feeling determined or forced by the practico-inert.
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Foucault’s views on subjectivity, freedom, and ethics also have many
possibilities for contemporary application. Foucault’s views are useful for showing
what is at stake in any practice related to disease control or with respect to any healthrelated mechanisms in which behavior or bodies are being controlled or altered and
norms are being established. Foucault’s thought has implications for fields such as
neuroethics, pregnancy and childbirth, aged care, and disability ethics.
For example, neuroethics is an emerging field of bioethics related to new brain
imaging technology. Brain imaging technology is now commonly used in both research
and medical practice, and it raises issues concerning mental privacy, diagnostics, and
predicting behavior. This new brain imaging technology allows us to observe the human
mind in new ways. Eventually, we will likely be able to identify brain states that
correspond to a patient’s every thought. As this technology continues to progress,
providers will be able to isolate “normal” brain images or brain images that correspond
to certain desirable thought processes. These increasing opportunities for identifying
exactly how our neuro-processes work will inevitably introduce new categories for
normality and change how we conceive of “mental health” and “normal brain states.”622
The question that will arise is whether there should be medical or behavioral
interventions for individuals who display brain images that are deemed abnormal or
unhealthy. Interventions could be aimed at changing both bodies and behaviors in order
to bring the brain images in line with “normal” brain states. An ability to closely map
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how our physical processes correlate with the behavior, moods, emotions, and choices
could lead to a categorization of our every thought as normal or abnormal.623
A Foucauldian approach to this issue would pay close attention to how new
concepts are emerging for understanding how our brain processes work and how this
will affect how subjects understand themselves or others as normal or abnormal. It
would also be concerned with whether or not brain imaging is too narrowly confining
the types of subjects we can be or the kinds of relationships we can establish with one
another. The Foucauldian ethical subjectivity would focus on helping people have the
relevant knowledge to make a decision about how to respond to this new technology and
the new body of knowledge and truth that will emerge alongside it.
Another area of debate within contemporary medical ethics where Foucault’s
views would be useful concern practices related to pregnancy, labor, and childbirth. In
our epoch of biopower, scientific studies of the progression of pregnancy have
introduced a “normal” amount of time a pregnancy is allowed to progress beyond its due
date before healthcare providers will suggest using artificial hormones to induce labor.
A new understanding of optimal averages for labor progression has also led to a
“normal” amount of labor time before providers will recommend a cesarean delivery.
This has become an area of heated debate within the ethics of childbirth and delivery:
opponents of such measures argue that while an average or “optimal” delivery date can
be isolated, all women’s bodies work differently and providers are too quick to use
artificial measures to induce pregnancy. Additionally, opponents argue that cesarean
delivery rates are far too high and many could be prevented if the providers led the labor
623
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progress naturally. Their argument is that the identification of an “optimal” or “ideal”
delivery date or labor time excludes far too many women from the category of
“normality” and leads to unnecessary medical interventions in the process of labor and
delivery. Proponents of these measures argue that these medical interventions, even if
some times unnecessary, prevent health problems that can occur in infants and women
when pregnancies are carried past their due date or prevent complications during
delivery that occasionally result in fetal or maternal death.624
A Foucauldian approach to this debate would focus on how the optimal medical
norm now shapes the experiences of subjects. For example, some women have
expressed regret in retrospect and communicated that they viewed their birthing
experiences as less than ideal because the “abnormal” progression of labor or delivery
resulted in medical intervention. Others communicated pressure from providers for
artificial induction or cesarean delivery that they later felt were unnecessary. Some
indicated that these experiences changed the feelings they had toward their infants or to
their partners in early months.625 Confining birthing experiences into tightly defined
categories of “normal” and “abnormal” have effects on the concepts women use to
categorize their birthing experiences. As I have emphasized, Foucault would not
necessarily take a stand for or against the use (or perceived overuse) of artificial
induction or cesarean delivery, but would caution us to remember that everything has the
potential to be dangerous. All newly discovered knowledge and accompanying norms
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create new experiences for subjects. His thought reminds us to question the inherent
necessity of our practices and consider whether there are new ways to respond to the
practice.
What I have outlined here are just a few ways that Sartrean and Foucauldian
thought could continue to be developed in contemporary discussions in healthcare
ethics. The views that I have outlined in this dissertation also have implications for other
areas of ethics, political philosophy, and law. Sartre argues that all of our free praxis
inevitably has effects that outlive or go beyond our original intentions, often coming
around full circle to restrict our possibilities. This means that we could apply his
dialectical model of subjectivity to analyze the unintended effects of any new practice
and how it will influence the practico-inert field of possibilities. Foucault’s views, too,
have application outside the domain of healthcare. One example we saw was the War
on Drugs. Processes of normalization are also operative in all educational settings, from
preschools to universities, or any setting where optimal levels are established and
subsequent methods of evaluation are introduced. We can also use a Foucauldian lens to
evaluate the effects of any norm introduced at the level of populations.
Sartre and Foucault, each in his own way, challenge some of traditional ethical
philosophy’s deepest assumptions about human subjectivity. Both also present unique
views on ethics that introduce a mode of being for an engaged historical agent. While
the views derived from their ethical writings may not constitute a complete ethical
theory to approach contemporary moral problems, the inclusion of their voices in the
ongoing conversation can add depth and unique perspective to conversations about
contentious ethical and social practices of our time.
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